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
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
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SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY POSTURE.

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Conduct of War.
Strategic Operations.
Nuclear-Conventional
Balance.
Capabilities Derived from
the Doctrine.
Soviet Preparation for War.
Soviet Mobilization Plans.
Types of Mobilization.
Mobilization of Manpower.
Mobilization of Materiel.
Preparation of the
Population.
Preinduction Military Training.
DOSAAF.
Paramilitary Training.
In-Service Training.
Post-Service Training.

Soviet Strategic Leadership.
Defense Leadership Bodies.
Leadership of the Country's Defense.
Leadership of the Armed Forces.
Defense Committee (1937-1941).
State Defense Committee (GKO).
The Stavka.
The Defense Council.
The Main Military Council.
Administrative Leadership.
Operational Leadership.
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Strategic Utilization of the Branches
of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Branches' Organization.
Branches' Doctrine.
Branches' Operations.
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Block 20, continued:

capability to respond to various levels of threats, while maintaining its self-proclaimed roles as the "pillar of world peace" and the leader of the world socialist revolutionary movement. It is based on the image and conduct of future war and the threat this poses to Soviet national security; it is not based on the political utility of war, or the initiation of war as an instrument of policy. ↗

SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY POSTURE

by

Philip P. Scianna

B.S., Saint Peter's College, 1970

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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in

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Scope

Ever since the October Revolution in 1917, the Soviet leaders have been faced with a number of circumstances which posed a threat--real or perceived--to the existence and continuity of their new social and political system. As such, there has been a constant effort to formulate a strategic doctrine from which the Soviets could structure an effective military posture to satisfy two independent, but closely related requirements. First and foremost, the Soviets wanted to insure the security of their political system, the nation, and the party--all three as components of the rubric "national interests." Additionally, the Soviets realized that the requirements of Marxist-Leninist ideology for advancing the historical process of the world to socialism placed an external burden on the shoulders of the political leadership. Trotskyite notions of "world revolution" were resolutely condemned as being dangerous to both the national interests and the ideological interests. Therefore, it became necessary for the Soviets to formulate a viable strategic doctrine--those principles and precepts governing the employment and structure of military power and policy--which would meet the essential requirements of national interests and the ideology, without seriously endangering one for the other.

The thesis of this work is that Soviet strategic doctrine, as it was transformed during the Brezhnev regime, has brought about a military posture which provides not only a credible deterrent value, but

also an effective defensive value. It attempts to strike a balance between deterrence and actual war performance value without an over-reliance on one or the other. The former supports the foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, while the latter, in conjunction with peaceful coexistence, provides for the security of national interests. Soviet strategic doctrine gives the Soviet Union the capability to respond to various levels of threats, while maintaining its self-proclaimed roles as the "pillar of world peace" and the leader of the world socialist revolutionary movement. It is based on the Soviet image and conduct of future war and the threat this poses to Soviet national security; it is not based on the political utility of war, or the initiation of war as an instrument of policy.

In arriving at these conclusions, various approaches have been employed to analyze the various inherent components of strategic doctrine in order to bring about as total a picture as possible. These approaches include: historical, elite-interest group, bureaucratic, analytical, and political culture. This is not to give the impression that this work considers every question dealing with Soviet strategic doctrine, but instead, those which have brought about its development to meet the two principal needs of the Soviet Union--national interests and ideological leadership. Personality conflicts, for example, were not brought into play, as the extent of these went beyond the fundamental scope and intent of this work.

This work is divided into six chapters. Chapter I addresses the evolution of Soviet strategic doctrine as was formulated before the leadership of Khrushchev, and developed under his leadership between

1957 and 1964, and considers such questions as (1) why Khrushchev reversed the long-held communist dogma that war was inevitable into one of peaceful coexistence; and (2) how the Soviets viewed a future world war during the early 1960s, with particular emphasis on the issue--and dilemma--of long war versus short war. Chapter II shows the reconstruction of Soviet strategic doctrine under Brezhnev to include (1) why the doctrine which developed under Khrushchev was inadequate, and the final decision to enhance Soviet capabilities to parity with the United States; (2) what the new attitudes were regarding the inevitability and future of war, its political utility, causes, conditions, types, and conduct; and (3) how the strategic doctrine was translated into capabilities since 1966.

Chapter III describes how the Soviets prepare for war through their mobilization plans for manpower and materiel, as well as the system of universal military training--pre-induction, in-service, and post-service--to include the themes of the political messages during the periods of training. Chapter IV shows the preparatory measures taken to institutionalize bodies for the leadership of the country and the leadership of the armed forces in time of war. Chapter V describes how the precepts of Soviet strategic doctrine have been manifested in the strategic utilization of the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces through the roles and structure of each branch coming into line with Soviet views on the types of wars, conduct of war, nuclear-conventional balance, and joint operations. Chapter VI presents a summary of the principal tenets of Soviet strategic doctrine and the conclusions derived therefrom.

Before embarking upon the principal course of this work, it is necessary to consider some of the basic precepts concerning the two needs which Soviet strategic doctrine attempts to fulfill--national security interests and ideological leadership. These precepts are discussed with respect to the basic factors of Soviet military policy, and the role of the ideology with regard to risk-taking and objectives.

Basic Factors of Soviet Military Policy

There are four main factors which form the basis of Soviet military policy: (1) the size and geographical position of the Soviet Union; (2) the force of Russian national tradition; (3) the nature of the political system by which the Soviet Union is ruled, with its dual character as the state leadership in the Soviet Union and as claimant to the leadership of the world communist movement; and (4) the fact that the Soviet Union's rise to superpower status coincided with the development of military-nuclear technology and the expansion of capabilities for long-range warfare and politico-military activities.¹ To these factors should be added an economic one, that, as a basic principle, military spending has enjoyed a position of great privilege in the allocation of resources in materials and manpower.

The first two "traditional" factors have dictated the way in which Soviet defense and military policy has been tackled. There has always been a drive in Russia towards securing safe frontiers, towards the creation of buffer zones beyond these frontiers, and toward using intimidation and the threat of force to influence events beyond even that area. In the event of the invasion of Russia, time to mobilize

has been bought by space. The solution dictated by tradition has been to use mass manpower to guard the country's long and vulnerable frontiers, or to intimidate neighboring countries. This has bred in the Soviets a confidence in the ability of numerical superiority to solve military problems on its own, and a conviction of the need to over-insure by the use of numbers while proceeding step by step with great caution.² To some extent, this confidence in numbers has also been behind the traditions of Russian sea and air power: hence, their early tendency to build very large numbers of ships, submarines, aircraft, and missiles. Indeed, there is strong support in the Soviet Union for the rather simple concept that, within certain limits, the more military power the country has the better--the tendency to think quantitatively in military matters.

The third of these basic factors--the influence of the ideology--means that these same Soviet leaders, whose military thinking is so deeply rooted in Russian tradition, are also motivated by a sense of political and historical mission. In addition to its national claims, such a leadership tends to believe that it is more right on political grounds to be present, to spread its influence, or to intervene in situations all over the world.³ It tends to believe that history is on its side, and that it is the right and duty of the Soviet Union to be active on the side of history and help history along--even if only by low-risk policies like subversion and propaganda. The part played by ideology, therefore, in formulating military policy, is not so much connected with the desire to impose specific communist institutions, political or economic, on the outside world; it lies in the

conviction which it gives the Soviet leadership of its political right and duty to spread its influence, to have its say, and to interfere or intervene in whatever way it can.

The fourth factor--the nuclear age and the expansion of long-range warfare capabilities--of course, affects military policy in a more direct form than the traditional and ideological. To some extent, the nuclear age came upon the Soviet Union unfairly; victory in World War II had, for the first time, enabled the Soviets to solve their traditional land-air problem, particularly in Europe, by drawing their own frontiers and setting up buffer zones beyond them, and just when this was within their grasp, they were faced with an entirely new threat: that of strategic air warfare against the interior of the country with atomic weapons. The development of so much of Soviet military policy since then has involved a continuous search not only for answers to the question: how can nuclear weapons and long-range warfare best contribute to the defensive and offensive requirements of Soviet military policy and how can the Soviet Union reach parity with the United States; but also the question: what can military nuclear capabilities do and not do in the general policy of the furtherance of Soviet political aims?⁴

The Ideology, Risk-Taking, and Objectives

Does the communist ideology determine Soviet policy? If so, does it require the Soviet leaders to launch military attack upon the capitalist world as soon as some given level of relative military power is achieved? The answer to the first question may be in dispute,

although there are at least presupposition and influences of the ideology which distinguish Soviet foreign policy from that of a state merely seeking to increase power. Paradoxically, the answer to the other question can be given definitely: the ideology does not require initiation of a war at any point.⁵ Whether or not the ideology determines Soviet policy, the prevailing balance of power--which is predominantly defined by the nuclear striking power of the United States and the Soviet Union--makes mandatory a most cautious calculation of risks and costs in any contemplated strategy. This being so, one cannot properly conclude that the communist ideology "requires" the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear war to gain control of the world.⁶ Although Bolshevik ideology and Soviet history bear witness to the fact that the Soviet Union drives for a unified world order, it is nonetheless true that, again, both the ideology and practice of communism require that this drive be carefully calculated in terms of costs and opportunities.⁷ There may indeed be errors, as in the cases of the initial calculation to open the Finnish "Winter War" in November 1939, and the Korean War in June 1950; but no rational communist leaders of the Soviet Union could ignore the terrible risks in an all-out military campaign against the United States. This is not to argue that the Soviet Union will never attack the West. In such a case, the war will not be initiated as a consequence of a "requirement" of the ideology, but as a miscalculation on the feasibility of gaining from such a move.⁸ In fact, the ideology not only does not require taking the great risks inevitable to launching a world war in the nuclear era; it opposes very strongly any measure

smacking of "adventurism" or taking inadmissible risks. Soviet policy, whether in spite of or because of its ideological overtones, is predominately based upon the calculation of power.⁹

The paramount objective of any state is survival. No gain is meaningfully possible without self-preservation, and to carry this axiom one step further: no gain by attack is possible unless it exceeds the losses incurred in consequence of the attack. The primary Soviet objective, like that of the United States, is survival.¹⁰

Thus, a cardinal Soviet objective is to deter the United States from launching a war. While the United States may be certain that it would never attack the Soviet Union, the Soviets are not so assured. It is often impossible to distinguish vituperous Soviet propaganda from indications of real Soviet fear of an attack, but is apparent that the Soviet concern is real. In particular, while not necessarily expecting the United States to attack, they may fear that the United States may not be deterred when "rationally" it should be.¹¹ This may be reflected in the Soviet statements which assert that the possession by both sides of powerful nuclear arsenals is no guarantee of peace.¹²

The cardinal objective of expanding power is dominant in Soviet political strategy, except insofar as it is restricted by the prescriptions of the primary objective, survival. The fundamental Soviet objectives which determine political and military strategies may be concisely summarized in one: advance the power of the Soviet Union in whatever ways are most expedient so long as the survival of the Soviet power itself is not endangered.¹³

World communism is the ultimate goal of the Soviet leaders, in the sense of their aspiration. This aspiration feeds and clothes a striving for power, even though it is based on expectation derived from the Marxist-Leninist view of history. Nonetheless, while seeking to expand their influence beyond the communist world, and to maintain their authority within it, the Soviet leaders give primary attention to the security of the Soviet state. Moreover, they do have goals of internal development and progress not exclusively directed toward amassing power in the world. The Soviet leaders attempt to advance the power of the USSR in whatever ways seem most expedient, as long as Soviet survival is not endangered.

The Soviet leaders recognize full well that general war in the foreseeable future would certainly not be in their interest. However, "peaceful coexistence," by their definition, means a vigorous policy of expanding their influence and power by any expedient short of war. They seek opportunities to exploit counterdeterrence, i.e., the neutralization of the US deterrent in certain local challenges when they consider the risks to be low, especially in cases where aggression can be indirect.

Notes

¹Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Military Policy, 72-73," Seventh Soviet Affairs Symposium: The Soviet Union in 1972-1973 (Garmisch, FRG: US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 1973), p. 3.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958; reprint ed., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974), p. 4.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Raymond L. Garthoff, "Ideological Conceptions in Soviet Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, vol. 2, no. 5 (1953), pp. 1-8.

⁸Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 5.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Radio Moscow's broadcast of Marshal Zhukov, 19 April 1957, and Pravda, 13 February 1955, cited by Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 5.

¹³Ibid.

CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE:

1957-1964

In forming their strategic doctrine, the Soviets have undergone a series of significant changes which passed from a period of stagnation under Stalin into an era of dynamic reorganization under Khrushchev. In each case, the Soviets attempted to construct a strategic posture based on their perceived needs and derived from their view of a future war. Beginning with the basic factors of Soviet military policy and Lenin's views on war, the Soviets developed their strategic doctrine between 1940 and 1953 along the lines of conventional superiority over the West to fight a war similar to that of World War II. The death of Stalin ended the period of stagnation just as the Soviets were making significant advances in the wake of the nuclear era. This resulted in a new image of war by 1955, which developed a strategic doctrine calling for a war-winning strategy through the use of strategic nuclear weapons and superior conventional forces.

Soviet views on the inevitability and likelihood of war were also modified with the advent of the nuclear age. Where formerly, war with the West was inevitable, Khrushchev reversed this long-held communist dogma. The dominant thesis in Soviet military thought now maintained that since the vast destructiveness of nuclear warfare prevented distinction between the victor and the vanquished, war was not inevitable,

but indeed, preventable. This brought about a new Soviet image of future war between 1957 and 1964 which coincided with Khrushchev's formula of deterrence and peaceful coexistence, and resulted in providing means which were inadequate to bring about a war-winning strategy should deterrence fail.

This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) Historical Background; (2) The Inevitability and Likelihood of War: 1955-1964; and (3) The Soviet Image of Future War: 1957-1964.

Historical Background

Lenin On War

One of the earliest precepts of the Bolsheviks following the Revolution was on the inevitability of war between capitalism and socialism.¹ It was based on the assumption that imperialism would not allow itself to be swept away by the ultimate tide of the historical process to socialism. Lenin had stated:

The force of the revolution, the force of the impact, the energy, the decisiveness and triumph of its victory at the same time heighten the force of resistance by the bourgeoisie. The greater our victory, the greater the extent to which the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and shift to more resolute attacks.²

As such, the capitalist world was perceived to be in a state of constant preparation for total war with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist bloc.³

Lenin noted two factors which occupied a particularly important position among the array of factors opposing bourgeois adventurism. These were, first of all, the growth of world socialism in general and a strengthening of its influence on international politics; the second factor was ". . . the increasing influence on the military strength

possessed by world socialism on world development for the benefit of the root interests and aspirations of peoples."⁴ Lenin saw no hope for talks, arguments, appeals, or imprecations to stop the enemy if he were not faced by substantial military force, a strong army, and preparedness by the entire nation to fight. He repeated the statement by Engels that for the revolution, it was essential to maintain supremacy ". . . by means of that fear instilled in the reactionaries by the arms of the revolution."⁵

All these, when combined with Lenin's stress on the Clausewitzian dictum that "war is a continuation of politics," led the Stalin regime to conclude that war with the West was inevitable. However, the intent of Lenin was not to imply that war was inevitable, but that if war should occur, it would pursue those policies which were manifested just prior to the outbreak of the war. War continued the policy of the belligerents; war was not necessarily an instrument or tool for policy implementation.

The "inevitability of war theme" was used quite effectively by the Soviet leaders to portray and lend credence to the state of constant emergency, which in turn, supported such national drives as collectivization and industrialization during the 1930s, the Great Patriotic War,⁶ and the diplomatic confrontations of the Cold War. It was derived from the a priori rejection of the feasibility of having two opposing social systems exist in the world.

The Evolution of Soviet Strategic Doctrine:
1940-1955

The strategic position of the Soviet Union which emerged from the

settlements of World War II was profoundly changed. The location of the new center of potentially opposing power across the sea had created for the Soviets new strategic requirements for intercontinental offensive and defensive capabilities, and doctrine to govern their employment. The major weapon of intercontinental warfare was air power, with the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) soon to assume that role.⁷

In 1940, on the eve of World War II, Soviet military doctrine had, after two decades of subsiding ferment, settled down into a basically determined conception. They accepted the view that the ground forces, and in particular, the infantry, were the element of military power which determined victory in a war. Sea and air power were explicitly designated to assist and support the ground forces in all their operations.⁸ The major potential enemy, Germany, was organized along similar lines and, most important, could be defeated by combined-arms forces focused on support to the ground forces.

In 1945, the same basic doctrine, modified in particulars, was on the whole even more firmly established by the experience of the war and wartime development; but the strategic situation was drastically altered. The elimination of the former German and Japanese military power created a vacuum which the Soviets sought to fill. The dominating aspect of the area in 1945 was, however, the location of the new major source of opposing power in North America. The United States was clearly unassailable by the weapons systems which the Soviets had previously developed and then employed in World War II.⁹ The strategic requirement to annihilate or to neutralize a power beyond the reach of the Soviet infantry, tanks, artillery, and tactical air forces was completely unprecedented in

Soviet experience. It is well to recall that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, has never engaged in a war thousands of miles from their home base, across the sea.

In 1950, the strategic situation was very much the same, save that new opportunities were just appearing to the Soviet leadership. Mastery of the production of the atomic weapon and the introduction of tactical jet aircraft promised an important increase in Soviet capability.¹⁰ The ground forces had been substantially modernized for conventional warfare, but the basic need for intercontinental air and sea power was unfilled. Perhaps equally important, the basic doctrinal need had not been met. In all its essentials, Soviet military doctrine remained very much the same in 1950 as it had been in 1940.¹¹ Efforts at innovation and originality in Soviet military thinking had appeared in the period from late 1945 to early 1947, but they were cut short by a new wave of internal censorship and "freezing" of thought. Whether as additional cause or as a consequence of the intellectual autarchy born of the ban on discussion of new weapons and foreign military conceptions, "Stalinist" doctrine became, in fact, stagnant.¹²

The geographical-political contours in 1955 were, on the whole, similar to those of 1945. The major changes had been the accretion of Eastern Europe and China to the Soviet bloc on the one hand, and the creation of NATO, Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian alliances, and the integration of West Germany and Japan into the Western camp, on the other hand.¹³ However, the military significance of the geographical area had changed. First, there was the emerging approach of nuclear parity between the two blocs, which meant the reciprocal ability to

deal mutually incapacitating blows regardless of who struck first. This, in turn, was largely the product of the developing nuclear weapons, long-range jet bombers, and long-range missiles in both blocs.¹⁴ This led Malenkov to conclude, by 1955, that nuclear war would not necessarily be initiated by a nuclear strike from the West aimed at eliminating communism, for this would result in mutual destruction; he therefore saw the cold war as the potential prelude to the end of civilization.¹⁵

Another important development was the end of the "period of Stalinist stagnation," which had stifled military thought from 1947 to 1953. To be sure, the legacy of this era is not yet entirely erased, but the death of Stalin had permitted a renaissance of military thought, and revisions in the doctrine inherited from the prewar period and ingrained during the war.¹⁶ By 1955, in other words, not only had the means of intercontinental warfare developed significantly, but also the way was opened to a clearer understanding of the intermediate objectives required by the postwar changes in the geostrategic arena.

The Soviet Image of War: 1955

By 1955, under the leadership of Malenkov, there had emerged a definite and new Soviet image of a future total war. While surprise attack had attained much increased importance and attention with modern weapons, the Soviets suggested that such an attack did not permit a quick victory.¹⁷ The initial strategic strikes by bombers would wreak devastation upon the United States and the Soviet Union,

and upon their allies; however, mutual destruction did not spell mutual defeat. The priority of strikes would destroy the enemy's strategic air and missile bases insofar as these are known. Major cities and industrial centers, on a lower level of priority, would also suffer heavily. Radiological and bacteriological weapons might be used.¹⁸ This enormous mutual destruction would probably consume the major portion of the respective long-range air and missile forces. Thus, the efforts of these forces would, in a sense, cancel each other out. This would be a crucial phase of the war, one which a weak or ill-prepared power could lose; but it would not be the decisive stage of the war between well-prepared major powers, and would not determine the final outcome between them.¹⁹

Tactical air power and rockets, those forces designated to attack the enemy's military forces up to 1,000 miles from the starting borders, would similarly engage in mutual nuclear strikes; but here, the Soviets did not see a mutual stalemate. The heart of such a capability would be the ground forces--trained for nuclear war, armed with nuclear weapons--and here the war would begin with a serious imbalance: a preponderance of Soviet forces.²⁰ Moreover, in the Soviet view, their mobilization and dispatch of ground forces would be much less critically disrupted than would that of the United States by nuclear exchange, due to their larger forces-in-being and to its deployment status. The surviving Soviet land armies would thus be expected to be capable of defeating the proportionately weakened enemy forces on the ground. Thus, the Soviets would strive to achieve at least a favorable "draw" by occupying the Eurasian continent, and exploiting such resources as

might still be available to restore some of the Soviet Union's losses.²¹ The shrunken and devastated West would be entirely relegated to the Western Hemisphere.

In the major theater, Central-Western Europe, the Soviets would expect to defeat the NATO forces and to occupy the territory at least to the Channel and to the Pyrenees. Soviet intermediate and long-range air and missile forces would not only strive to knock out SAC and British Bomber Command strength in the United Kingdom, Spain, North Africa, and Turkey, but also effectively to interdict (with submarine action) any supply of men and materiel from the United States.²²

In the Middle East and the Far East, those countries allied with the West would be seized by exploiting local Soviet and Chinese superiorities in a situation where the mutual strategic exchange would have denied the United States the ability to bring in sufficient additional strength to prevent their advance.²³ The "neutrals" would be left, at least for a time, on sufferance; local communists would probably ride to power on the swell of victory.

This picture may seem to offer the Soviets more advantage than the West would concede to them. It did not mean that the Soviets were so certain of success, or so callous of costs, that they would have favored launching a total war; however, it does show the Soviet blueprint for "winning" a total war if circumstances would have led them to strike or respond to a strike during the mid-1950s.²⁴

The Inevitability and Likelihood of War:
1955-1964

In February 1955, after Malenkov's defeat, the authoritative party

journal, Kommunist, argued that emphasis on the mutually destructive consequences of nuclear war played into the hands of the imperialists; it created the false impression that, ". . . the atomic threat is such that the instigators of war will not dare to use their own bombs, since they will not decide to commit suicide."²⁵ Such a concept, the journal said, blunts the vigilance of the people toward those, ". . . who in the preparation of nuclear warfare would like to take the people by surprise."²⁶

Malenkov's opponents charged him with propagating two harmful opinions about the political consequences of nuclear weapons--opinions which superficially seem contradictory, but really are not. First, they charged Malenkov with false confidence that nuclear war would not be initiated by an "imperialist" surprise attack aimed at wiping out communism. Second, they objected to this stated belief that a continuation of the cold war was likely to ensue in a nuclear war that would destroy civilization.²⁷ Distinctive foreign and defense policies followed from these views as expressed by Malenkov: maintain a small deterrent nuclear force while seeking to end the cold war and firmly consolidate peace.

In the first major foreign policy statement by the Bulganin government after the ouster of Malenkov, Foreign Minister Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union had not only caught up with the United States in the field of nuclear weapons, but even surpassed it. Moreover, he directly contradicted Malenkov's previous statement that, ". . . world civilization would perish in a new world war," by saying that this would be the fate only of the capitalists.²⁸

Soviet confidence, as expressed by Khrushchev, that the West would not attack the Soviet Union unless strongly provoked was reflected in two new important doctrines. First, world war was not "fatally inevitable." According to Khrushchev,

In contemporary conditions, the prospect is opened of achieving peaceful coexistence for the entire period in the course of which the social and political problems that now divide the world must be solved.²⁹

Second, the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union was final. In sum, the assessment of Malenkov was based upon mutual destruction, that of Molotov upon Soviet superiority, and that of Khrushchev upon peaceful coexistence. The first two addressed the outcome of a war, while Khrushchev addressed the inevitability of a war and the potential means of preventing it.

What were the grounds of this confidence that the Soviet Union was secure despite the US preponderance of nuclear power? In good measure, it was based on experience. For many years, the United States had been in a position to destroy the Soviet Union with relative impunity, but had not done so. By 1953, the United States had acquired an operational capability to destroy the Soviet Union, but clearly did not intend to employ it except in a situation of great peril. The Eisenhower Administration's doctrine of massive retaliation, while it clearly worried Khrushchev when first promulgated in 1954, was, in time, recognized to portend no basic change in the US strategy of containment.³⁰ By the middle or late 1950s, when the Soviet leaders took the decision to program a small ICBM force, they had had time to observe that the mere existence of the US strategic force was no threat to

Soviet security. Moreover, despite Soviet propaganda against "the imperialist warmongers," they had also come to the realization that the American leadership was not bellicose. This recognition was acknowledged only in a backhanded fashion by Soviet assertions that the US leaders, prompted by sober realism, not good will, were effectively deterred from initiating nuclear war by fear of Soviet strategic power.³¹ In fact, the Soviet leaders did not think it essential to produce a large strategic power because in their eyes the inhibitions of the American leadership provided a sufficiently reliable deterrent.

The Geneva summit conference of July 1955 almost certainly marked a turning point in Khrushchev's strategic thinking. His face-to-face meeting with the leaders of the West reassured him that they were not fundamentally bellicose, and the warm enthusiasm for the summit meeting throughout the non-communist world probably added to Khrushchev's confidence that, when necessary, he could quickly change the international atmosphere and relax tensions by offering the West small concessions or even merely hinting that he might be prepared to do so. A year later, the failure of the United States to intervene in Hungary was probably taken by the Soviet leaders as decisive confirmation that the West meant to employ its strategic preponderance defensively and would not make it the basis for far-reaching political or military offensives against the Soviet Union.³²

The advent of nuclear weapons convinced the Soviet leaders that they must avoid actions which appreciably raised the risk of war. This conviction played a part in the decision to program only a relatively small ICBM force for the early 1960s. Not only were the

Soviet leaders convinced that the United States would not initiate nuclear war without cause, but they had also resolved not to give cause.³³ The decision to acquire a relatively small ICBM force, in turn, heightened the Soviet sense of a need for caution, since it meant that the Soviet Union would remain markedly inferior in strategic intercontinental power for years to come. This meant that US fears of a Soviet surprise attack or a preemptive attack were unfounded, and that if events seemed to be moving toward a sharp confrontation, the Soviet Union had no recourse but to back down before the risk of general war became serious.

The disagreement between the Soviet Union and China on cold war strategy has stemmed in good measure from a disagreement as to how much pressure can be exerted by communist initiatives and retaliatory actions without unduly increasing the risk of nuclear war. In this open polemic, Soviet leaders have argued that the danger of a general nuclear war is relatively small, or at least controllable; moreover, so long as communist policy does not become more aggressive, the risk will remain small.³⁴ Highly provocative communist actions, such as those demanded by China, however, would seriously increase the likelihood of war.

The general Soviet line, consonant with efforts to cultivate an atmosphere of detente in East-West relations, is that the danger of war has abated somewhat, thanks largely to respect in the imperialist camp for Soviet military strength.³⁵ It can be argued that if the Soviet political leadership had consistently entertained a really high expectation of war, it would probably have sanctioned considerably larger ICBM construction-budgets and programs during the early 1960s

than appeared to have been the case.³⁶

The Chinese Communists have accused the Soviet leaders of having ceased to be revolutionaries because of fear of nuclear war. The Soviet leaders acknowledge that fear of nuclear war has affected their choice of means for further revolution. An article in World Marxist Review stated:

Prevention of nuclear war has become a preconsideration for carrying out the world socialist revolution in a way that would not jeopardize civilization. . . .³⁷

They say that the revolutionary process will proceed by its own momentum, assisted by prudent Soviet support; but they argue that provocative support for revolution by the Soviet Union would risk nuclear war.³⁸

Political spokesmen, looking for fresh ammunition in the polemics with Peking, have chosen to stress the irrationality of war in contrast to the virtues of peaceful coexistence.³⁹ The military, on the other hand, professionally concerned with how to wage wars successfully if they should occur, are naturally disposed to assume that some useful purpose is served by their efforts to ensure victory in any future war; an attack on Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics is, in fact, an attack upon the very basis of their profession and its contribution to the nation's life. However, in view of the political commitment to peaceful coexistence, Marshal Sergei Biriuzov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff in 1963, stated:

Nuclear war, like any war, is also an instrument of policy, but of a rash, senseless policy, because its utterly devastating character cannot guarantee to aggressive circles the achievement of their reactionary goals. Mankind faces a dilemma: either to avoid a new world war or to find itself in a position whose consequences are difficult to foresee in full.⁴⁰

The Soviet military have also seized upon the argument, as Marshal Biriuzov's statement on the senselessness of war suggests, that if the military man's raison d'etre can no longer be found in waging and winning wars, it can rest on the function of preventing them.

An examination of the respective roles of ideology and power politics in Soviet policy-making demonstrates that there is, in general, no divergence or discrepancy between them. Both the communist ideology and power politics considerations place the criteria of calculated risk, cost, and gain at the foundation of any strategic initiative. Communist doctrine certainly does inject unusually intense hostility into Soviet policy-making and gives rise to expansionist aims and unlimited goals in Soviet policy, but Marxism-Leninism does not blindly propel the Soviet Union toward war or the witting assumption of great risks.⁴¹ Why should the Soviet leaders, confident that they are moving with the sweep of history, court disaster by a premature gamble?

The risks and consequences of a global nuclear war are recognized by Soviet leaders, who consequently strive to avoid any "adventurist" gamble. The importance in Soviet policy of the overall balance of power, the "relations of forces in the world arena," as they call it, militates against a preoccupation with purely military solutions. The Soviet leaders would not be prone to unleash the terrible might of their--and therefore, our--military power on the basis of theoretical probability of military victory.

Thus, nuclear war is an even less likely rational tool for the Soviet Union to utilize in order to advance its position. Nonetheless, an irrational decision cannot be totally ruled out. More dangerous is

the chance of a "war by miscalculation." There are a number of ways in which an unintended general nuclear war could be precipitated: (1) escalation from local hostilities; (2) warranted or perceived fear of a surprise attack resulting in a preemptive strike; and (3) the danger of military escalation following an escalation of political prestige in a critical confrontation.⁴² While general nuclear war remains a possibility, it is highly improbable that it will be used in an attempt to advance Soviet power. The danger lies not so much in a possible Soviet decision that the time is ripe to strike as in a possible misjudgment that the time is ripe to push.

In one very significant respect, the post-Stalin leaders have returned to early Leninism and its reliance on the forces of internal revolution as the means to the eventual victory of communism in the world. Because war in the nuclear age has become utterly inexpedient as an instrument of extending either Soviet control or communist rule, it has been relegated to a reserve position as the ultimate defensive recourse of the Soviet state. Soviet expectations, in turn, are becoming identified with indigenous revolution or even peaceful transition to communist rule, with peoples being influenced by the powerful example of a productive and successful Soviet society.

The Soviet Image of Future War: 1957-1964

Causes and Features

With regard to the circumstances of war outbreak, the favored Soviet view was that a future war would begin with a surprise nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union during a period of crisis.⁴³ Escalation

from a local war was another possibility in Soviet opinion, as was war by miscalculation or accident.⁴⁴ Soviet literature is quite hazy on the expected train of developments at the immediate outset of the war, although it recognized that a war begun by surprise attack and one arising from the escalation of a local conflict had widely different implications. The questions of warning and preemption also serve to cloud the picture at this point.

On the matter of warning, Soviet views were divided. During the latter 1950s, the prevailing view was that since war would be likely to come after a period of crisis, the Soviet Union should receive sufficient strategic warning to make preparations to deal with an attack.⁴⁵ However, during the early 1960s, the validity of this assumption was questioned, and there was at least one school of thought that an aggressor might try to mount an attack from the blue with no advance prior crisis, which--given the constant high state of readiness of strategic delivery forces--might mean the outbreak of war without signs of mobilization and other traditional preparations. This view coincided with the Soviet belief that a future world war would be the continuation of the West's imperialistic policy with its inherent predatory characteristics, as well as the ultimate attempt of capitalism to prevent the advance of the historical process toward socialism. On the other hand, there was a growing belief among some Soviet circles that modern warning methods, detente, and the deterrent credibility of the Soviet strategic posture, had reduced Western confidence in the feasibility of a successful surprise attack, and hence lowered the prospect of war outbreak in this fashion.⁴⁶ In view of Soviet statements on the serious

consequences of a preemptive nuclear strike, which some Soviet authorities have said could place their country ". . . in an exceptionally difficult position . . ." and even ". . . lead to defeat . . ."⁴⁷ one is perhaps warranted in supposing that the scenarios for the initial period of a future war would include an attempt to preempt and blunt any initial nuclear attack that the other side might seek to launch.

Among the basic features of a future general war upon which a large measure of consensus is to be found in Soviet military literature during the period was (1) that it would be global and nuclear in character; (2) that missiles would be the main means of nuclear delivery; (3) that it would be a war of coalitions with a group of socialist states ranged together on one side for the first time in history; and (4) that it would be fought for unlimited ends, namely, the existence of one system or another.⁴⁸ The possibility that some non-communist countries might range themselves on the side of the Soviet bloc in the course of the war was also recognized. Another agreed feature of future world war was that it would be highly destructive, with nuclear attacks being carried out not only against military targets, but also against industrial, population, and communications centers as well.⁴⁹ The idea of adopting measures to limit the destructiveness of a nuclear war if one should occur had no public backing among Soviet military theorists or political spokesmen, as such, Soviet doctrine was inhospitable to such concepts as controlled response and restrained targeting. In addition to these aspects of a future war, Soviet thinking began to attach special significance to the initial period of the war.⁵⁰

Whatever the outbreak circumstances might prove to be, in the Soviet view a future war would involve an initial nuclear exchange by both sides. Most of the strategic forces-in-being were expected to be consumed in the initial phase of the war,⁵¹ which would bring heavy mutual destruction but which probably would not--at least in the most frequently professed Soviet view--end the fighting capacity of the major contestants then and there.⁵² While the Soviet concept of the decisive character of the initial period admitted the possibility that the war might come to a sudden and abrupt close, the general tendency was to hedge at this point and assume that the war would now move into a second phase. The majority of Soviet military writers suggested that the initial round of strategic attacks would be followed by theater campaigns in Europe and elsewhere on land, sea, and air. These would be fought with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and would vary in intensity from bitterly contested battles involving strong combined armed forces to mop up operations.⁵³ The rapid occupation of Europe and its isolation from US support by Soviet operations against sea and air lines of communication are regarded in Soviet literature as among the strategic tasks to be accomplished in these campaigns. The participation of the Warsaw Pact countries in the European campaign was foreseen in Soviet writing,⁵⁴ but nothing similar was mentioned with respect to Sino-Soviet collaboration in the Far Eastern theaters of any future global war, as was the case in the concepts of the mid-1950s.

At this point, having pictured a two-phase war consisting of initial strategic strikes followed by widespread theater campaigns,

the Soviet literature of general war became quite vague as to the character of any further military operations or how the war itself might be terminated. For those countries in the enemy camp within the reach of Soviet theater forces, the expectation was that occupation of their territory, and probably the overthrow of their governments with the help of internal "peace forces", would bring a political settlement of the war favorable to the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ The United States would pose a different problem. Unless the US will to continue the war had been broken, the Soviet Union would now be confronted with a long drawn-out war of uncertain outcome. If Soviet capabilities permitted, it might attempt a military assault against the United States, although Soviet military theorists on the whole did not appear to be very optimistic that the capabilities left over after a period of nuclear exchange would permit such an undertaking.⁵⁶ The only Soviet clue as to what might be expected from here were the suggestions by some Soviet writers that in a "class war" of rival systems for organizing society, they would expect their system to prove the more durable in a badly disrupted world, bringing about an eventual margin of communist superiority before which the opposition would ultimately decide to give in.⁵⁷

The Issue of Short War Versus Long War

Khrushchev's visit to Camp David in 1959 set the stage for his easing the military burden on the Soviet economy through major troop reductions and reliance on a "cheap" rocket deterrent strategy. Military costs were the main stumbling block to Khrushchev's plan to redirect the Soviet economy away from its lopsided focus on heavy industry--particular-

ily defense-oriented industry--in favor of a more broadly based economic growth.⁵⁸ His drive for "consumer communism" was to be accomplished through reduced defense expenditures, and transferring those allocations of resources into the consumer sector of the economy. It was a policy of less guns and more butter.⁵⁹

Early in 1963, Khrushchev strongly reaffirmed his conviction that a new war would be likely to end quickly after an initial nuclear exchange, in fact, ". . . on the very first day."⁶⁰ This view was adopted by a number of military writers and commentators. An article in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil in April 1963 spoke of the readiness of the Soviet armed forces to deal ". . . a lightning blow in order to topple and destroy the enemy on the very first day of the war."⁶¹ The following month, an article in the same journal, giving added momentum to the public reiteration of Khrushchev's January 1960 strategic ideas, emphasized the radical changes in military affairs that were tending to make strategic nuclear attacks more significant than the ground offensives in long drawn-out wars of the past.⁶² Later in the year, similar themes, emphasizing the Soviets' capability of ". . . routing the enemy on the very first day of the war,"⁶³ appeared in some of the Soviet commentary on the anniversary parade in Red Square on November 7th.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the published views of several prominent military leaders revealed a shift toward Khrushchev's line of argument. Those of Marshal Malinovskii were of particular interest for their gradual evolution in this direction. When Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, he had asserted that large standing armies, surface navies, and fleets of bomber aircraft were becoming obsolete as a result of the

development of nuclear-rocket weaponry.⁶⁵ He not only said nothing about developing Soviet conventional arms, but even envisioned the replacement of the surface navy and air force with rocket forces.

Khrushchev outlined his position as follows:

Our state has at its disposal powerful missiles. The air force and the navy have lost their former importance in view of the contemporary development of military technology. This type of armament is not being reduced but replaced. Almost the entire air force is being replaced by rockets. We now have cut sharply, and will continue to cut sharply, even perhaps discontinue, production of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the navy, the submarine fleet assumes great importance, while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did. In our country, the armed forces have to a considerable extent been transformed into rocket forces.⁶⁶

Malinovskii's statements, while conceding the great importance of rockets, were more cautiously balanced than Khrushchev's:

The rocket troops are indisputably the main arm of our armed forces. However, we understand that it is not possible to solve all the tasks of war with any one arm of troops. Therefore, proceeding from the thesis that the successful conduct of military operations in modern war is possibly only on the basis of the unified use of all means of armed struggle, and combining the efforts of all arms of the armed forces, we are retaining all arms of our armed forces at a definite strength and in relevant, sound proportions.⁶⁷

In October 1961, Malinovskii had avoided the duration-of-war issue in his Party Congress report, although his remarks suggested a hedge against the possibility of a protracted war.⁶⁸ In his November 1962 pamphlet, Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, Malinovskii stressed the prospect of decisive military results in the initial period of the war, stating: "No one can now deny the possibility that a war may quickly run its course."⁶⁹ While he noted that Soviet doctrine takes into account the possibility of a protracted war, he did not elaborate on this point.⁷⁰ A year later, in an interview with a group of editors

of Soviet military newspapers and journals, Malinovskii omitted altogether the hedge against the possibility of a protracted war. Rather, he emphasized the radical effect which modern weapons might have on the duration of a war, stating:

New means of warfare are radically changing the character of modern war. . . . Very little time may be required with modern weapons to accomplish the basic missions of the war, perhaps hours or even minutes. All this has a definite impact on the operations of all branches of the armed forces.⁷¹

Another military leader who also advanced the view that nuclear weapons were likely to shorten significantly the length of future wars was Colonel General S. Shtemenko, then Chief of Staff of the Soviet Ground Forces. His views were of more than casual interest in light of his role in the Ground Forces, an establishment tending to lean toward the traditional long-war view. In a major article in early 1963, Shtemenko wrote that ". . . with such large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and diversified means of delivery, the duration of a war may be substantially shortened."⁷² At the same time, while restating the validity of Soviet combined arms doctrine, he gave no attention in this lengthy article to the prospect of protracted war.

The long war view, however, was not without its advocates, although most of them argued their case in terms of the need for mass armies rather than on specific grounds for protracted war. One of the more prominent exponents of the long-war viewpoint was Marshal P. Rotmistrov, the tank expert, who took a sober view of the heavy losses which widespread enemy nuclear attacks could be expected to inflict on the Soviet Union and its armed forces, and who argued from this that

Soviet soldiers therefore must be prepared for quite a lengthy and

bitter war. They must be ready for massive heroism and any sacrifice in the name of victory over the enemy.⁷³

Another more extensive and theoretically elaborate argument for the protracted war thesis was in a book by Colonel P. I. Trifonenkov in late 1962, entitled On the Fundamental Laws of the Course and Outcome of Modern War; another was Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, a 1963 symposium volume by a group of twelve writers. Both books followed, in general, the main tenets of Soviet doctrine and strategy as found in other contemporary Soviet military literature, including recognition of the decisive influence of the initial period of a war, but assumed that war would very likely extend beyond the initial nuclear exchanges.⁷⁴ They also argued for a strategy of protracted war in which the economic superiority of the West could be canceled out because of the West's more vulnerable industry and population. Thereafter, it was argued further, the superior political-morale qualities of the Soviet side, plus its residual economic and military capacities, would operate to insure victory.⁷⁵

Among the military theorists whose views on the duration-of-war issue were of some interest was Colonel General Lomov. His assessment over a period of a year and a half shifted first in one direction and then another, typifying the ambivalence on this issue so often encountered in Soviet doctrinal writings. Lomov's mid-1963 brochure on Soviet military doctrine, for example, gave somewhat less weight to the possibility of protracted war than his article on the same subject a year earlier, which had dwelt at length on the importance of preparing the country's economic base for a prolonged war by providing for large-scale wartime expansion of industry.⁷⁶ In mid-1963, by contrast, Lomov

stated:

On this question, current Soviet military doctrine is guided by the proposition that war objectives can be attained in a short period of time, since powerful surprise blows with rocket-nuclear weapons and effective exploitation of the results by the armed forces can quickly decide the major strategic tasks of the war.⁷⁷

Lomov went on to say in mid-1963 that the prospect of a short war was based on "current realities"; first, on the growing advantage of the socialist camp with respect to the "correlation of forces in the world arena," and second, on the superiority of the Soviet Union over ". . . its probable enemy in the military-technical provision of nuclear weapons to the armed forces."⁷⁸ A third factor adduced by Lomov was that the worldwide peace movement, together with modern weapons capabilities, would make it possible to ". . . significantly shorten the duration of a war and to speed up the conclusion of peace."⁷⁹ Only after this marshaling of reasons favoring the likelihood of a short war did Lomov add a single sentence to the effect that,

. . . it cannot be excluded that under certain circumstances a war might take on a protracted character, which will demand of the country and the armed forces a prolonged, maximum effort.⁸⁰

By early 1964, however, Lomov had again shifted ground. In his Krasnaya Zvezda series on military doctrine he returned to the importance of preparing the economy for a prolonged war,⁸¹ a point stressed in 1962 but dropped in 1963. While acknowledging the prospects of a short war by citing Malinovskii, Lomov also gave added emphasis in his Krasnaya Zvezda series to the possibility of a long war. Instead of saying that the possibility ". . . is not excluded," he now declared:

It is absolutely clear that, depending on the conditions under which the war begins . . . warfare will not be confined to nuclear strike. It could become protracted and demand of the country and the armed forces a prolonged, maximum effort.⁸²

What may have prompted Lomov to swing back in the protracted war direction was not clear. Nor was it necessarily of any consequence, except to suggest that while Khrushchev's short-war view may have gained headway among some of the Soviet military, it had not won over many others, which continued to favor a more conservative position. Lomov's change of heart on the duration-of-war issue was apparently related also to the fact that his January 1964 Krasnaya Zvezda series as a whole seemed intended to offer support for a quiet military lobbying effort against Khrushchev's December 1963 forecast of impending manpower cuts in the Soviet armed forces.⁸³

The corollary aspect of the short-versus-long war issue was whether the country could count only on forces-in-being and reserves mobilized and stockpiled in advance of the war, or whether it was still possible under nuclear conditions to generate significant additional strength in trained military manpower and new production during the course of the war.⁸⁴ Hidden below the surface of this debate was the larger question of the prospect for survival of a viable Soviet society in the event of a nuclear war.

With regard to the problem of mobilization, it was concluded that peacetime forces-in-being would be adequate to attain the goals of the war.⁸⁵ This view was based on the proposition that it is beyond the economic capability of the Soviet Union or any other country to maintain sufficiently large forces in peacetime to meet wartime needs. The logical way out of this impasse was to assume that the necessary force build-up would be carried out after the start of the war in accordance with mobilization plans. Here, however, Soviet military theory ran

into two obstacles.

One of these was the view that the length of the war and its outcome may be determined ". . . by the effectiveness of the efforts made at its very beginning."⁸⁶ This meant that forces-in-being were the critical factor, and if they were to be limited by peacetime economic restraints, the prognosis in case of war would look very poor. The second obstacle was Soviet recognition of the great difficulty and uncertainty of mobilizing and deploying additional forces under nuclear conditions. In general, however, Soviet military theorists had not drawn the pessimistic conclusion that wartime mobilization efforts were likely to prove futile, as Khrushchev's occasional remarks suggested.⁸⁷ Rather, military writers continued to concern themselves with such matters as methods of mobilization, and seemed to draw some comfort from the prospect that the enemy would face problems similar to their own.

In January 1960, Khrushchev decided to shift Soviet strategic doctrine from its previous, rather ambivalent state to one firmly ground in a policy of nuclear deterrence.⁸⁸ The reasoning underlying the new strategic doctrine, and the policies resulting from it, was based on the belief of Khrushchev and other party leaders that war with the United States was highly unlikely, on the rising needs and demands of the Soviet domestic sector, and on the decreasing utility and burdensome costs of large, standing conventional forces. The new strategic policy provided for a sharp reduction of Soviet conventional "theater" capabilities; for a significant upgrading of the role, mission, and allocations of strategic rocket forces; and for a shift of the

burden for the conventional "theater" capabilities from the truncated Soviet conventional forces to the East European armed forces of the newly revitalized Warsaw Treaty Organization, which remained firmly under Soviet control.⁸⁹

The new strategic doctrine stunned the Soviet military establishment. Not only was the military to be truncated and a quarter of a million officers summarily dismissed to an unpromising civilian environment, but more importantly, the new doctrine, as the military saw it, put all Soviet strategic eggs into one basket--the demands of a world nuclear war. Only limited capabilities would be available to deal with lesser conflicts. Moreover, while Soviet strategic doctrine was becoming increasingly rigid along these lines, the United States was developing a range of forces, weapons systems, and doctrines capable of dealing with various levels of hostilities and retaining an important flexibility of response.⁹⁰

By 1961, the array of dissenting opinions within the military gave way to several crystallized positions, which reflected both the specific interests of their adherents and the realignments caused by the shock of the new doctrine. The "modernists" among the military were spokesmen for the party leadership; they accepted the new doctrine and policies, and actively championed them by denigrating the opposition as "old fogeys" who had not learned the lessons of the nuclear age, and who made a fetish of command experience and orthodoxy. The modernists' credo was that nuclear war will be radically different from any previous war, consequently old military doctrines and processes are obsolete. Believing that nuclear war had ceased to be politically and

militarily meaningful, they placed strong faith in deterrence policies and asserted that political wisdom, rather than military expertise, should be given the decisive role in prewar and wartime processes. The modernists included Marshals Biriuzov, Eremenko, Moskalenko, and Sudets, and General Koslov, along with numerous other officers.⁹¹

The "traditionalists" among the military were spokesmen for the large majority of the officers and the community of strategists; they accepted the premises of the new doctrine, but strongly rejected those of its implications which negatively affected both their special interests and the large security interests of the state. While agreeing with the modernists that a new war will be radically different from any previous one, because of its speed and destructiveness, they did not agree with them on issues regarding the size, role, mission, and potential effectiveness of the conventional forces. They therefore maintained in a protracted argument which is now commonplace in Soviet military literature, that mass armies are still necessary in a nuclear war; that overreliance on mechanisms and policies for preventing war, such as nuclear deterrence, is dangerous since it does not prepare the country for fighting a war adequately; that the needs of the defense establishment must be given priority in national planning, subordinating domestic economic objectives to defense needs, which require larger allocations of resources; and that in matters concerning the complexities of modern war, the military experts are, in the final analysis, more competent to make judgements. The traditionalists included Marshals Zakharov and Rotmistrov, and numerous other generals and colonels.⁹²

The "centrists" among the military were spokesmen for a group of high-ranking officers who sought to conciliate both strategic schools (which involved most members of the High Command) while arguing the need for a more balanced strategic doctrine. The centrists included Marshals Malinovskii, Grechko, Krylov, Yakubovskii, and Sokolovskii.⁹³

Conclusion

During the Stalinist era, the capitalist world was perceived to be in a state of constant preparation for a total war with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. Lenin's call for constant combat readiness in the event that a war should occur was interpreted by the Stalin regime that a war with the West was inevitable. This "inevitability of war" theme was used quite effectively by the Soviet leaders to portray a state of constant emergency to support various national drives. During World War II, the infantry was the main element of military power, supported by air and naval forces. The postwar situation, despite the drastically changed geostrategic environment, especially vis-a-vis the United States, and in spite of Soviet technological advances with atomic weaponry by 1950, found Soviet strategic doctrine very much the same as it had been in 1940. Basic doctrinal needs had not been met as a result of the "period of Stalinist stagnation" which stifled military thought from 1947 to 1953.

With the death of Stalin, the way was opened to a clearer understanding of the immediate objectives required by the postwar changes in the geostrategic arena. The Soviet view held, in 1955, that a future world war would not be decided solely upon the initial nuclear

strikes. Mutual destruction would not spell mutual defeat, but instead, the effects of nuclear forces would cancel each other out. At that point, the war would proceed on the theater level where the preponderance of Soviet forces would create a favorable imbalance on the battlefield. The objective would then be to occupy the Eurasian continent, and achieve at least a favorable "draw" while the West licked its wounds. Therefore, Soviet strategic doctrine was aimed at producing a war-winning strategy, primarily with conventional means.

The Soviet view that war was not necessarily inevitable, but necessarily preventable was derived from the confidence of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders that the United States was not the bellicose state it was once perceived to be. Additionally, the destructive nature of nuclear warfare, precluding any realistic distinction between the victor and the vanquished, had brought Soviet policy to seek peaceful coexistence as a rational substitute for the cold war. Khrushchev was even willing to rely on strategic inferiority during the late 1950s and early 1960s, reinforced only by strategic deception, together to provide a credibility for Soviet deterrence. Given that the security of the Soviet state is the foremost consideration of the Soviet leadership, in conjunction with the Leninist dictum of avoiding unnecessary risks which would jeopardize that security, the Soviets would never have considered strategic inferiority as an option had they viewed an inevitable war with a belligerent United States.

The attention of the professional military was reoriented toward a strategic doctrine and corresponding posture aimed at preventing war rather than arriving at ways to obtain a war-winning strategy.

Khrushchev's insistence that war was not inevitable enabled him to advance the priority of his domestic programs while adhering to the basic tenets of Lenin stressing calculated risk and caution to preserve, maintain, and secure Soviet gains.

Compared to the Soviet image of war in 1955, that which emerged by 1964 was not "total", especially in its ends--the existence of one system or the other. Its destructiveness would be such, that Soviet military theorists were inhospitable to such concepts as controlled nuclear response and restrictive nuclear targeting. Also, special significance was given to the initial period of the war when most strategic forces-in-being were expected to be consumed. Following the nuclear exchange, the war might come to a sudden close; if not, conventional theater operations would ensue.

It was at this point that the short-versus-long war issue played a critical role in Soviet strategic doctrine. Khrushchev's endorsement of the short-war thesis was in line with his policy of reducing conventional forces and placing absolute strategic primacy in the newly formed Strategic Rocket Forces. While the short-war advocates were unable to explain how the total ends of the war--the final elimination of capitalism--were to be attained, the long-war advocates were concerned with arriving at a war-winning strategy through the maintenance of large forces-in-being--both strategic-nuclear and conventional--to pursue the total ends called for through a protracted war. Therefore, with the short-war thesis, based on the prevention of war, Soviet strategic doctrine moved away from its 1955 stand on a war-winning strategy.

The Soviet image of future war--the "ways of war"--were incongruent with its strategic posture of inferiority and conventional-force reduction--the "means of war". Khrushchev opted for deterrence alone and did not seek a viable war-winning strategy should deterrence fail and a total war initiated. Khrushchev's judgements and policies were based on narrow probabilities, and not the worst-cased possibilities demanded as a starting point for a meaningful and effective strategic doctrine. Khrushchev's views on the inevitability of war and his formula of deterrence and peaceful coexistence were the dominant influence on Soviet capabilities, not the military strategists' views of what the future war would look like. The latter, in fact, was not supported by the political motivations of the strategic doctrine between 1957 and 1964.

The image of future war, as presented between 1957 and 1964, was not so much a basis for Soviet strategic doctrine as it was a concerted effort by the military establishment to point out the deficiencies of a policy that placed an overreliance on deterrence, without considering the disaster that could occur if deterrence failed and the Soviet Union was faced with a war which they could not win because of the lack of capabilities and the lack of a war-winning strategy.

Notes

¹Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 70.

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³Milovidov and Koslov, The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, p. 19.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Lenin, Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii, vol. 37, p. 261, cited by Milovidov and Koslov, The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, p. 20.

⁶The official Soviet designation for World War II.

⁷Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 10.

⁸Ibid., p. 11.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Arnold I. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, Rand Report no. R-434-PR (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1965), p. 41.

¹⁶Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 13.

¹⁷Ibid., p. xii.

¹⁸Ibid., p. xiii.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. xiv.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵"The Peoples Decide the Fate of the World and Civilization," Kommunist, no. 4 (March 1955), p. 16, cited by Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 39.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 41.

²⁸Pravda, 8 February 1955, in Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 42.

²⁹Report of the Central Committee to the Twenty-second Party Congress, 17 October 1961 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), vol. 1, p. 50, cited by Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 166.

³⁰Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 167.

³¹Ibid., p. 168.

³²Ibid., pp. 47-48.

³³Ibid., p. 168.

³⁴Ibid., p. 175.

³⁵Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 116.

³⁶Ibid., p. 117.

³⁷World Marxist Review, December 1962, p. 9, in Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 176.

³⁸Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 177.

³⁹Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 76.

⁴⁰Marshal Sergei Biriuzov, "Politics and Nuclear Weapons," Izvestiia, 11 December 1963, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 74.

⁴¹Raymond L. Garthoff, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," in The Military-Technical Revolution, ed. John Erickson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 240.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 112.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 113.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Marshal P. Rotmistrov in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 2 (January 1963), p. 30, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 113.

⁴⁸Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 114.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Colonel General S. Shtemenko, "Scientific Technical Progress and Its Influence on the Development of Military Affairs," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 3 (February 1963), pp. 26-28, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 114.

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⁵⁴Colonel S. Lesnevskii, "Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Countries," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 10 (May 1963), pp. 71-73, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 114.

⁵⁵Colonel General N. A. Lomov, Soviet Military Doctrine (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "ZNANIE," 1963), p. 26, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 115.

⁵⁶Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 115.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966), p. 90.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 91.

⁶⁰Nikita S. Khrushchev's election speech in Kalinin District, Pravda, 28 February 1963, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 131.

⁶¹Colonel S. Baranov and Colonel E. Nikitin, "CPSU Leadership--The Fundamental Bases of Soviet Military Development," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 8 (April 1963), p. 22, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 131.

⁶²Major D. Kazakov, "The Theoretical and Methodological Basis of Soviet Military Science," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 10 (May 1963), pp. 10-12, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 131.

⁶³Leont'ev commentary on Moscow radio, 12 November 1963, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 131.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964, p. 92.

⁶⁶Nikita S. Khrushchev in Pravda, 15 January 1960, cited by Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964, p. 92.

⁶⁷Marshal R. Malinovskii in Pravda, 15 January 1960, cited by Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964, p. 92.

⁶⁸Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 132.

⁶⁹Marshal R. Malinovskii, Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstvo Oborony SSSR, 1962), p. 26, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 132.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹"The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Tasks of the Military Press," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 21 (November 1963), p. 9, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 132.

⁷²Shtemenko, "Scientific Technical Progress and Its Influence on the Development of Military Affairs," p. 27, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 133.

⁷³Marshal P. Rotmistrov, "The Causes of Modern Wars and Their Characteristics," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 2 (January 1963), pp. 29-30, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 133.

⁷⁴Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 133.

⁷⁵Colonel P. I. Trifonenko, On the Fundamental Laws of the Course and Outcome of Modern War (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstvo Oborony SSSR, 1962), pp. 48, 53-54; Colonel G. Fedorov, Major General N. Susko, et al., Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstvo Oborony SSSR, 1963), pp. 187 ff. An editorial preface to the Trifonenko book pointed out that some of the author's propositions were of a "polemic nature" and not necessarily agreed to by the reviewing authorities. It was not indicated, however, whether or not this applied to the propositions on protracted war; cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 134.

⁷⁶Colonel General N. Lomov, "On Military Doctrine," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 10 (May 1962), p. 15, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 135.

⁷⁷Lomov, Soviet Military Doctrine, p. 25, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 135.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 26.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Colonel General N. Lomov, "Basic Tenets of Soviet Military Doctrine," Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 January 1964, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 135.

⁸²Colonel General N. Lomov, "New Weapons and the Nature of War," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 January 1964, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 136.

⁸³Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 136.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 137.

⁸⁶Colonel V. Larinov, "New Means of Combat and Strategy," Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 April 1964, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 137.

⁸⁷Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy, Izvestiia, 24 February 1962, cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 137.

⁸⁸Pravda, 14 January 1960, cited by Roman Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, Research Paper P-383 (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, International and Social Studies Division, 1967), p. 15.

⁸⁹Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 15.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 16.

⁹²Ibid., p. 17.

⁹³Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

During their first two years, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had resolved to abandon Khrushchev's one-sided and incongruent strategic doctrine in favor of one which would develop a war-winning strategy and bring the Soviet Union to strategic parity with the United States. While world war is not inevitable in the Soviet view, it is an essential task of the Soviet strategist to formulate a strategic doctrine beginning with worst-cased situations and working down the scale of possibilities. As such their image of future war plays a paramount role in formulating strategic doctrine and associated war plans. The nature of future war will be determined by the causes and conditions precipitating the war, which in turn give rise to various categories of war. Since Western imperialism has been determined to be the primary cause for a future war, the Soviets weigh the conditions of just and unjust war based on their perceived need to defend against such imperialism, while preserving and protecting their gains.

Once the cause, condition, and category of a given future war are assessed by the Soviets, the next decisive factor will be the extent of their response. While most of their attention is given to the totality of a general war, the Soviets do not disregard the possibility of limited and local wars, not only in view of the potential for these smaller-scaled wars to escalate into a general world war, but

also because they realize the possible necessity to respond to the US doctrine of "flexible response," even if only by proxy and material support.

With regard to the conduct of a future war, the Soviets dramatically portray the dynamics of strategic nuclear weapons as the most significant change in warfare. The future world war will be a "frontless" or "fronts everywhere" war, and as such, necessitates a change from the former and traditional strategic operations of the last war. However, not all traditional means are tossed aside by the Soviets as they recognize the need for a nuclear-conventional balance to produce a war-winning strategy and bring about a final victory. The capabilities derived from the new Soviet strategic doctrine have brought the Soviet Union to strategic parity with the United States and provided the Soviets with the potential means for a war-winning strategy.

This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) Soviet Strategic Doctrine in Transition: 1964-1966; (2) New Attitudes Regarding the Inevitability and Future of War; and (3) The Capabilities Derived from the Doctrine.

Soviet Strategic Doctrine in Transition:
1964-1966

The Cuban Crisis of 1962 made it all too clear to the Soviet leaders that it would be difficult, if not impossible to pursue peaceful coexistence and realistic political objectives from a position of strategic inferiority. Furthermore, they resolved never to

be placed in a position of relying on deception as a viable alternative for actual strategic deterrent credibility. If passive peaceful co-existence were to evolve into a more meaningful and active intercourse with the United States through detente, the requirements for strategic parity had to be achieved to prevent any unilateral advantage for the United States.

The broad issue of resource allocation appeared to provide the basis of the modernist approach to the issues of duration of war and the constituents of military power. The new Soviet leadership in 1965 was faced with two broad alternatives in allocating resources: either to allocate more resources for defense needs or to postpone such a program and concentrate instead on a long-range economic program and greater satisfaction of consumer needs.¹ Khrushchev had opted for the second alternative, stressing a small armed forces based on strategic missile forces, in the hope that this would release valuable resources for the badly strained consumer sectors of the economy.

In view of the increases in the defense budget beginning 1966, it appears that the new leadership wanted to reverse the Khrushchev policy in the hope of placating the bulk of the military community, and also disassociate themselves from Khrushchev's policies.² Soviet modernists, and those who supported their position, were presumably arguing at the time--late 1964 and throughout 1965--that adoption of the short war doctrine and stress on the quantitatively smaller missile component of military power would be a wiser policy, allowing more resources to be released for the non-defense sectors of the economy. Their emphasis was on qualitatively improving the armed

forces; deemphasis was on large armed forces--the position of the traditionalists.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was faced with a serious situation brought about by Khrushchev's methods and the substance of his policies. First, the credibility of Soviet military capabilities was severely undermined; such a belief was a dangerous precedent which might have emboldened a potential opponent to challenge the Soviet Union. Second, Khrushchev's erratic and "harebrained" diplomatic behavior not only disturbed international politics and motivated the United States to remain prepared and militant, but it also compromised Soviet policy and international influence. Third, his overcommitment to varied policy objectives often negated planning policies, which were convulsed by massive and sudden "grand designs."³ To the new regime, the antidote of this malaise of bombast, irresponsible claims, erratic political behavior, and confusing crash planning seemed to be sobriety, pragmatism, and the establishment of credibility through the attainment of conspicuous capabilities to match objectives and declaratory policy.

The new regime's policy formula struck this note: "We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active, and at the same time, we exhibit flexibility and caution."⁴ It was to be a policy of,

. . . opposing aggressive imperialist circles without allowing itself any sabre-rattling or irresponsible talk . . . soberly assess the situation and to find a precise orientation in it under all circumstances, favorable as well as adverse to weigh, in a sober manner, the possibilities which we have. . . .⁵

It was to be also a policy based on a business-like approach to a new pragmatism where, ". . . a mere bookish knowledge of Marxism does not

supply the confidence possible for working policy."⁶

The problem of credibility, relevant to both internal and external politics, has been a central concern and one repeatedly addressed in recent years. For example, in addressing military leaders at the Kremlin in July 1966, Brezhnev stated:

We are compelled once more to a point to our country's military might not for the sake of boasting or to intimidate anybody. We mention it primarily because this is the real state of affairs at the present time. Our superiority with respect to the latest types of military equipment is a fact, comrades, and facts are stubborn things. This topic must also be broached because some generals and even responsible US state figures are flying into a passion thoughtlessly and rashly maintain the opposite viewpoint. . . .⁷

The new regime's policy was, therefore, one of restraint, prudence, and continuing detente, based on a deterrent relation with the United States, and on pragmatic, balanced economic planning at home. It could be described as a "speak-softly-while-you-are-getting-a-big-stick" policy. The regime's appraisal of the nature of US strategic deterrence convinced them of the need to avoid (1) provocations that would lead the superior adversary to war, (2) situations that could escalate into a major war, and (3) either-or situations in which the alternatives would be war or severe concessions.⁸

Although the new regime significantly transformed the method and style of soviet policy, it did retain at least two of Khrushchev's underlying assumptions regarding the political and strategic environment of the Soviet state: (1) that nuclear war would be a catastrophe for both the East and the West; and (2) that a policy of detente and nuclear deterrence was essential, since it was the primary mechanism for preventing unprovoked nuclear attacks and for regulating the

whole range of US-Soviet relations, thereby leading to prudence and stability.⁹ This policy of detente and deterrence, however, was not seen as a constraint on political or military initiatives in areas which were presumed to be of less than vital interest to the other superpower, as long as they were conducted according to the "rules of the game." Participation with the United States under such rules placed the self-imposed requirement upon the Soviet Union to achieve strategic parity.

While the new regime was setting the political stage for improving relations with the United States, the military debate concerning the evolving strategic doctrine for the Soviet Union was continuing as strong as before. Following gestures and overtures intended to appease the military (such as the reinstatement of Marshal Zakharov as Chief of the General Staff, and the "rehabilitation" of Marshal Zhukov), as acknowledgement of its important role in the ouster of Khrushchev, Brezhnev was yet unable to totally squelch the military's criticism of and propositions for the evolving strategic doctrine. Additionally, the strategic debate in the military coincided with the sharp disagreement among the members of the Politburo. One group, including Podgorny, Polyanskii, and Kirilenko, favored a continued priority for internal economic development.¹⁰ Another group, including Suslov and Shelepin, sided more emphatically with the military's insistence on further strengthening of the Soviet defense establishment.¹¹

In July 1965, when he addressed an audience of officers at the Kremlin, Brezhnev clearly sought to ease the military's concerns:

In view of the dangerous intrigues by the enemies of peace, our concern for further strengthening our defense and consolidating the security of the entire socialist comity acquires paramount importance. History has taught us that the stronger our army is, the more watchful we are, the stronger the peace on our frontiers and earth. We have learned that well.¹²

He further sought to assure the military that a policy of detente and deterrence in no way affected the demands and needs of the military; however, he cautioned that such a buildup of defense capabilities must proceed carefully toward parity:

Our devotion to the cause of peace in no way affects our country's defense. In fact, it is indicative of our very attentive and solicitous attitude toward the country's defense . . . preparation for defense does not require sudden burst of activity nor a war cry, but long, intensive, tenacious, and disciplined work on a mass scale.¹³

The dissenters disagreed with the regime on several basic issues. They maintained that a formal rejection of the political utility of nuclear war was dangerous to morale, negated certain central ideological tenets, forced a policy of fatalism and passivism, and undermined both the rationale for allocating larger resources and authority to the defense establishment, and the preparedness necessary in the event of an actual nuclear war.¹⁴ They contended that the capitalist world, far from observing the "rules of the game" of detente and deterrence, arrogantly continued to use its vast power, bragged about its strategic superiority, denigrated Soviet capabilities and resolution to use them, and tended to act as the more super of the superpowers. Furthermore, they added, a policy of stability and prudence served the interests of the capitalists by easing their concern about Soviet intentions and capabilities, and by providing them with a broad margin of initiative to pursue "adventurist" policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Finally, they claimed that a policy of detente and deterrence eroded the ideological cohesiveness of the communist world, undermined the revolutionary zeal of the Third World, and fostered "embourgeoisment" of socialist societies.¹⁵

Far from being persuaded by Brezhnev's gestures and overtures, the military traditionalists intensified their public criticism of the regime's defense policies. A policy discussion by proxy developed, with colonels serving as supported spokesmen for the generals and marshals. The article by Lieutenant Colonel Ye Rybkin¹⁶ received widespread attention in the Soviet Union in 1966 and 1967, and forced the party to condemn it publicly on several occasions, treating it as the most repugnant form of criticism of party policies.

In the article, Rybkin sought to negate the distinction between nuclear war and wars of the past, and thereby undermine the party's argument that the revolutionary new characteristics of nuclear war make it mandatory for political leaders to assume both political and strategic direction of the defense establishment during peace and war. He rejected any unilateral Soviet acquiescence to the idea that nuclear war has lost its political and military utility and rationality, and thereby rejected the party's position that a minimum deterrence policy was adequate to its defense needs and made demands for large, all-purpose armed forces meaningless. Also, he severely questioned the Soviet party leaders' assumptions about the moderations of many Western leaders by pointing at dangerous, "adventuristic" Western intervention policies, and by asserting that such an assumption was meaningless anyway, since the threat of a nuclear war by accident had grown immeasurably.¹⁷

Finally, he rejected ideologically based, soothing political formulas which maintained that the innate social and spiritual strength of the communist countries assured their superiority over the decadent West, and should be looked upon as a weapon.¹⁸

Rybkin refuted the ideas of the most prominent Soviet strategic thinker, General Talenskii, who had supported both regimes' policies of rejecting nuclear war as madness. In May 1955, Talenskii had written:

In our time there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims through the use of nuclear weapons and at the same time survive, and that it is possible to find acceptable forms of nuclear war.¹⁹

Rybkin cited Talenskii and then attacked him for spreading such dangerously fatalistic doctrines:

An a priori rejection of the possibility of victory is harmful because it leads to moral disarmament, to a disbelief in victory, and to fatalism and passivity. It is necessary to wage a struggle against such views and attitudes.²⁰

Rybkin's position was supported by Colonel Sidel'nikov, another well-known military strategist, who invoked Lenin in demanding larger allocations for defense, strategic superiority over the adversary, and the preparation of such capabilities and reserves in peacetime, rather than frantic attempts to secure them in the course of war:

V. I. Lenin said . . . even the very best army, one most loyal to the cause of the revolution, will be immediately routed by the enemy unless satisfactorily armed, supplied with provisions, and trained. . . .²¹

Sidel'nikov also addressed the problem of nuclear deterrence, and indicated the falacy of overreliance on such a policy:

One must not ignore the occasionally arising opinion of roughly the following nature: 'A world thermonuclear war can actually be prevented; all the peoples and all progressive forces of the

earth oppose it. If so is it necessary to maintain large armies and spend large amounts on the maintenance of armed forces?' One who reasons in this manner obviously has in mind only the possibility of preventing war and forgets or fails to observe another thing--the presence of a serious danger of a world war. The imperialist countries are stepping up the armament race, increasing their armies, and strengthening their aggressive military blocs.²²

The diffusion of the military's position vis-a-vis the regime undoubtedly helped the regime to assert its position and to deal with the military in a selective, arbitrary manner. The proceedings at the Twenty-third Party Congress, and subsequent developments, indeed support such an assumption and lend credibility to speculations that a compromise was struck between the proponents of intensified domestic allocations and the proponents of increased allocations to the defense sector. It is also speculated that this compromise failed to satisfy the more militant elements in the armed forces, although it did satisfy some important members of the High Command, who then closed ranks with the party leadership.²³

By reconstructing events of 1966 and 1967, one can venture the hypothesis that the compromise included plans (1) to proceed with an accelerated program for producing offensive strategic weapons; (2) to accelerate a limited ABM program; (3) to continue the present levels of conventional forces, while improving equipment and weapons; (4) to retain tight Politburo control over the strategic missile forces; (5) to continue the policy of nuclear deterrence, detente, and stable relations with the United States; (6) to reject any crash-program proposals for across-the-board expansion of military capabilities; and (7) to maintain wide authority in managing the affairs of the defense establishment.²⁴

New Attitudes Regarding the Inevitability and
Future of War

War As a Continuation of Politics

Lenin stressed that wars have a political substance and represent the continuation of politics in a specific shape, namely, with the help of violent means. He pointed out:

All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war, is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed.²⁵

Therefore, it is politics which prepares and gives birth to war, formulates the aims of war, and determines where and when to begin, pursue, and terminate the hostilities. With the outbreak of war, armed force and military means assume the role of the main instrument of policy.²⁶ Additionally, Soviet writers make a concerted effort to point out that according to Lenin,

. . . the fundamental thesis of dialectics consisted in the fact that war was merely a continuation of policy by other means.²⁷

While emphasizing the political foundations of wars, Soviet strategists do not reduce the essence of war only to politics. However, they insist that politics permeates all aspects of war, comprises its foundation, and is its basic symptom.²⁸ The continuing emphatic rhetoric and constant invocation of this Lenin-Clausewitz dictum has, coincidentally, provided the party leadership with a powerful tool to continue and reinforce its superiority over the Soviet professional military in the areas of strategic and political leadership.

Considering the essence of a possible nuclear war, Marxist-Leninists

insist that they do not confuse it with another question, close to but not identical with it, concerning the admissibility or inadmissibility of nuclear war as a means of politics. According to their writings:

They resolutely condemn this war, considering it the greatest crime against humanity, and fight persistently to avert it, and completely prohibit and destroy mass destruction weapons. Such is the aim of the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union. . . .²⁹

They strongly attempt to advance the thesis that it is the foundations of Soviet foreign policy--peaceful coexistence, detente, etc.--in conjunction with the vast strength of its armed forces, which have prevented the natural and inevitable clash between the two opposing systems--capitalism and communism--and, as such, have been the pillars and mainstay of world peace.

The Causes and Conditions of War

The foremost strategic aim of the Soviet Union is to insure the readiness of its armed forces primarily for a world war against a militarily and economically powerful coalition of capitalist powers. They perceive the most probable, and at the same time, most dangerous means for the unleashing of a war by the West against the socialist camp, would be a surprise attack.³⁰ Soviet military strategy takes into account their perceived features of a real aggressor, and considers that in contemporary circumstances, even a large war might arise suddenly, without the threatening period characteristic of the past.

In addition to preparing for a decisive battle with the aggressor during a world war, the Soviet Armed Forces are also preparing for

small-scale local wars which might be unleashed by the West. As evidence for such action by the West, they point to such wars which have arisen during the postwar period--Korea (1950), the Middle East (1957), and Vietnam (1965)--and show that they are conducted by ways and means which differ from those used in a world war.³¹ Therefore, Soviet military strategy calls for the study of means for conducting such wars in order to prevent them from developing into a world war, and to bring a quick victory over the enemy.

In order to understand the origin of wars, from the Soviet view, they distinguish between the reasons for war and the cause for their unleashing.³² The reasons for the origin of modern wars lie in (1) the operations of the "law of unevenness" and spasmodic nature of the economic and political development in capitalist countries, (2) the contradictions inherent to the capitalist system, and (3) the struggle of the West for world domination.³³ The direct causes of wars arising in the modern era are seen to be the ". . . aggressive imperialistic and predatory policies followed by the United States and other strong capitalist countries. . . ." ³⁴ which are directed primarily against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This paranoia, combined with ideological and national interest precepts to maintain Soviet gains and prevent any reverses, is a real concern for the Soviet leadership.

The most diverse events can become causes for unleashing war, since, in the Soviet opinion, the ruling classes of the West usually resort to direct fabrication of the reasons for an attack. In the present situation, this problem is considerably complicated in view of

the Soviet concern for the accidental origin of war. With the arms race, there is a serious danger that even a small miscalculation by the state leaders of one country or another can lead to the unleashing of a new war.³⁵ Nuclear weapons can be launched not only upon command of a government, but also at the ". . . discretion of individuals at the control panel." As such, the Soviets reject the effectiveness of US command and control procedures for nuclear release. Careless operation of radar systems causing incorrect interpretation of instrument readings, the mental disorder of a pilot, and faults in the electronic equipment of nuclear rocket systems could also start a war.³⁶

In a sense, the Soviets are aware of the danger of their precipitating a conflict in the course of advancing the historical process and making gains for socialism. Marshal Grechko stated: "The more we win, the more the capitalist exploiters will learn to unite and switch to more resolute attacks."³⁷ This poses an interesting dilemma for the Soviet Union: the more they gain to achieve security and advance the historical process, the greater the risk to their security and reversing the historical process. So while they view imperialism as the source of all wars,³⁸ they must also assess their means and ends in perspective of a possible backlash and reversal.

The Soviet view of the international arena sees three basic contradictions of the present period, which is primarily that of the transition from capitalism to socialism: (1) contradictions between the capitalist and socialist system; (2) contradictions between the working people and the imperialist states; and (3) contradictions between the former metropolitan countries and the developing countries that are

dependent on them.³⁹ The development and intensification of all these contradictions could ultimately end up in a new world war, civil wars, and wars of national liberation, respectively.

Given these potential causes for a future war, the Soviets then assess the conditions and character of the war. The moral assessment of a war, in the Soviet view, should be given not according to the technical means employed in it, but to the political aims it serves. In judging the character of a war, the Soviets establish which policy it continues, what forces are waging it, in whose interest, and whether the war in question serves to ". . . assert the freedom and independence of peoples or is aimed at their enslavement."⁴⁰

Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, for liberation from exploitation and national oppression, or in defense of its state's sovereignty against an aggressive attack is a just war. Conversely, the Soviets contend that any war unleashed by the imperialists with the aim of seizing foreign territories, enslaving and plundering other peoples, is an unjust war. Such wars,

. . . continuing the policies of the imperialist bourgeoisie, are aimed at holding back by violence the logical course of social development, to suppress the revolutionary-liberation movement of the oppressed classes and peoples, and to strengthen the exploiter system.⁴¹

While this boiling caldron of Soviet propaganda is, more often than not, tossed aside by Western analysts, it is significant in that the Soviets must surely realize the detrimental effect on the morale of the armed forces, indeed, the entire nation, should they decide to suddenly disregard this espoused dogma and attempt a protracted act of aggression.

Just wars of the modern era are considered to include wars in defense of the nation, civil wars born of antagonistic contradictions of the capitalist society, and wars of national liberation from the grip of imperialism.⁴² The Soviets also appear to differentiate between "wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland," and "wars for the defense of the socialist system from imperialist aggression."⁴³ Such a distinction could represent the Soviet awareness of a potential armed conflict with another socialist country, namely, China, giving rise to the former, as well as potential armed conflict with the West, giving rise to the latter.

As the very antithesis of just wars, unjust imperialist wars are alien to the popular masses, harmful to social progress, and profoundly amoral and reactionary in their social role. According to the Soviets, unjust wars include imperialist intervention and aggressive wars against the socialist countries, civil wars of reactionary forces against the revolutionary classes within the country, colonial wars against the oppressed peoples or newly independent states, wars between imperialist powers, or aggressive attacks by the imperialists or other capitalist countries.⁴⁴ The Soviets cite intervention by the United States in Vietnam, and Israeli aggression against the Arab countries as examples of unjust wars.⁴⁵

After deriving the imperialist cause of war, and the just or unjust conditions of war, Soviet military strategy starts with the fact that in the present era, the following basic categories of war are theoretically possible. First, war between the capitalist and socialist camps, which if not prevented, would be, by its political essence, a

decisive armed conflict between two opposing world social systems, and as such, would be a total world war. Second, imperialist wars undertaken by the West for the purpose of suppressing national liberation movements, and the seizure or retention of colonies. Third, national liberation wars, civil wars, and other wars aimed at the repulsion of aggressive and predatory attacks. Both imperialist wars and national liberation wars are small local wars in size and scope.⁴⁶ World war is seen as a necessity of capitalism, whose inherent nature demands aggression and the prevention of the ultimate course of history to socialism and communism. While the Soviet Union asserts its condemnation for all predatory wars, they consider it their duty, as the leader of the world socialist movement, to support the struggle of oppressed peoples during their just wars of liberation against imperialism.

General War

The Soviets attribute several basic characteristics to a future world war. First, the destructive role of nuclear weapons, especially during the initial period of the war will be unprecedented. Second, the enormous spatial scope of the war will encompass virtually every sector of the globe. Third, the increased role of the masses will result in popular active support for the just and defensive war of the socialist community, and a passive resistance for the unjust and predatory war by the capitalist community. Fourth, it will be a clash between two military coalitions with vast resources at their disposal, and will result in the extinction of one of the systems; these coalitions will be made up of nations located in different regions of the world.⁴⁷

Fifth, it will involve widespread use of the means of mass destruction, resulting in heavy personnel losses and the need for large manpower reserves to replenish military formations and the economic sectors. Sixth, it will require mass armed forces.⁴⁸

The Soviets then pose the question of what constitutes the main military-strategic goal of the war: the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, as was the case in the past, or the annihilation and destruction of objectives in the enemy's interior, and the disorganization of the latter? The theory of Soviet military strategy gives the following answer to this question: both of these goals should be achieved simultaneously.⁴⁹ The annihilation of the enemy's forces, the destruction of objectives in the rear areas, and the disorganization of the interior will be a single continuous process of a total general war. The Soviet strategist points to two main factors being at the root of this solution: (1) the need to decisively defeat the aggressor in the shortest possible time, for which it will be necessary to deprive him, simultaneously, of his military, political, and economic possibilities of waging war; and (2) the real possibility of achieving these goals simultaneously with the aid of existing means of armed combat.⁵⁰ In other words, the means to achieve the ends are available and must be used in a war of such total magnitude if a meaningful victory is to be considered a realistic possibility.

In order to destroy the targets comprising the military might, as well as the economic and political potential of the enemy, the Soviets will call upon the long-range strategic means primarily through the methods of armed combat corresponding to these means--strategic rockets,

long-range aviation, and missile-launching submarines. The proportion of these military operations in the entire armed conflict will increase in a future general war.⁵¹ At the same time, the military operations which will have to be carried out over a relatively small depth, where groupings of enemy ground troops will be concentrated, will be much less important in a future war. Mass nuclear strikes will be of decisive importance for the attainment of Soviet goals in a future general war. The employment of these assaults will be the main and critical method of waging war.⁵²

Armed combat in the ground theaters of military operations will also take place differently. The defeat of the enemy's groupings of ground troops, the destruction of his rockets, aircraft, and nuclear weapons will be achieved mainly by Soviet nuclear strikes. This will lead to the formation of numerous zones of continuous destruction, devastation, and radioactive contamination, thus isolating and localizing enemy formations, and creating great possibilities for waging extensive maneuver operations with highly mobile mechanized troops.⁵³

Formerly, an attack was usually carried out along a solid front in closed battle formations, slowly, against the defending enemy who assumed the same operational position. Now, the Soviets propose to conduct an offensive by mobile shock groupings along the main direction at lightning speeds with a rapid appearance at considerable depth of the enemy's position. Formerly, attacking troops were usually confronted with the task of seizing an entire locale within the boundaries of the attack formation, while now they have only to seize those individual vitally important regions which are not destroyed by the nuclear strikes.⁵⁴

Soviet tactical objectives will not be as large and deep as the map becomes more and more chared. If a nuclear war should come, the front line for the Soviets will be everywhere.⁵⁵

One of the more significant Soviet features of a possible nuclear war is its social-class content and political goals, which will be unprecedented in their vastness. Such a war will attempt to solve not only the immediate political tasks for the Soviets, but also the problem of the socio-political structure of the world--the total elimination of the capitalist system and ultimate confirmation of the socialist system. The main political aim in a general war, according to the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is as follows:

In case the imperialist aggressors nevertheless dare to unleash a new world war, nations will no longer endure an order which plunges them into devastating wars. They will sweep imperialism away and bury it.⁵⁶

However, the Soviets also realize that while world wars under some conditions may rouse the masses to struggle, they may under different conditions temporarily restrain the revolutionary process of national liberation. They are quick to acknowledge the historical experience, indeed, to include their own, that the military way for the development of the world revolution process is neither the most universal nor the easiest one. They point out:

A revolution following a war, connected with a war, or flaring up during a war is a particularly painful birth of the new social system. War disorganizes the economic life of the country, affects the social progress, the consciousness and morals of the people, teaches them to resolve political problems by means of armed force, and makes the building of socialism more difficult.⁵⁷

The political aim of eliminating capitalism in a total general war would be meaningless, indeed, self-defeating, if the burdens of

building and preserving socialism were insurmountable as a result of such a total war.

Another aspect of the Soviet view of general nuclear war is that it can be comparatively short in time, since the chief political and strategic goals can be achieved as a result of the massive use of strategic nuclear means and active operations by all types of armed forces in the basic theater of military operations.⁵⁸ This thesis poses definite tasks for preparing not only the armed forces for the war, but also the nation or coalition of nations as a whole, particularly in terms of their economic preparation. The short war poses the greatest hope for any possible meaningful victory, and only through assured and guaranteed preparations can one state hope for the shortest possible war. At the same time, the Soviets recognize the various political, economic, and strategic problems related to the preparations for war, and therefore consider and plan for those conditions which could lead to a relatively long and protracted war.⁵⁹ As such, the Soviet Armed Forces shifted from a one-tracked emphasis on the absolute strategic primacy of the Rocket Forces alone, to one of a balanced strategic posture among all the branches.

Limited War

Soviet treatment of the "limited war" concept is handled very carefully. Most of the discourse is aimed at criticism and condemnation of the US concept of limited war, which is seen as a ploy to secure conditions under which the territory of the United States will remain invulnerable by keeping the war within a geographical framework which

would not embrace the American continent.⁶⁰ Therefore, the Soviets conclude that since the war will be limited only with relation to the United States, while European nations would be fully embraced in war, the war is anything but "limited." Additionally, the US concept of limited war, as well as the Schlesinger Doctrine of "selective targeting" are seen by the Soviets as a method for preparing a total nuclear war against the Soviet Union.⁶¹

The Soviets state that limited war is characterized by premeditated restraint by both sides with respect to one or more factors characterizing war in general, for instance, the political aims, character and size of the forces and means used, the size of the areas for military operations, the number of participants in the war, etc.⁶² Although the characteristic feature of a limited war is considered to be deliberate and mutual restraint on the part of the belligerents, the Soviets, nevertheless, consider it impossible to determine accurately that limit at which further relaxation of the restrictions will lead to the escalation of an all-out nuclear war. Most essential from the standpoint of determination of limited war is the fact that a limited war is any conflict in which all available forces and means of the belligerents are not used.⁶³ Since the Soviets contend that the only kind of limited war acceptable to the West is that which is conducted according to the rules proposed by the West,⁶⁴ they are most reluctant to acknowledge these rules for it would serve to give a green light for aggression by the United States.

The Soviets evaluate the US theory of limited war as one born out of the blind alley created by its predecessor, "massive retaliation,"

which was unsuitable against "enemy number two" of the imperialist system--the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁶⁵ As such, the United States is attempting to gradually shatter socialism, and suppress national liberation through its three forms of limited war: local war, limited-conventional war, and limited-nuclear war.⁶⁶ According to the Soviets, the main problem, especially with limited-nuclear war, is that these are in effect,

. . . tantamount to the beginning of a global nuclear-missile war. Indeed, who will believe that the imperialists, if they lose a 'small' nuclear war, will refrain from using their entire nuclear-missile might.⁶⁷

Thus, the Soviet Union does not deny the credibility of the US doctrine for limited war, they simply deny the assumption that the United States will maintain the restraints and limitations. They submit that the United States concept of limited war is an attempt to justify imperialism through war, and is not a theory for just war.⁶⁸

The Soviets consider territorial limits, as opposed to other types of limitations, to be most effective from the point of view that it is easier to bring them into play. Precise geographical limits must be considered depending on the political and military intentions of the belligerents. While this principle can be fulfilled easily on islands and peninsulas, the Soviets express much doubt that it can be met in highly developed continental regions where there are no clear natural boundaries, such as in Europe.⁶⁹ At the same time, they recognize that the presently existing military-political alliances of states complicate the possibility of limiting armed conflict to a certain territory inasmuch as all the alliances indicate that an attack on

one of the countries is considered as an attack on the alliance as a whole.

Nuclear limitations present certain inherent problems which could, all too quickly, result in the escalation to total nuclear war.⁷⁰ The problems of deciding to employ tactical nuclear weapons involve too many uncertainties. First, the actual combat effectiveness of the weapon is unknown. Second, enemy reaction to its use is difficult to predict. Third, the difficulty of classification recognition by the belligerents of a nuclear weapon from its power as tactical or strategic could create reports of the latter where the former was used. Fourth, the difficulty of determining the means of delivery for a tactical nuclear weapon can also lead to miscalculation. Fifth, the problem of determining whether delivery means located outside the zone of the limited war can be used.⁷¹ As such, the Soviets maintain that limited war, especially limited-nuclear war, does not preclude a total nuclear conflict, but is, instead, ". . . a unique dress rehearsal for it, one of the possible methods of unleashing it. . . ." ⁷² Again, pointing to the European theater, the Soviets conclude that the destruction and devastation resulting from tactical nuclear war would differ insignificantly from the consequences of a strategic nuclear conflict.⁷³

By its character, a limited war contains two problems. On the one hand, such a war must be conducted decisively with the best methods using the necessary forces and means to achieve the set political and military goals; on the other hand, in a limited war the armed forces must be used in such a way as to reduce the risk of escalation into general war. Therefore, the Soviets consider this situation as a

contradiction, since the need for success in a limited war is incompatible with the requirement for limiting the scale of combat operations with regard to territory, forces and means, the number of participants, etc.⁷⁴ While they ascertain that the United States must have the capability to conduct such wars with conventional weapons, the possibility of escalation to nuclear weapons will increase tremendously if the conventional forces cannot fulfill their assigned tasks.⁷⁵ However, recognition of the problems and dangers of limited wars does not bring the Soviets to disregard its possibility:

The fact that the Soviet Union was fighting by every means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing both 'large' and 'small' wars, is, of course, known to everyone. But the possibility of limited wars was by no means disputed. The point was something else, that such wars inevitably increased the risk of escalation and developing into global war, and therefore, a determined struggle should be waged against their arising. That was the point of view of the Soviet government and it remains such.⁷⁶

In advancing the justification for the Soviet concept of limited war, Marxist-Leninist theory applies the concept of "local war" to characterize the scale of a war pointing up its differences from a world war. Local wars include wars having a limited number of participants, and enveloping a relatively small geographical area.⁷⁷ The national liberation war is such an example. While maintaining that these are just wars, with limited means and ends, the Soviets recognize again, the conditions under which local wars might escalate into a global conflict: (1) if the major protagonists were the two major superpowers; (2) if the war were not extinguished in time; (3) if the war affected the basic interests of the socialist states; (4) if NATO launched a surprise attack against one of the socialist countries;

(5) if the West miscalculated and accidentally triggered a world war in the midst of a local war.⁷⁸

Additionally, the Soviets do recognize the possibility of a local war with nuclear weapons:

By the nature of weapons and force employed, local wars are properly divided into wars in which only irregular formations operate or those in which only regular forces with modern arms are also used; only conventional weapons are employed or those in which the threat exists of escalation into a war with limited employment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁹

The Conduct of War: Strategic Operations and Nuclear-Conventional Balance

The Soviet argument about the basic method of conducting future war is: will it be a land war with the use of nuclear weapons as a means of supporting the operations of the ground forces, or a war that is essentially new, where the main means of solving strategic tasks will be the nuclear weapon? Who will be the supporting and the supported in the large, planned, coordinated operation, required when many allied armies are to fight in an armed conflict?⁸⁰ The answer is found in the following types of strategic operations determined by Soviet strategic doctrine for the armed forces during a future war: (1) nuclear rocket strikes to destroy and annihilate objectives which comprise the military-economic potential of the enemy, to disrupt the system of governmental and military control, and to eliminate strategic nuclear devices and the main troop units; (2) military operations in land theaters in order to destroy enemy forces; (3) protection of rear areas of the socialist countries and troop groupings from enemy nuclear strikes; and (4) military operations in naval theaters to destroy

enemy naval groups.⁸¹

The objects of actions in a future war will be the strategic means of the enemy, his economy, his system of government and military control, and also the groups of ground and naval forces in the theaters of military operations. This being the case, the main objectives will be beyond the theater limits, deep within enemy territory, and therefore, will be accomplished by the Strategic Rocket Forces, long-range aviation, and rocket-carrying submarines.⁸²

Another type of strategic operation in a modern war in the military operation in land theaters aimed at the final destruction of enemy troop units, the capture and occupation of enemy territory, and the prevention of an invasion of the socialist countries.⁸³ The nature of these operations has changed when compared to the last war. Now it is not the case of the Strategic Rocket Forces--the basic means for conducting modern warfare--timing their operations with those of the Ground Forces, but just the opposite, namely, the Ground Forces utilizing to the fullest extent the results attained by the Rocket Forces for a rapid fulfillment of their tasks. In this case, the main task of the Ground Forces will hardly be the breakthrough of the enemy defense, much less its "gnawing through."⁸⁴ Breaking through the defense is not such an acute problem as in past wars. Nuclear rockets, by their very existence, exert an influence on the selection of even tactical objectives, for they allow commanders to assign more decisive targets and to influence the course of combat, eliminate enemy obstacles, and deny enemy initiative. The Soviets contend that a lack of nuclear rockets cannot be compensated for by any other advantages, such as morale or better

training. These factors can turn the tide of victory only if nuclear rockets are available.⁸⁵

An extremely important type of strategic operation considered by the Soviets is the protection from nuclear attacks of the enemy, using the PVO (anti-air), PRO (anti-missile), and PKO (anti-space) forces for strategic defense. They naturally recognize that successful conduct of a future war and a sufficient degree of reliable assurance of the normal vital activities of the Soviet Union are impossible without the effective conduct of these operations.⁸⁶ These operations are intended to repel enemy air and rocket attacks in flight, in order to prevent them from reaching the most important administrative-political centers, economic regions, groups of rocket forces, aviation, and naval forces, as well as regions of reserve mobilization.

Soviet naval operations will be directed against groups of enemy naval forces to destroy their naval communications, while protecting Soviet coastal regions from nuclear attack. Naval operations of this sort will be independent operations, as opposed to naval operations involving transport and firepower support for the Ground Forces.⁸⁷

The Soviets consider it an essential requirement to use their strategic rockets from the very outset of a future world war, ". . . literally in the very first hours and minutes, in order to achieve the most decisive results in the shortest possible time."⁸⁸ This requirement of Soviet strategy derives from the fact that nuclear attacks by the enemy may cause such losses in the rear, and such troop losses that the Soviet Union would be placed in peril.⁸⁹ The critical aspects of the initial period of conflict bring the Soviets to reject former

notions of periods or stages of war. The initial period will ". . . predetermine the development and outcome of the war and as such it will be the most destructive and violent period of the war."⁹⁰

While stressing the primacy of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviets realize that the enormous scope of a future world war, the diversity of conditions for conducting it in the various theaters of military operations, as well as the complexity of strategic goals require the use of joint and coordinated efforts by all branches of the armed forces, and the use of various means of combat, including conventional weapons.⁹¹ Soviet strategic operations of a future world war will consist of coordinated operations of all branches of the armed forces, and will be conducted according to a common concept and plan, under a single strategic direction. The main force of such operations will be the weapons of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Simultaneously, with these nuclear strikes, or more probably, immediately after them, front offensive operations, airborne operations, naval operations, and operations by large pre-frontal formations of PVO forces will be initiated for the final destruction of surviving formations of enemy troops.⁹² Since each side will strive to advance following a nuclear strike, occasions will arise for counter-engagements through combat maneuver and conventional firepower. However, the scope of such combat will acquire a somewhat localized character.⁹³

As the nuclear strikes "punch through" enemy defenses, Soviet motorized infantry and tanks will advance rapidly to eliminate individual pockets of enemy resistance, not dismounting as a rule, but making only brief stops.⁹⁴ In effect, Soviet firepower will be used to

destroy, while maneuver troops will be used to seize, occupy, and control. Furthermore, this increased role of firepower with nuclear weapons will provide the Soviets with the means for greater dispersion of troops to reduce casualties, and greater economy of force to allow commanders to expand their tactical frontages.

It is entirely obvious to the Soviets that no matter how important the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces and submarine-launched missiles may be in a future war, victory can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all means of waging war. In order to achieve the political and military goals with which the Soviet Union will be confronted in a future war, it is not nearly enough to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack, to defeat his main forces, and to disorganize the interior. For final victory, it will be necessary to bring about the complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces, deprive him of strategic bridgeheads, and control important regions.⁹⁵ All these, and a number of other problems, can be solved only by the Ground Forces in coordination with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, producing a nuclear-conventional balance.

The Capabilities Derived from the Doctrine

In their drive toward strategic parity and qualitative superiority, the Soviets initiated an intensive capabilities-building campaign in 1966. Their revised image of war called for a comprehensive strategic posture which entailed increasing not only the strategic means, but also the conventional means to insure a strong two-fisted punch which could win a war, and preclude a "glass-jaw" strategic posture.

ICBM Forces

In 1966, the Soviet ICBM forces included three types: the SS-7 (1962), the SS-8 (1963), and the SS-9 (1966).⁹⁶ Today, the Soviet Union has deployed seven types of ICBMs including the SS-9, SS-11 (1966-73), SS-13 (1969), SS-X-16 (1975), SS-17 (1975), SS-18 (1974-76), and SS-19 (1974).⁹⁷ The SS-7 and SS-8 were dismantled in 1977 in accordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.⁹⁸ However, the protocol to the interim agreement permitted the substitution of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for ICBMs deployed prior to 1964.⁹⁹ The relative ICBM inventories of the Soviet Union and the United States are depicted at table 1.

TABLE 1

USSR AND US ICBM LAUNCHERS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>
USSR	285	1428	1485
US	910	1054	1054

SOURCE: Gen. George S. Brown, "Appraising the Strategic Nuclear Balance," Commander's Digest, vol. 20, no. 3, 3 February 1977, charts 2 and 14, pp. 5, 23.

The Soviet deployment program for new ICBMs began its third year in 1977. The new Soviet ICMBs are more accurate than the systems they are replacing. Moreover, these accuracies are expected to improve further as the Soviets continue their test programs and refine and modify selected missile components.¹⁰⁰ The US ICBM force of 1054 at the end of fiscal year 1977 will remain constant through the end of fiscal year 1982 (30 September 1982). Of the 1,054 missiles, 550 will

be MIRVed.¹⁰¹

SLBM Forces

An even larger leap forward can be seen with regard to the Soviet's SLBM building program which grew from about thirty in 1966 to well over eight hundred by 1977. The protocol to the SALT I Interim Agreement permitted the United States and the Soviet Union to increase the size of these forces: the United States to 710 SLBMs on 44 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); the Soviet Union to 950 SLBMs on 62 SSBNs.¹⁰² Also, as noted above, the protocol provided for the substitution of SLBMs for ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or older SLBM launchers. The current types of SLBMs include the SS-N-5 (1963), SS-N-6 (1968-73), SS-N-8 (1973), SS-N-X-17 (1981, and SS-N-X-18 (1981).¹⁰³ The dramatic increase in Soviet SLBMs is seen at table 2.

TABLE 2

USSR AND US SLBM LAUNCHERS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>
USSR	30	320	860
US	600	670	670

SOURCE: Brown, "Appraising the Strategic Nuclear Balance," charts 5 and 14, pp. 10, 23.

The size and diversity of the Soviet SLBM force and the pace at which it has developed reflect its high priority among Soviet military programs.

The development and deployment of Soviet SSBNs since 1966 began

with the Yankee class in late 1967, and represented a significant advance in Soviet sea-based strategic capability. Between 1966 and 1974, thirty-four Yankee class SSBNs were produced.¹⁰⁴ This class still constitutes the largest component of the Soviet strategic SSBN fleet. Recent additions to the Soviet SSBN force are the twelve-tubed Delta I and sixteen-tubed Delta II class submarines. Each type is armed with the 4,200 nautical mile SS-N-8 missile. The long range and accuracy potential of this missile system, combined with the operating capabilities of the Delta I and Delta II SSBNs, make this weapon system the greatest SLBM threat to the United States.¹⁰⁵

TABLE 3

USSR AND US BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

<u>USSR</u>	<u>Year Operational</u>	<u>Propulsion</u>	<u>Missile</u>
Golf Class	1960	Diesel	3 SS-N-5/4 (350-700 NM)
Hotel II Class	1964	Nuclear	3 SS-N-5 (700 NM)
Yankee Class	1968	Nuclear	16 SS-N-6 (1,300/1,600 NM)
Delta I Class	1973	Nuclear	12 SS-N-8 (4,200 NM)
Delta II Class	1976	Nuclear	16 SS-N-8 (4,200 NM)
<u>US</u>			
Polaris	1960	Nuclear	16 A-3 (2,500 NM)
Poseidon	1971	Nuclear	16 C-3 (2,500 NM)
Trident	1979	Nuclear	24 C-4 (4,000 NM)

SOURCE: Brown, "Appraising the Strategic Nuclear Balance," chart 4, p. 9.

It is expected that a Yankee class SSBN will be modified to carry the SS-N-X-17 missile.¹⁰⁶ Although the new Delta class continues to be introduced into the Soviet submarine force, it is expected that the Yankee class will continue to constitute the majority of the Soviet SSBN force for the foreseeable future.¹⁰⁷

Intercontinental Bombers

Consistent with their view of the primacy of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the main strategic-nuclear arm, the Soviets have not pursued a building program for their strategic bomber force. Their emphasis has been directed strictly for qualitative improvements of their long-range air force through the Backfire bomber. The Backfire is capable of delivering weapons anywhere in the United States without aerial refueling. Staging from Arctic bases and refueled, the Backfire could cover virtually all of the United States on two-way high altitude subsonic missions.¹⁰⁸ The unrefueled radius would cover the western United States in an arc generally extending from Los Angeles to the western tip of Lake Superior.¹⁰⁹ Carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), the Backfire would have somewhat reduced capabilities, but the potential range of the ASM would produce comparable target coverage. Tanker support would be required for intercontinental missions involving supersonic dash or extended low-altitude operations.¹¹⁰ All Backfire are believed to have a refueling probe and to be capable of aerial refueling. Backfire's extensive capabilities for various types of peripheral land and sea missions, as well as its intercontinental capabilities, indicate Soviet dedication to maintaining an inter-

continental bomber force with qualitative, not quantitative, superiority.

TABLE 4

USSR AND US INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>
USSR	165	150	135
US	750	520	495

SOURCE: Brown, "Appraising the Strategic Nuclear Balance," charts 7 and 14, pp. 12, 23.

Conventional Forces

In reversing Khrushchev's policy which called for manpower reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as the insignificance of the conventional forces in a future war, the Brezhnev regime has brought about a renaissance in the conventional forces of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited self-determination within the socialist commonwealth,¹¹¹ the Soviet view on limited or local war, and the need to provide a sufficient conventional punch to complement the nuclear strike if a general war should occur, all brought qualitative and quantitative improvements to the Soviet conventional arsenal.

TABLE 5

USSR AND US CONVENTIONAL FORCES

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>Divisions</u>			
USSR	140	160	168
US	17	13	16

<u>Manpower</u>				
USSR	3.2 million	3.4 million	3.7 million	
US	3.1 million	2.7 million	2.1 million	
<u>Tanks</u>				
USSR	33,000	39,000	45,000	
US	9,000	10,000	10,000	
<u>Tactical Aircraft</u>				
USSR	4,000	4,800	4,600	
US	2,200	4,800	3,400	

SOURCE: The Military Balance, 1966-67, 1970-71, 1976-77
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1966, 1970, 1976).

Recapitulation

The capabilities-building program of the Soviet triad since 1966 resulted from the remolding of Soviet strategic doctrine in 1966. A look at the composite totals shows how this doctrine moved the Soviets out of strategic inferiority and into an era of strategic parity.

While these comparisons provide a useful starting point, an overall assessment must go beyond individual qualitative and quantitative factors. The character of Soviet strategic-development programs and growth in their strategic capabilities indicate preoccupation with nuclear conflict. The vast expansion of capabilities has led many to conclude, from the US perspective, that the

TABLE 6
USSR AND US TOTALS

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>Total Missile Launchers</u>			
USSR	305	1750	2335
US	1510	1724	1724

<u>Total Delivery Vehicles</u>				
	USSR	470	1800	2470
	US	2280	2244	2219
 <u>Total Strategic Offensive Warheads/Bombs</u>				
	USSR	620	2000	3540
	US	6920	4925	8500

SOURCE: Brown, "Appraising the Strategic Nuclear Balance," charts 7 and 14, pp. 13, 23.

Soviet strategic programs went well beyond the minimum requirements for deterrence. Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in 1977:

Evidence acquired during the past year strengthens this view, and I now believe the Soviets are striving to achieve warfighting capabilities which, if war occurred, could leave them in the better relative position.¹¹²

Soviet strategic doctrine, as it was developed since 1966, has brought Soviet capabilities from a questionable deterrent posture to one which has given them a profound war-winning capability. As such, current Soviet strategic posture is predicated not on the intentions of a potential adversary, but upon demonstrated and manifested capabilities.

At this point, the potential exists for a reversal of the process where Soviet strategic doctrine is translated into capabilities, into a process where the newly developed capabilities might be translated into a new strategic doctrine. Under such conditions, the Soviets could possibly consider a limited counterforce strike designed to disarm the US bomber and/or ICBM forces based on the assumption that the United States would not strike back due to the threat that the Soviet Union might then use the remainder of its nuclear reserves in

a counter-city strike. The Soviets might consider such situations if they perceive that the United States is insincere in its efforts to reach a meaningful arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, as well as overtures which the Soviets could perceive as a reversal of detente and a return to cold warriorism. However, it is more likely that a rational approach will continue to govern the strategic doctrine based on Lenin's precepts that war is not necessarily inevitable, but, however, must be prevented through a viable and strong strategic posture.

Conclusion

The Cuban Crisis of 1962 made it all too clear to the Soviet leaders that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to pursue peaceful coexistence and realistic political objectives from a position of strategic inferiority. Furthermore, they resolved never to be placed in a position of relying on deception as a viable alternative for actual strategic deterrent credibility. If passive peaceful coexistence was to evolve into more meaningful and active intercourse with the United States through detente, the requirements for strategic parity had to be achieved to prevent any unilateral advantages for the United States. This Soviet drive for strategic parity, then, was aimed more to decrease the relative strength of the United States than it was to increase the relative strength of the Soviet Union. While these "decreasing" or "increasing" motives appear to be identical, they are separate in terms of political and strategic motivations: a Soviet desire to decrease the relative strength of the United States is derived from a drive for strategic parity, while the desire to increase the

relative strength of the Soviet Union is derived from the drive for strategic superiority. Additionally, the Soviets cannot overlook the growing Chinese nuclear threat contiguous to more than five thousand miles of Soviet frontier.

The Soviets believe that it is an inherent characteristic of capitalism to be aggressive, expansionist, and ultimately seek to destroy the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth in order to alter the ultimate course of history away from socialism and communism. They contend that this policy of capitalism could bring the West to initiate a general war were it not for the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence and detente, and the strong Soviet strategic posture; the former prevents war, while the latter supports the political initiative by providing strategic deterrent credibility. Dissenters maintained that while this policy formula of detente-deterrence is worthwhile in itself, they feared that overreliance on such a formula would lead to fatalism, passivity, and a strategic doctrine which would fail to prepare and structure the armed forces adequately should the detente-deterrence formula fail. Also, the continuing debate between the party and the professional military over party control versus professional autonomy underlay much of the strategic doctrine debate.

Brezhnev's policy of restraint and prudence cautiously brought the Soviet Union to strategic parity with the United States which, in itself, was instrumental in producing meaningful bilateral negotiations between the superpowers. Any further drives toward superiority will probably take the form of qualitative improvements for both the conventional

forces and the rocket forces. The Soviet Union under Brezhnev, while continuing to maintain that war is not necessarily inevitable, but necessarily preventable, has gone full-circle back to the originally intended meaning of the Lenin-Clausewitz dictum that once initiated, "war is a continuation of politics," but not a rational instrument of politics or means of policy.

Future wars will arise if the basic contradictions between socialism and capitalism, working people and imperialist states, and the former metropolitan countries and the developing countries that are dependent on them, are intensified to the point where world war, civil wars, and national liberation wars, respectively, emerge. The conditions for just and unjust war are perceived with respect to these contradictions, and are weighed based on the Soviet need to defend against Western imperialism while preserving and protecting their gains.

A general war will be a total experience with regard to its means, ends, and scope. The Soviets will utilize every means available to bring about the total and final elimination of capitalism, which they contend could no longer be tolerated to exist should it unleash another general war. The strategic goals will include the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, as well as interior objectives aimed at destroying or disrupting his economic strength and political-military control.

The Soviets will want to end a total war as quickly as possible so that their losses will be kept to a minimum. They realize that the elimination of capitalism would be a meaningless victory if, in the process, they were left to preserve and build socialism in the world amidst the rubble in the aftermath of a total war. Therefore, the

Soviets might consider an end to hostilities in a general war if the ends--the total elimination of capitalism--become meaningless in view of the cost of the means to pursue that end. The longer the war lasts, the greater the costs to Soviet gains.

The short war, then, provides the most plausible and most preferable means for the Soviets to attain their total war aims. Additionally, while the use of strategic-nuclear rockets would be extremely important in a short war, the Soviets realize that the role of the conventional forces would also be critical, as only they could finalize the total war aims and close the circle of a war-winning strategy. The possibility of a protracted war is also carefully addressed in Soviet strategic doctrine. Here, too, if the war aims are not achieved after the series of nuclear strikes and simultaneous theater operations by the conventional forces, the Soviets want to prepare themselves as much as is economically possible during peacetime for the various phases of protracted war through as large a standing force as possible, again to support a war-winning strategy. Therefore, Soviet strategic doctrine has been reconstructed under Brezhnev into one which is aimed at a war-winning strategy in either short or protracted war through nuclear-conventional force balance, as opposed to Khrushchev's deterrence only-short war-one armed-mutual destruction doctrine which did not provide for winning a future war.

The Soviets realize that a war other than general war, and with an adversary other than the United States could arise, which would not necessarily warrant a total and/or nuclear response. As such, Soviet condemnation of a limited war as portrayed by the United States is not,

in any way, to be interpreted as a priori condemnation of a limited war concept. The Soviets will not confirm the US concept of limited war because it would be a green light for further aggression by the United States. Furthermore, they refuse to believe that the United States will observe any set limitations during the conflict; also, the present alliance structure in Europe would preclude such limitations, particularly with regard to the number of participants in the conflict. The problems of nuclear limitations, particularly with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, provide the easiest road to general war, and according to the Soviets, would serve as the final dress rehearsal for it. The Soviet concept of local war--civil wars and wars of national liberation--is formulated in accordance with their perception as the leader of the world socialist movement. While the most important limitations considered are the number of participants and the geographical limits, they do not disregard the possibility of nuclear weapons in a local conflict.

The Soviets dramatically portray the dynamics of strategic nuclear weapons as the most significant change in modern warfare, and the decisive means for achieving the critical strategic goals. However, as an essential element of the war-winning strategy in a future war, the Soviets are also advancing the need for nuclear-conventional balance, which together with a short war, could produce the desired results of a meaningful final victory.

The Soviet capabilities-building campaign brought the Soviet Union to strategic parity with the United States. It also provided a strategic posture which is aimed at fulfilling their realization of a

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
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war-winning strategy, if war should occur, and which is predicated on the capabilities of the potential adversary, not his intentions. While the potential exists for these new capabilities to create a revised, and somewhat more belligerent strategic doctrine and outlook on war, it is more likely that a rational approach will continue to govern the strategic doctrine based on Lenin's precepts that war is not necessarily inevitable, but, however, must be prevented through a viable and strong strategic posture.

Notes

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⁴Leonid Brezhnev in Pravda, 30 September 1965, cited by Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 10.

⁵Editorial in Kommunist, no. 12 (August 1965), cited by Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 10.

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⁷Leonid Brezhnev in Pravda, 2 July 1966, cited by Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 11.

⁸Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 12.

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¹⁰Ibid., p. 21.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Radio Moscow, 3 July 1965, cited by Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, p. 22.

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⁴⁷Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, ed., Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 3 (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, 1973; Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 137.

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CHAPTER III

SOVIET PREPARATION FOR WAR

The ways which the Soviet Union prepares itself for a possible military conflict are based on its plans for mobilization. Such plans address the inherent problems of a nation at war to include bringing the peacetime cadre forces up to the strength necessary to produce the desired extent of response. Also, the various contingents and measures to protect, preserve, and maintain the economic and industrial output required to support the war effort are of critical importance for obtaining a rapid transition to a wartime production momentum. The Soviet program to maintain a high combat readiness, not only in the armed forces, but also in the Soviet population as a whole, is truly a remarkable effort to fulfill the requirements of mobilization. Political messages on military-patriotic themes remain constant throughout the life of the Soviet citizen. In examining these and other factors contributing and affecting the Soviet Union's preparation for war, this chapter is divided into four sections: (1) Soviet Mobilization Plans, (2) Preinduction Military Training, (3) In-Service Training, and (4) Post-Service Training.

Soviet Mobilization Plans

Types of Mobilization

Taking into account the threat of a surprise nuclear attack and the resulting difficulties of mobilization, the Soviets would like to

have peacetime armed forces available such that the main aims of the initial phase of the war can be attained without additional mobilization. However, they realize that to keep the armed forces in such a state is economically impossible. Therefore, they strive to keep such forces which could deliver a well-timed nuclear strike, repel a surprise air attack, and actively wage operations on land and sea where the power of their first blows can be increased rapidly by throwing into action mobilized units and commands.¹

Under conditions where nuclear weapons are used, both belligerents will be subjected to attack in the very first hours of the war and will be in approximately the same condition regarding equipment and troop transport to the theaters of operations. Therefore, the Soviets contend that the side which manages to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory during the first days of the war will acquire the capability to utilize more effectively the results of its nuclear strikes and to disrupt the mobilization of the enemy.² They consider this to be especially important with respect to the European theaters with their relatively small operative depth.³

With respect to methods and ways of realization, the Soviet Union's mobilization of armed forces can be total or special, open or concealed.⁴ Total mobilization is declared by governmental decree and is accomplished openly. It begins before the war during a period of aggravation of the international political situation, as in World War I, or during the war, as in World War II. Special mobilization includes simultaneously or consecutively only the territories of certain military districts in the immediate vicinity of the probable theater of operations. The concealed

method is sometimes used for special mobilization, which consists of mobilizing only certain units under the guise of different types of checks, training groups, maneuvers, etc.⁵ Such was the case in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Concealed mobilization is possible even under present-day conditions, but it will be realized somewhat differently than previously. As the relations between the belligerents become increasingly strained, the Soviets plan to bring a part of the armed forces, intended for the solution of the problems of the initial phase of the war, gradually into a state of complete combat readiness.⁶

Assignments of personnel and allocations of materiel are appropriated based on the three readiness categories for Soviet divisions. Category I units are between 75 percent and 100 percent strength with complete equipment; Category II units are between 50 percent and 75 percent strength with complete fighting vehicles; Category III units are at 33 percent strength, possibly complete with fighting vehicles.⁷ Category I units are intended to carry out the first operations and main tasks in the beginning of the war. Category II units will have mobilization periods short enough to enable them to participate in the initial operations perhaps the latter stages. Category III units probably will not figure too prominently in the initial phase of the war, but more likely will assume a more defensive and protective role initially, and later, as it approaches full combat readiness, could provide the "second wave" punch for counterattack operations.⁸

Mobilization of Manpower

An important factor determining the degree of preparation of the

armed forces is the system of recruitment in peacetime and during mobilization. The Soviets consider the most suitable system to be one of territorial recruitment of armies during mobilization, which, under conditions of nuclear war, considerably accelerates the process of converting the armies to a wartime organization. As for a peacetime army, its main purpose--the immediate repulsion of an aggressor and the preparation of trained manpower reserves for war--can be fulfilled only by using cadre formations staffed on an extraterritorial basis.⁹

Soviet manpower resources for bringing the armed forces up to strength during mobilization are usually kept in reserve on the military register. The register contains all individuals of the appropriate ages liable to military service, both those with active military service and those without active military service. Some of those liable to military service are "reserved" by factories and institutions of the national economy and, during mobilization, will not be called.¹⁰

The main source of replenishment of the reserve of men with military training is those discharged each year from the cadres of the peacetime armies. However, no peacetime army fully absorbs all the eligible men at a given age, and therefore, there is always a certain number of men in the reserve who have not undergone training in the active forces. In the military training of these individuals, a network of civilian institutions is used by the Soviets to prepare different types of specialties needed by the armed forces such as mechanics, radio operators, telegraph operators, etc.¹¹ The number of officers discharged each year from the active forces and retained on the military register is usually very small in comparison with the mobilization requirements. Therefore,

a reserve of young officers is created by the Soviets in peacetime mainly from sergeants discharged each year into the reserve, especially from those with higher and secondary education.¹² The reserve of young officers with technical skills is also replenished by individuals who have completed special civilian institutions of higher learning, but have not performed any active service.

The Soviets realize that in a modern war, the problem of making up manpower losses will become particularly acute from the very first hours of the war. According to the experience of previous wars, manpower losses were restored mainly by forming, during mobilization, reserve and training units and groups which underwent abridged military training, and were sent to the front in the form of draft companies and battalions. Another method used to bring forces up to full strength was the "placer" method,¹³ that is, sending into the armed forces a certain number of more-or-less trained men. Because of the probability of great losses resulting from nuclear strikes, and the possible liquidation of entire units and even formations, the Soviets consider it hardly feasible to limit themselves to the creation of only reserve and training units and formations, sending to the front drafted subdivisions.¹⁴ As such, the primary form of restoration of losses will be the formation of new completely trained and assembled commands or individual units, ready to step into battle immediately upon their arrival to the front.

The great losses which may be caused by the nuclear assaults of the enemy, as well as unavoidable extensive disruption of the operation of the entire transportation and communication system, bring the Soviets to the requirement that mobilization be simplified, dispersed, and accom-

plished as quickly as possible.¹⁵ Only under these conditions could they hope to utilize the mobilized troops during the initial operations of the war, particularly Category II units. The Soviets, therefore, attempt to simplify mobilization by accomplishing it according to territorial methods, thereby avoiding the extensive transport of mobilized men, weapons, and equipment to the points of mobilization, and simplifying the system assigning men to units. As such, the Soviets plan to form one unit at each mobilization point.¹⁶

Mobilization of Materiel

The Soviet view of the initial phase of a modern war requires that the material means for conducting those first operations not only be prepared during peacetime, but also dispersed, taking into account the requirements of anti-nuclear defense. Moreover, in the interior of the country, at the points of troop mobilization, the Soviets want the required reserves of materiel readily available. In accordance with their designation, the materiel reserves for the armed forces are divided into emergency and mobilization reserves, strategic and government.¹⁷

Emergency reserves are kept directly in the units and commands existing in peacetime in sufficient quantities to insure their mobilization deployment and, most important, the conduct of military operations for some specific period of time.¹⁸ The mobilization reserves are designated by the Soviets for the replenishment of expended materiel in operations during the initial phase of the war. The quantity and distribution of materiel reserves depend on the mission and requirements of the formation being supplied.¹⁹ By strategic reserves of materiel, the Soviets mean that part of the government reserve which is placed at

the disposal of the Soviet High Command. All other reserves constitute state reserves, presumably for the population and the economy.

The Soviets determine the quantity of strategic and state reserves on the basis of the need for the continuous supplying of the armed forces until the mobilized industry expands production according to the war program. Special emphasis is given to the special need for fuel and lubricants in view of the fact that the Soviets consider one fleet alone will probably consume as much as 100,000 tons of fuel during an operation.²⁰ All together, fuels and lubricants may constitute more than 50 percent of the total volume of logistics required by the armed forces.²¹ The Soviets believe that armed forces requirements for materiel can be determined more or less accurately only for the initial operations of a future war, as well as for the support of troops, deployed or newly formed according to the mobilization plan. All other calculations are very tentative at best, and are made with an allowance for probable heavy losses of materiel even before the troops get them.²²

In the logistical support of the armed forces, the Soviets recognize that the timely delivery of all required materiel to the troops from the peacetime stockpiles plays a very important role. Here, the Soviets might expect to encounter difficulties. In previous wars, the main means of delivery were the railroads. Under present conditions, in the case of destruction of railway focal points, the restoration of trackage on the basis of industrial work methods, and with timely accumulation of roadbed and bridge components, is possible only at a rate not exceeding 40 to 50 kilometers per day, while the restoration of bridges cannot proceed at a rate exceeding 120 to 150 meters per day.²³

The Soviets fully recognize that railroads can no longer fully insure the delivery of materiel to the troops, and therefore, motor transport will have to play an increasingly decisive role. Additionally, pipelines will be acquiring ever-increasing importance. For example, the Soviets estimate that an operation conducted by a front will require up to 25,000 tons of fuel and lubricants per day.²⁴ In order to deliver such a quantity of fuel over a distance of 300 kilometers, more than 10,000 five-ton trucks would be required.²⁵ Air transport remains but a possibility, since the Soviets continue to limit it because of the inadequate carrying capacity of aircraft, the requirement for airfield equipment and facilities, and the need for coverage during flight. Military transport aircraft will apparently be used primarily for airborne assaults and the delivery of rockets and fuels to the Strategic Rocket Forces.²⁶

The Soviets consider it absolutely necessary to use all forms of transport in combination, including river systems. While this will make it possible, if need be, to switch the flow of materiel from one type of transport to another, the additional requirement for transloading equipment will consume much precious time. Also, as shown at table 7, the Soviet's transportation system is not equitably balanced as to the proportion of its various means.

TABLE 7
SOVIET TRANSPORT MEANS

	<u>1940 (%)</u>	<u>1965 (%)</u>
Rail	85.10	71.50
Water	12.30	15.60

Pipeline	0.79	6.80
Auto	1.80	6.20
Air	0.01	0.07

The Soviets contend that insuring the viability of industry, especially heavy and military industry, is a most important aspect of the preparation of industry for war. In previous wars, the problem was solved by an appropriate geographical arrangement of important industrial objectives in the interior of the country, beyond the reach of enemy aircraft. However, the weapons of a future war would not allow such a geographical arrangement to protect industrial objectives, and therefore, their viability must be insured by compulsory dispersion, duplication of production, and anti-nuclear defense measures, to include underground complexes.²⁷ The Soviets want the most important industrial enterprises to be located underground in premises prepared beforehand for this purpose. In the case of new above-ground construction for industrial enterprises, the most valuable equipment would be located in specially constructed vaults beneath concrete shelters.²⁸

Soviet organization of the technical support of the troops is based on the principle of utilizing locally occupied facilities and resources. Their damaged military equipment would not be evacuated, but collected at repair agencies of the front.²⁹ These repair agencies will use local means of repair. Another problem arises regarding the state of training of the rear services, as most of them will be deployed or formed during mobilization and are not included in many of the training maneuvers to any great extent.³⁰

The preparation of agriculture in the Soviet Union is accomplished

according to the following main requirements. First, the level of its development must insure the creation of considerable reserves of food and raw materials in case of war. Second, its structure must facilitate the carrying out of the mobilization of the armed forces. Third, agriculture must, at the very outset of the war, maintain a level of production to supply the current needs of the population, the expanded needs of the armed forces, and the needs of industry for raw materials.³¹ All this in view of the fact that ". . . a considerable number of the workers and machines engaged in agriculture are drawn into the armed forces."³²

Preparation of the Population

The Soviets point to three main directions in which the preparation of the population takes place in peacetime. These are (1) the moral-political preparation of the population; (2) the preparation for defense against weapons of mass destruction, and for the removal of the results of the attack; and (3) the military preparation of the population.³³

The moral-political preparation is considered by the Soviets to be of decisive importance, since the use of weapons of mass destruction imposes exceptionally high, previously unheard-of demands on the political morale of the population. This moral-political preparation of the Soviet people for war consists mainly in educating them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, love of country and the party, and teaching them to be ready to suffer any hardships of war for the purpose of achieving victory.³⁴ It is aimed at reinforcing the will to fight and resist despite the unprecedented hardships, and at the same time, eliminating any possible resistance to the war effort and/or the leadership of the

party.

Preparations for civil defense consist mainly of (1) the timely warning of the population of an impending danger; (2) its partial evacuation; (3) the creation of shelters; (4) insuring individual means of protection, water, and food; (5) appropriate instructions and a continuing education of the public; and (6) the creation of a service to maintain order and prevent panic.³⁵

The military preparation of the population presently acquires great importance not only from the point of view of replenishment of the armed forces during the war. A militarily-trained population can also be enlisted in the organized struggle against sabotage and espionage, as well as against small air and naval landings of the enemy. In other words, this training would help to support partisan and militia operations throughout the country should an invasion force enjoy success.³⁶ In many respects, the increased emphasis on civil defense and military training of the population, especially since 1967, can be viewed as a replacement for the "inevitable war" dogma to perpetuate the "state of emergency" atmosphere in the Soviet Union which helps to maintain and legitimize party power and policy.

Preinduction Military Training

Military-Patriotic Education

The resolution of the Twenty-third Party Congress stressed the importance of military-patriotic education to instill in Soviet children a high moral conviction and devotion to the party, love of the socialist fatherland, and a readiness to defend it.³⁷ The Congress also urged an

expansion of ties between enterprises, educational establishments, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and military chasti (units) and podrazdeleniye (subunits).³⁸ The Soviets consider military-patriotic education of the people, and especially the youth, to be a matter of state importance and one of the necessary conditions for strengthening the defensive might of the country.³⁹ Party committees have established sections and departments for conducting military-patriotic work, and the more experienced and competent aktivs are being assigned permanently to educating the youth on combat traditions. The regulations of the CPSU require party organizations

. . . to ensure that military-patriotic educational work and the training of youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces is the concern not only of certain institutes and officials, but also of a majority of party members.⁴⁰

The basic goal of military-patriotic education is to help each member better understand his duty in defending the country. Thus, the decisions of the party, the propaganda of the heroic traditions of the Soviet people and the armed forces, the great respect for the difficult work of Soviet soldiers are closely linked with the concrete responsibilities of young people on mastering military and military-technical knowledge for the fulfillment of their military duty.⁴¹ The general task is to bring up the youth in the spirit of fervent Soviet patriotism, in the spirit of love for the army and trust in its combat traditions, and to prepare the youth for the self-sacrificing and skillful defense of their socialist motherland.⁴²

The political messages of military-patriotic education are aimed at (1) formulating a precise, fervent, and well-conceived concept of the

historical progressiveness of communist ideas and the indisputable advantages of the socialist system; (2) increasing the psychological endurance, the striving to execute military discipline, the ability to endure the hardships of military service, as well as courage, bravery, and boldness; and (3) providing glorious incentives for the youth to master military-technical skills needed prior to their entry into the military service.⁴³ Military-patriotic education is an active process of instilling in the Soviet people the high political awareness, moral qualities, and practical skills required to properly defend the socialist homeland.

Students are educated toward a dedication to communism, their Soviet homeland, the party, and the Soviet government. Every attempt is made to inculcate the students with a high consciousness of their social and military duty, and to instill them with discipline, love of the military service, a sense of Soviet military pride, and an aspiration for heroic deeds.⁴⁴ The political convictions will hopefully serve to give the students the necessary moral will power to make themselves physically fit, give them concrete military experience, and prepare them for fulfilling the required norms for the rating of Ready for the Defense of the Homeland." Each lesson in basic military training is intended to develop the youth's interest in military affairs, add to the knowledge and skills that he needs as a defender of the motherland, and confirm the ideals of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, national pride, and readiness to defend socialist achievements.⁴⁵

Among the more prevalent military and political themes are the love of a soldier for his homeland and his chast,⁴⁶ and the great honor of

being a soldier.⁴⁷ Military service is characterized not as an obligation, but as a "sacred duty" of the people.⁴⁸ These themes are brought in to complement the other political messages from the party to the youth such as "the imperialist threat," "hatred of the enemy," "the crisis of capitalism," and "perpetual vigilance."

The Soviets place a special responsibility for the ideological training of youth, as well as their military-patriotic education, on the schools, particularly the secondary schools. Still, even in the first grade, training talks contain accounts and stories on military-patriotic subjects.⁴⁹ Teachers stress that if the imperialists manage to unleash a war, then in defense of the socialist motherland, not only soldiers will be fighting, but also school children. Military book corners are established in school libraries where students prepare for readers' conferences which deal with military-patriotic themes.⁵⁰ In social science courses, materials are drawn from the periodical press and photographic displays, devoted to the revolutionary and military glory of the Soviet people, are used. In music classes, students learn songs from the times of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War.⁵¹ Even mathematics and physics courses are oriented toward the student's understanding of military equipment and solving problems involving military data. Literature courses reveal the sources of courage and patriotism among the Soviet people and help to formulate the ideal defender of the country.⁵² In short, all subjects are aimed at formulating views and concepts

. . . which form the basis for a proper attitude towards military service and guarding our socialist fatherland. Social science courses provide convincing proof of the advantages of the social,

economic, and political bases of the socialist system, and the superiority of the socialist form of life.⁵³

Many schools create military glory museums, rooms, and corners, which are considered important enough to receive letters of commendation from high Soviet officials, such as that of Marshal Malinovskii to School Number 24 in Komsomolsk-na-Amur.⁵⁴ Other schools set up special exhibits and honor rolls such as "Our Graduates in the Soviet Army," where soldiers' photographs, letters, and certificates from commanders are displayed. Extracurricular school activities are also oriented toward military-patriotic themes. The children visit battle sites, museums, monuments, and acquire photographs of Soviet war heroes.⁵⁵ Meetings with participants of heroic achievements, and film festivals on war-related subjects are arranged to reveal the courage and heroism of the Soviet people and their inflexible communist convictions. Pioneers frequently hear stories about the courage and valor of their fathers and grandfathers in the Civil War and Great Patriotic War, and make commemorative militarized road marches which recreate the combat routes of the units in their military district.⁵⁶

DOSAAB

In 1967, the Soviet Union enacted a new Law of Universal Military Service which reduced the term of a conscript's service from three years to two years and set up a system of compulsory pre-military training for Soviet youths, thus transferring basic military training into the preinduction period.⁵⁷ The new law stated:

Before call-up for active military service, introductory military training is to be conducted for young men of preconscription and conscription age everywhere, without interrupting produc-

tion or studies.

Introductory military training, including civil defense training for young students at general-education schools (beginning in the ninth grade), in specialized secondary educational institutions, and in educational institutions of the technical-vocational system by regular military instructors.⁵⁸

The law resulted in a rebirth of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF), an organization first founded in 1927.⁵⁹

DOSAAF organizations work for the popularization of military knowledge, the military-patriotic education of workers, and the training of young people for military service.⁶⁰ A new stage in its work began even prior to the new law, with a May 1966 resolution by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, "On the Status and Measures for Improving the Work of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF)." The future task of the defense society was formulated in this resolution: ". . . to actively assist in the strengthening of the country's defensive capability and in training the worker to defend the socialist Homeland."⁶¹ Special efforts are made (1) to inculcate Soviet youth with the glorious combat traditions of the armed forces; (2) to acquaint them with life in the army and navy, the demands of the military oath, and the responsibilities of the soldier; and (3) to understand the necessity of observing iron military discipline. Additionally, the further perfection of military-patriotic training and the assistance of the party in the molding of the prerequisite moral and psychological qualities in the Soviet people which will allow them to endure the severe trials of modern warfare, make up the priority task of all DOSAAF organizations. As such, educational work

is conducted simultaneously with the training of youth of draft and pre-draft ages in the fundamentals of military science.⁶² DOSAAF's primary organizations are found in schools, industrial plants, offices, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and enterprises of all types. There are 80 million people in 330,000 primary organizations in DOSAAF's ranks.⁶³

In DOSAAF's training organizations, enlistees undergo comprehensive training for military service, acquire military and technical specialties, enhance their political understanding, and receive physical training. War veterans speak before the students, and the youths participate in field trips to places famous for the revolutionary and combat glory of the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ DOSAAF has many paramilitary clubs where young people of premilitary age acquire not only a knowledge of the principles of military affairs and become acquainted with the history of the Soviet Army and its traditions, but also acquire the military specialties of automobile driver, motor mechanic, parachute jumper, radio operator, or electrical mechanic.

In the course of elementary military training, the Soviet youth learns about the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, their character and peculiarities, and the significance of service in the army and navy as an honorable duty of citizens of the Soviet Union. They also study the fundamental demands of the military oath and military regulations. They learn how to fire infantry weapons, and become acquainted with the combat characteristics of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, as well as the means of defense against them. Additionally, they acquire knowledge and experience in one of the military-technical occupational specialties, primarily through the club system of DOSAAF.⁶⁵ In other

classes, they receive drill training and instruction in military topography.

Much of DOSAAF's success depends largely upon the degree of cooperation it is afforded from other Soviet institutions and bureaucracies such as Komsomol, trade unions, sports organizations, the Znaniye society, schools, and active military units.⁶⁶ It is here that DOSAAF can expect to encounter the traditional bureaucratic resistance from other groups, especially when competing with them for priority of the students' and workers' time. Just prior to the Seventh All-Union DOSAAF Congress, the DOSAAF members noted

. . . with great satisfaction that the increase in the level of mass defense work among the workers has been the result of the constant leadership and attention of the party.⁶⁷

This statement might indicate that the party organs had to twist the proverbial arms of the various bureaucracies to release their personnel for training, as well as their providing other means of support for DOSAAF's efforts.

Every so often, DOSAAF's military instructors, most of whom are reserve officers and sergeants, are criticized in the press for improper methodological techniques and attitudes toward their work. Therefore, once every five years, each military instructor takes courses to improve his qualifications at institutes for advanced training of teachers, such as the Penza Pedagogic Institute.⁶⁸ Many military instructors who do not have a higher pedagogical education take correspondence courses from various institutes, to which they are accepted without competition.⁶⁹

The initial supply and facilities problem of DOSAAF is being solved by increased investments from the government. Establishing a training

point at each secondary school, major factory, kolkhoze, and sovkhoze was no small undertaking. From 1967 through 1970, 560 club training buildings, technical training schools, and various athletic facilities were built and put into operation--a 150 percent increase over the previous four years.⁷⁰ Again, between 1972 and 1977, 50 unified technical schools, 87 firing ranges, 187 military-technical training camps, and 696 other projects had been built; the capital investment totaled 282.2 million rubles, which was 105 million rubles more than was spent from 1967 to 1971.⁷¹ Much of these funds were obtained by DOSAAF's lotteries, which can be expected to net the organizations about thirty million rubles annually.⁷²

Paramilitary Training

When the Law on Universal Military Service reduced a conscript's term of service from three years to two years, there was no corresponding reduction in the amount of training required for each soldier. Therefore, it became necessary to task DOSAAF to provide those courses of instruction for basic military training, as well as the training of personnel in elementary military specialties. As the law states:

Introductory military training and the training of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces are conducted under the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The appropriate ministries and departments, together with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, create the necessary training and material base, ensure the selection and training of military instructors for introductory military training and exercise control over organizing and implementing it.⁷³

In addition to the requirements for basic military training, the importance of providing the conscript with some elementary specialty is becoming increasingly important. During the Civil War, there were only

sixteen to twenty military-technical occupational specialties, whereas today there are hundreds of them.⁷⁴ Today, every third draftee receives a military-technical specialty in the DOSAAF system.⁷⁵

Though no specific program was embodied in the 1967 law, it appears that the basic military instruction given to Soviet youth amounts to some 140 hours. This can be further broken down as follows: (1) 40 hours are devoted to instruction in some particular branch of military knowledge, such as vehicle maintenance, the principles of the radar set, or elementary signalling procedures; (2) about 30 hours are devoted to civil defense instruction; and (3) about 70 hours are devoted to the study of Soviet military regulations and the Soviet military oath, familiarization with the anti-tank grenade launcher or other automatic weapons, and some live firing practice after some initial marksmanship training. In addition to the basic bloc of instruction, conscripts participate in a five day field exercise.⁷⁶ By the beginning of the 1971 school year, only 7,665 secondary schools and pedagogical institutes had preinduction training programs; 16,000 additional schools were to adopt programs in the 1971-72 school year; and the remaining 18,000 schools in the 1972-73 school year.⁷⁷

The required 140-hour training program does not include the myriad activities of DOSAAF, which sponsors military-related sports, clubs, and competitions for the Soviet youth. There are 2,300 technical-sport clubs in rayons and cities, and more than 4,000 in primary DOSAAF organizations. More than twenty million young men and women in sports sections, circles, and clubs are studying automobiles, airplanes, motorcycles, helicopters, submarines, motor boats, radios, parachuting, model

building, marksmanship, and other types of technical sports.⁷⁸ In fact, a large number of world and European champions, national record holders, and winners of major international competitions have come from the ranks of the society. DOSAAF technical-sports clubs are devoted to military-related sports and should not be confused with non-military sports, such as basketball or gymnastics, which are part of the highly organized Voluntary Sports Society (DSO).

Socialist competition is strongly encouraged among the various clubs of different DOSAAF organizations. At the Fifth All-Union Games in military-technical types of sports, more than twenty-one million participants went to the starting line, four thousand of whom became masters and candidate masters of sport. More than two million athletes fulfilled the norms for ratings.⁷⁹

Other DOSAAF activities include out-of-school group defense work. Creation of detachments of Young Friends of the Soviet Army, the "Red Pathfinders" movement; circles of young aviators, artillerymen, sailors, and tankers; military sports games, military glory evenings, meetings with participants and heroes of wars, excursions to battlegrounds, all help to create high patriotic feelings in the youth.⁸⁰

Another important paramilitary task of DOSAAF is to provide sufficient physical training so that the youth can pass the norms required for the "Ready for Defense of the Homeland" and "Ready for Labor and Defense" (GTO) badges. In addition to training received during the school year, military-sports camps are created during summer months by DOSAAF, Komsomol, and Pioneer organizations. Along with the patriotic excursions and paramilitary subjects, the youth are, at some time, put

through the GTO "complex." There are five stages in the GTO system, corresponding to different age groups.⁸¹ Stage III, for ages sixteen to eighteen, aims to perfect the physical skills young people will need for labor and for service in the armed forces. All draftees must fulfill the established GTO norms; young people work on them while still in school. Subjects for which norms have been established are: (1) 100 meter race; (2) cross-country race; (3) jumps (distance and height); (4) grenade tossing or shot putting; (5) ski race or sprint race (for regions with snow), or bike race; (6) swimming; (7) pull-ups or weight lifting (for men), bending and unbending hands on a gymnastic bench (for women); (8) small-caliber rifle shooting, or shooting actual military weapons; (9) walking tours to show skills of orientation; and (10) demonstrated skills in a miscellaneous sport such as handling an automobile, motor boat, motorcycle, or glider.⁸²

Military training of children in the ages preceeding their compulsory pre-draft military education is not left to individual impulses. Sixteen million Pioneers (ages ten to fifteen), under the direction of Marshal I. K. Bagrmayan, participate each year at summer camps in the military game Zarnitsa (Summer Lightning).⁸³ Here the children are introduced to the elements of military discipline, guard duty, military regulations, civil defense, and maneuvers in formation. Zarnitsa has acquired a "mass character" and is now ". . . one of the most important forms of military-patriotic indoctrination of youth."⁸⁴ Patron army and navy units often provide leadership and facilities for Zarnitsa military exercises. In the Vladivostok area, detachments of Pioneers participated in assault landings and in the repulse of a naval assault force. At the

end of the exercise, 6,500 Pioneers from 50 detachments passed in ceremonial review before a vice admiral.⁸⁵

Zarnitsa is the "little sister" of a new military game for youth. The Komsomol military sports game, Orlenok (Eaglet), is a continuation of the Pioneers' Zarnitsa. In Zarnitsa, the children only begin to familiarize themselves with army subjects, while in Orlenok, they ". . . seriously study military regulations and familiarize themselves more thoroughly with army life."⁸⁶ In addition to studying Soviet armed forces regulations, "Eaglets" are trained in sentry duty, repelling an attack, grenade throwing, infiltration, dealing with decontamination, map and compass work, firing the carbine and machinegun, and civil defense.

The compulsory preinduction military training program has advantages for the Soviet military other than preparing conscripts for service in the armed forces. First, the predraft training points have become valuable recruiting centers for the military officer cadet academies, and in addition, save some of the training costs of these institutions. Second, the use of reserve officers as instructors provides a sizeable number of reserve officers with continuing military activity while in a civilian status. Third, predraft training provides basic military training for the roughly 50 percent of Soviet youth that is not called to active duty. Fourth, the preinduction program is, in part, intended to inculcate military-patriotic sentiments and party discipline and values in the youth population. Political indoctrination is an important part of military training in the Soviet Armed Forces, and the predraft and associated patriotic programs prepare the youth in the

political creeds appropriate to a Soviet serviceman.⁸⁷

In-Service Military Training

Political Training

Marshal Andrei Grechko outlined the following basic principles of training and education of military personnel: (1) communist ideology and party spirit; (2) a unity of training and education; (3) training troops in what is necessary in war and under conditions which approximate combat reality as closely as possible; (4) a unity in training military personnel and their high degree of combat readiness; (5) training and education of personnel in the spirit of active offensive actions, persistence, and decisiveness in attaining a goal; and (6) a combination of the individual training of troops with the training of subunits, units, and ships.⁸⁸ Communist moral substance and party spirit in training and education determine the political orientation and class character of the entire comprehensive process of training personnel. This principle reflects the leading role of the CPSU in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the development and perfection of the entire system of training and educating Soviet military personnel.

Shaping the personality of the Soviet soldier does not mean only ". . . instilling in him specific combat qualities or making him a specialist in a specific military field of knowledge and skill, . . ."⁸⁹ but also,

. . . seeing to it that he is a confirmed and politically aware fighter, a fiery patriot of the socialist Motherland and an internationalist who is utterly devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.⁹⁰

Furthermore, the Soviets believe that only a politically mature, ideo-

logically convinced person is capable of becoming an active builder of communism while rebuffing the slander of ideological enemies.⁹¹ A profound ideological conviction of the soldier is considered to be the ". . . reliable guarantee of the strength of their moral spirit, the immunity to foreign influences, and of the successful struggle with the enemies of socialism."⁹² The most important result of the ideological and indoctrinational work should be the development of loyalty to the motherland and hatred for its enemies in each soldier. Also, an internal awareness of the possibility of war, and a constant readiness to unstintingly defend the socialist fatherland.⁹³

A special role in fostering patriotism in soldiers is played by political indoctrination. Group leaders explain to the servicemen the basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the CPSU congresses and other documents of the Soviet government, and tell them about Soviet achievements. The servicemen's scientific world outlook, molded in the course of political studies, consolidates their ideological conviction and consciousness which, in turn, makes a favorable impact on the development of their patriotic feelings and on their attitude to performing their service duty.⁹⁴

In order to achieve these stated aims, the Soviet program for political training stresses certain recurring themes which have their foundations throughout the soldier's schooling and preinduction training. Every soldier is made aware of the current problems in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and the significance of the CPSU's struggle for further developing friendship and cooperation with countries of socialism, and for peaceful coexistence of states with different social

systems. Simultaneously, the aggressive intrigues of imperialist circles, aimed at preparing for and unleashing a new world war, are uncovered.⁹⁵

Political lectures repeatedly explain to the soldiers the decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet government, the urgent problems of the modern world, the essence of the situation existing in the world, and a unmasking of the aggressive misanthropic nature of imperialism. During one particular winter training period, more than 60 percent of all lectures, reports, and political information was devoted to these subjects.⁹⁶ Documentary films are constantly stressed in Soviet military literature, since they recreate in a lively and impressive form

. . . in the conscience of the young men pictures of the previous engagements and the instances of mass troop heroism of the older generations on the fronts of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars.⁹⁷

Portable transistorized radios and recorders are available for use during political training conducted at field locations, because according to the Soviets,

. . . it is difficult to organize continuous information on world events and propagandizing of advanced experience in the field and during tactical exercises without them.⁹⁸

A typical political bloc of instruction would have as its goal to help the soldiers understand more deeply (1) the features of the present domestic and international situation of the Soviet state; (2) the party's activities for implementation of the "Program of Peace" developed by the Twenty-fourth Party Congress; and (3) the party's demands on the armed forces for maintaining high vigilance and constant combat readiness. Eight hours are devoted to such a topic: two hours for lecture, two hours for independent study; and four hours for seminar.⁹⁹

All the political messages received by the Soviet soldier during

his training are primarily intended to advance his individual resoluteness, as well as that of his unit, to perform his military duties to the utmost of his ability. The political training attempts to keep his mind receptive only to party interpretations, while at the same time, locks out any "slandorous" messages from other external sources. As such, the finished product would be a soldier who is

. . . a man strong in spirit . . . his heart overflows with love for the socialist Motherland. He is boundlessly devoted to the people and the cause of communism and is always ready to give his strength and, if necessary, his life, in the name of our just cause.¹⁰⁰

Military Training

The basic underlying principle in all of Soviet military training is to shape and cement together the combat, moral-political, psychological, and physical qualities in every soldier and every armed forces collective. On the basis of this, the Soviets hope to develop high combat expertise, spiritual stability, constant readiness to endure any trials of war, and an ability to maintain constant combat activeness and an unshakable will to win under the most difficult conditions.¹⁰¹ In the final analysis, the Soviets believe that the success of a combat operation consists only of ". . . the organic unity of improved equipment and a man well trained morally-politically and military-technologically."¹⁰²

The Soviets impose a great task upon themselves with respect to the desired results of a soldier's military training, especially in view of the two-year term of service brought about by the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service. The Soviet conscript is now called up in two draft periods, May-June and November-December of each calendar year. The

revision of the call-up period has altered the operation of the uchebnyi god, the training cycle, which begins on 1 December of each year, but which is now subdivided into two "subperiods" of twenty-six weeks to coincide with the arrival of the two annual contingents of conscripts.¹⁰³ The general effect has been to reduce the amount of formal classroom instruction given to the recruit and the need to pass him as quickly as possible to on-the-job training, with great emphasis on field exercises. On the other hand, the number of hours devoted to political training is about the same, though here also, there has been a diminution in the classroom routine and a reduction in formal lectures.¹⁰⁴

Among the more common criticisms of unit training in Soviet military literature by inspecting officers are those addressed at wasted time, poorly prepared instructions, training schedules not being followed as to times and subjects, and too many personnel missing from required training.¹⁰⁵ Every minute of the soldier's day must be accounted for and utilized to insure the most effective productivity. The training day is a long one for the Soviet soldier, as it also includes the evening hours. A typical training schedule for a given day might be as follows:

0650-0700	Reveille for assistant platoon leaders
0700-0705	Reveille
0705-0735	Physical exercise
0735-0755	Cleaning of barracks, making of beds, washing
0755-0810	Morning inspection
0810-0840	Breakfast
0845-1520	Training exercises (seven hours with alternate breaks of five and ten minutes between classes)
1520-1530	Washing, cleaning uniforms, boots
1530-1610	Lunch
1610-1640	Free (personal) time
1640-1810	Self-training in political and military subjects
1810-1910	Care of combat equipment
1910-1920	Polishing of boots, accessories, washing
1920-2050	Political and mass-scale sports work

2050-2120	Supper
2120-2220	Time for personal needs
2220-2235	Evening walk
2235-2250	Evening roll call
2250-2300	Cleaning of uniforms, boots, washing
2300	Taps ¹⁰⁶

Soviet military training is more psychologically oriented than it is performance oriented. This is not to say that the soldier's specialty skills are not important; however, the Soviets place a bit more emphasis on the psychological conditioning of the soldier and his ability to come to grips with the environment of the modern battlefield. Psychological training is called upon (1) to mold among the soldiers the qualities which strengthen their capability to operate individually and collectively under the strained conditions of combat; and (2) to help them display steadfastness and self-control, and to operate actively, sharply, and bravely while using their weapons to their fullest capacity.¹⁰⁷ The Soviets realize that it is better for a soldier to be able to fire his weapon in a field of fire while under fire, than to score "points" for hitting a bulls-eye on a known-distance firing range. A sagger missile gunner who can score a hit on the mechanical-simulator ranges is quite different from one who can effectively operate his tedious, wire-guided missile under the gross distractions in a massive combat assault.

A necessary element in the psychological training of the troops is their gaining a correct notion of the essence and nature of modern warfare, as well as strengthening their certainty in the power of Soviet military material and weapons.¹⁰⁸ Psychological training is emphasized so that the Soviet soldier will be able to overcome the inherent stresses of combat by a molding of qualities which make them capable of acting in

the dangerous and tense conditions of modern war.¹⁰⁹ These qualities include a soldier's sound confidence, quick reaction to various situations, precise execution of his military skills, and incorruptible discipline--both to his superior and self-discipline.

During combat field training, a huge effort is made to include as much combat realism as possible. Such forms as tanks rolling over motorized riflemen in trenches, and live firing over the heads of troops are common in Soviet combat-training maneuvers.¹¹⁰ Much use is also made of audio-visual training aids which recreate the sounds and sights of real combat operations. Artillery preparations and close air support are executed within five hundred meters of the combat formations of troops. Shots are fired from rifles and automatic weapons, live grenades are tossed, rockets are launched, smoke screens are created.¹¹¹ The soldier is a participant of fire power demonstrations, and not just an observer sitting in the bleachers. Nuclear simulators, gas attacks, and decontamination procedures receive a great deal of emphasis during field training. The soldier is taught to don his protective mask and clothing quickly, and practices operating his weapon effectively for extended periods of time under such conditions. Thus, the Soviet soldier becomes more and more acclimated to the conditions of the modern battlefield, and after several of these exercises, he can be expected to display a relatively high degree of self-control, emotional stability, discipline, and precise, swift execution of his duties.

Post-Service Training

The ability of the armed forces to require additional training and service from the noncommissioned ranks who have been discharged into the

reserves compensates for the 1967 reduction in the length of service. Men remain in the Soviet Armed Forces reserves until they reach fifty years of age. Reservists in the age group thirty-five and under are subject to four refresher training sessions lasting up to three months each. Reservists under thirty-five who have served less than one year can be called back for refresher training sessions six times for periods lasting up to three months each.¹¹² Air reservists under thirty-five years of age are subject both to these training sessions and to refresher flying practice sessions up to five times for forty days each.¹¹³ That is, air reservists are subject to a maximum of almost nineteen months of additional training. In addition, reservists can be summoned to attend "examination sessions" for a period lasting up to ten days.¹¹⁴ It is evident that the military retains considerable control over the amount of time noncommissioned personnel spend in the reserves.

The training time that can be imposed on reserve officers is even greater. Reserve officers under thirty-five years of age can be summoned every year for a period lasting up to three months each time, although the total amount of time spent in reserve sessions is not to exceed thirty months.¹¹⁵ However,

. . . the USSR Minister of Defense has the right to detain, if necessary, reserve officers, generals, and admirals at refresher training sessions for up to two months longer than the periods established by this law, and also increase the number of refresher training sessions for reserve officers, without exceeding the total amount of time spent at sessions.¹¹⁶

Reserve officers in the thirty-five to forty age group can be called for two sessions of up to three months each, and those over forty-five can be recalled for one session. In addition, "commanders sessions,"

lasting from thirty to sixty training hours and organized by the commanders of garrisons and by local military commissariats, are held for reserve officers under thirty-five years of age once every three years. These sessions are held near the officer's place of residence. More important, reserve officers can be assigned during peacetime to full active duty for two to three years if they are under thirty years of age. "The number of those so serving and their military service specialties are determined by the USSR Council of Ministers."¹¹⁷

There is no way to provide an accurate estimate of how freely these rights of recall are exercised, although references in Soviet military literature indicate that they are invoked frequently enough. Both officers and enlisted reserves are often brought back for refresher training during major maneuvers. During the Yug maneuvers, ". . . some of the men who were working literally yesterday at factories, on farms, and in various offices are participating in the Yug maneuvers."¹¹⁸ Similarly, a political officer who was ". . . just yesterday . . . at the factory . . . is now participating in the Yug maneuvers."¹¹⁹

The option to recall reserve officers for two to three years of active duty is exercised quite frequently. Soviet discussions of training, discipline, and other problems of the officer corps make not infrequent references to cases involving young reserve officers who resent their call from civilian life. A reserve lieutenant called to duty wrote to Krasnaya Zvezda:

When the battalion commander asked me to take over the company, I was quite surprised and naturally refused. I explained my refusal by pointing out that I am not a cadre officer. There is much that I do not know. I cannot be responsible for combat equipment and materiel. And now I have been punished for no reason whatsoever.

Krasnaya Zvezda comments:

In fact, it appears that the lieutenant was punished for questioning an order. The lieutenant is complaining that he, an officer called up from the reserve, is being compelled (he stressed the word) to serve on a par with cadre officers.¹²⁰

These young officers recalled from the reserves for two to three years constitute a appreciable portion of Soviet technical or engineer officers. The recall from the reserves frequently interrupts a professional engineering career in civilian society. Officers with specialties in high demand, and others who have had no prior active military service are also likely to be called up.¹²¹ The latter are presumably persons in specialized secondary and higher schools who have studied in the program for training reserve officers.¹²²

The negative attitudes of young reserve officers to their recall are unfortunate for the military, which seeks to encourage reserve officers to stay in the armed forces as professional soldiers.

Individuals who have been reactivated are in particular need of constant assistance. Many reactivated reserve officers express a wish to make a career out of it. Such thinking should be encouraged in every way.¹²³

The extent to which officers who have been called up from the reserves express a wish to remain among the troops depends a great deal on the colonel and the time he devotes to them. . . . Colonels who treat their reserve officers as if they were on temporary duty will not encourage them to stay with the military.¹²⁴

Conclusion

Soviet mobilization plans are based on their perceived need for the earliest possible penetration into enemy territory to bring about a quick victory, or, should that approach be unsuccessful, to support and sustain a protracted war. The type of mobilization considered by the

Soviets--total or special, open or concealed--will depend upon the extent and nature of the intended Soviet response to a particular military crisis. The three readiness categories provide the Soviets with a capability for various degrees and flexibility of response.

Manpower recruitment problems during a war will be solved by bringing each of the three categories of units up to strength according to a territorial method. Cadre units of varying degrees of readiness--I, II, or III--are located at each mobilization point. Category I units will have the least number of reserve personnel (up to 33 percent); Category II units will have a balance of cadre and reserve personnel; and Category III units will have the most number of reserve personnel (up to 67 percent). As such, while Category I units can be expected to perform well in combat, Category II units will probably encounter operational difficulties as up to half of their men will be reservists; Category III units will, in effect, be reserve units, with hardly any unit training experiences. However, all units will be undergoing a sufficient degree of personnel turbulence during the various stages of the mobilization which could detract somewhat significantly from the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Additionally, the required needs for Soviet officers, particularly those with technical and specialty skills, will have to be met by the conscription of militarily-untrained technicians and engineers directly from the industrial sector.

Soviet materiel reserves will be stockpiled and dispersed based on the need for continuous supply of the armed forces until the mobilized industry expands production to sufficient proportions. Much emphasis is placed on the realized need to meet the requirements of a highly

mechanized armed forces, especially for such commodities as fuel and lubricants. The railroads still remain the dominant form of transportation in the Soviet Union. However, Soviet recognition of the railroad system's extreme vulnerability to attack and the ultimate disruption of the entire system of logistics has resulted in a slow trend toward conversion to a more balanced system of transportation. Unless the Soviets are able to advance the rate of this trend, most of the stock-piled materiel will remain at the factories and never get into the hands of the armed forces. Soviet mobilization of industry is predicated upon three measures: dispersion, duplication of production, and anti-nuclear defense, to include underground facilities for the more important enterprises. One very harmful effect of mobilization could be felt in agriculture, as both manpower and equipment will be withdrawn from this sector. Therefore, unless there are huge reserves of grain, the Soviet leadership could be faced with exactly the same situation which faced Tsar Nicholas II between 1915 and 1917.

The Soviet population is prepared politically, defensively, and militarily. Themes of Soviet patriotism, love of country and the party, are rampant through every means of communication. Civil defense measures have taken on a new impetus, as the public is constantly educated on warning systems, evacuation procedures, shelter construction, and individual protection and decontamination measures. Military measures are directed to prepare the population for partisan activities in the event of an invasion. All this perpetuates the continuing "state of emergency" cries of the CPSU, which help to maintain and legitimize party power and policy.

Military-patriotic education of the Soviet youth is considered an indispensable necessity for the defense of the Soviet Union. The themes and political messages of heroism, patriotism, love of country and the party, preparation for self-sacrifice, discipline, and the "sacred duty" of a soldier are presented to the children through their school lessons and extracurricular activities. This also includes the activities of the Pioneers and Komsomol. Among the other prevalent themes are "hatred of the enemy," "the threat of imperialism," and "perpetual vigilance." DOSAAF is responsible, under the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, for providing all youths with 140 hours of basic military training and some elementary military specialty. The over 330,000 DOSAAF organizations are at schools, factories, offices, and farms throughout the Soviet Union to insure that all youths are brought into the program. In addition to the 140-hour bloc of instruction, the DOSAAF system includes numerous military-sport clubs which foster the paramilitary spirit among Soviet youths, with a strong emphasis on physical training to enable the youths to pass the norms for their "defense" badges. In support of DOSAAF's efforts, the Pioneers and Komsomol conduct the war games Zarnitsa and Orlenok.

In-service political training continues the themes and political messages developed during the soldier's days in school and with DOSAAF. The means of indoctrination, however, are more formalized, rigid, and passive: repetitive lectures, party reports, and one-way seminars. The aims of this intensive political training on such a captive audience are to produce a resoluteness and conviction in the soldier to perform as best he could; should this fail, the boredom would be such that the

soldier would turn off any political messages, particularly external political messages. Thus, the party is able to benefit even in a negative sense. In military training, there is increased emphasis of field training, especially with the reduced two-year term of conscripts. The combat training of soldiers is more psychologically oriented than it is performance oriented. Combat realism during training exercises gives the soldier a good taste of actual battlefield conditions. Soldiers are participants in live-fire exercises, not merely observers in a row of bleachers. The Soviets are not willing to wait for an actual situation for their soldiers to face up to the shocks and apprehensions of combat. The experiences gained by Soviet soldiers in this respect is, indeed, an advantageous and significant factor in their favor.

The post-service training is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet military personnel chain. Both military training and political training are sporadic at best, so skills can be maintained for short periods of time or not at all. However, it is perhaps the most viable system possible considering the number of personnel involved in the reserves. Also, the very size of the Soviet reserves helps compensate for its shortcomings, together with the fact that the reservists will be integrated into cadre units in the event of a call-up or mobilization.

One of the advantages of universal military service is that a larger number of men receive military training. The ability to train successive cohorts of young men, and thus to build up large reserves of trained soldiers is important to the Soviets, who have a high regard for the value of large numbers of men and of their immediate availability. Universal military service, with its negligible pay for conscripts, is

also economically attractive to the Soviets. Additionally, the idea that an obligation or duty to the state as important as military service should be at the option of the individual rather than of the state, is inadmissible to Soviet leaders. Universal military service provides the Soviets with the means to fulfill their mobilization plans and make possible a quick decisive victory in a short war, or the means to engage in a protracted war, aimed not at a stalemate, but at supporting the war-winning strategy.

Notes

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⁵Ibid.

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⁷The Military Balance, 1977-78 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 21.

⁸Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 307.

⁹Ibid., p. 309.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 311.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 310.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 311.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 314.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 315.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 316.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 322.

²⁸Ibid., p. 323.

²⁹Ibid., p. 316.

³⁰Ibid., p. 317.

³¹Ibid., p. 324.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 329.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 330.

³⁶Ibid., p. 331.

³⁷V. Mironov, "The Training of Young People," Voyennyye Znaniya, no. 8 (1966) in JPRS 38,286 (1966), p. 7.

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⁴²M. Prokof'yev, "Rear Patriots," Voyennyye Znaniya, no. 10 (1967), in JPRS 43,558 (1967), p. 4.

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⁴⁴Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 August 1966, in JPRS 38,199 (1966), p. 8.

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⁴⁶"Intensification of the Patriotic Military Training of Youth," p. 13.

⁴⁷N. Nekrasov, "A Green Light for the Training Stations," Voyennyye Znaniya, no. 1 (1967), in JPRS 41,661 (1967), p. 43.

⁴⁸Major General G. Shatunov, "A Sacred Duty, an Honorable Duty," Kryl'ya Rodiny, February 1968, in JPRS 44,817 (1968), p. 19.

⁴⁹Mironov, "The Training of Young People," p. 7.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵¹"The Role of DOSAAF in Paramilitary Training and Military-Patriotic Indoctrination in the Schools," Voyennyye Znaniya, no. 9 (1966), in JPRS 38,291 (1966), p. 4.

⁵²Mikaberidze, "Military Patriotic Education of Youth," p. 6.

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴"The Role of DOSAAF in Paramilitary Training and Military-Patriotic Indoctrination in the Schools," p. 4.

⁵⁵Mironov, "The Training of Young People," p. 8.

⁵⁶"Intensification of the Patriotic Military Training of Youth," p. 13.

⁵⁷John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: The Royal United Services Institute, 1971), in Strategic Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1973), p. 96.

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⁵⁹Colonel General A. Odintsov, "School of Patriots," Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 January 1977, in Soviet Press Selected Translations, May 1977, p. 115.

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⁶⁶Primary Military Training," editorial in Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 June 1968, in JPRS 46,081 (1968), p. 62.

⁶⁷"The Seventh All-Union Congress," editorial in Voyennyye Znaniya, no. 12 (1971), in JPRS 55,089 (1972), p. 15.

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⁹⁸Ibid., p. 35.

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¹¹³Article 52, USSR Law on Universal Military Service, p. 8.

¹¹⁴Article 55, USSR Law on Universal Military Service, p. 8.

¹¹⁵Article 59, USSR Law on Universal Military Service, p. 8.

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¹²¹Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 14 (July 1971), cited by Goldhammer, The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at Troop Level, p. 10.

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¹²³Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 January 1970, cited by Goldhammer, The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at Troop Level, p. 10.

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CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Given the reshaping of Soviet strategic doctrine under the Brezhnev regime into one which seeks to bring about a war-winning strategy, should a future war occur, all Soviet views of war, their capabilities derived therefrom, and the preparations undertaken in the Soviet Union will have been for naught without a viable system of strategic leadership. The fact that this need for a viable system of strategic leadership appears obvious does not mean that the Soviet Union has always maintained such a system.

On 22 June 1941, the Nazi's "Barbarossa" campaign into the Soviet Union had begun, and the Soviets found themselves with an inadequate system of leadership, and no system for command and control. While they were, however, able to construct such a system, it was done in the midst of a war being fought on Soviet soil. It is understandable, therefore, that the Soviets resolved never to be faced with such a potentially disastrous situation in a future war. Yet the needs for "leadership of the country's defense," "leadership of the armed forces," and a plausible system of command and control were not actually met until the latter half of the 1960s, over twenty years after the Great Patriotic War.

The fact that so much, if not all, of the Soviet military literature on strategic leadership is based on the experiences of the Great Patriotic War does not necessarily mean that these are only academic and historical

works. Instead, these works serve to stress the successes of the various leadership bodies, to reinforce the urgency for such bodies, and to provide practical significance for contemporary conditions. In discussing the evolution of Soviet strategic leadership, this chapter is divided into three sections: (1) Types of Soviet Bodies for Defense Leadership; (2) Soviet Strategic Leadership: 1937-1964; and (3) Soviet Strategic Leadership under Brezhnev.

Types of Soviet Bodies for Defense Leadership

The Communist party's primacy in the making of policy largely derives from the Politburo's final authority in deciding defense and military questions. The degree to which the Politburo determines specific details, as opposed to general guidelines, is unknown, but presumably varies with the importance of the issue in question. Details that are not spelled out in Politburo resolutions are left to the governmental and military bodies responsible for implementing policy, which requires them to be policy-making bodies in their own right. There are two different types of bodies involved, summarized in the distinction between "leadership of the country's defense" and "leadership of the armed forces."¹ "Leadership of the country's defense" is the more encompassing term, somewhat equivalent to the Western notion of "national security affairs." According to Marshal Grechko,

. . . leadership of the country's defense is a broad concept. It includes besides military questions, questions of internal and external policy, of the economy, ideology, and diplomacy of the state.²

"Leadership of the armed forces," which particularly is equated with "strategic leadership," is narrower in scope, being concerned only with

specifically military questions.

The distinction between the two types of leadership parallels that which the Soviets make between broad and narrow definition of the term "military development." In the broad sense, corresponding to "defense," military development comprises

. . . the entire complex of measures by which the military policy of the Party and the State is effected, beginning with the organization of military production, the education of the population in moral-political and military affairs and the implementation of mobilization measures, and ending with ideological and organizational measures which are implemented in the Armed Forces themselves.³

In the narrow sense, however, military development is equivalent to the "development of the armed forces" and includes

. . . measures directly connected with building up and strengthening the Armed Forces, namely, the organization of military units and formations and bringing them up to strength, their being equipped with materiel and weapons, the training and education of personnel, the development of military science, the training of cadres, and the mobilization of units and formations for combat readiness.⁴

Thus the body that is responsible for leadership of the country's defense is superior to that which is restricted to leadership of the armed forces. The latter reports to the former, making requests and recommendations on matters that are beyond its own competence. However, since "defense" not only goes beyond, but also includes "development of the armed forces," the former can also make decisions on matters that nominally fall within the purviews of the latter.⁵

The Soviets apply this distinction between different types of leadership and levels of leading bodies both to their own system and to those of the West. Thus, leadership of the country's defense is described as the function of the US National Security Council, while leadership of

the armed forces is ascribed to the civilian and military leaders of the Pentagon--the Secretaries of Defense and of the individual services, plus the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶

Soviet Strategic Leadership: 1937-1964

1937-1941

In April 1937, the Defense Committee--a strengthened replacement for the 1932 Defense Commission--was charged with unifying all measures and questions of the defense of the Soviet Union, which in terms of the decisions ascribed to this body, appear primarily to have concerned weapons development and procurement, as well as the rapid expansion of defense industry.⁷ While this body provided the leadership of the country's defense, a Main Military Council of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) was created on 18 March 1938, followed by the formation of the Main Military Council of the Navy on 21 April.⁸ These Main Military Councils were to provide for the leadership of the armed forces. They were collegial organs "attached to" or "under the chairmanship of" the People's Commissar of Defense and of the Navy, respectively. They were not organic, or "part of" the People's Commissariat of Defense and of the Navy, but functioned as the "external adjunct" or "board of directors" for their respective Commissariats.

Technically, the Main Military Councils were advising bodies, for while decisions of the Councils were to be implemented through orders by the chairman cum minister, he was not, however, legally obliged to carry out the wishes of the majority.⁹ If he refused to do so, he was to report such disagreement to both the Council of People's Commissars

and the party's Central Committee, to which members of the Main Military Councils could appeal whenever their own views had not been accepted. However, it is doubtful that this happened very often, if at all; a powerful party figure was a member of each Council--Stalin in that of the RKKA, and Zhdanov in that of the Navy--who probably dominated, or at least heavily influenced, the actual decision making.¹⁰

Since bodies for the leadership of the armed forces are subordinate to bodies for the leadership of the country's defense, it would appear that some direct or formal linkage between the Defense Committee and the Main Military Councils was inherently necessary. However, other than the informal ties established by virtue of Stalin's and Voroshilov's positions on both leadership bodies (and through Stalin's party-proxy, Zhdanov, in the Navy's Main Military Council),¹¹ it appears that no direct linkage was established between the Defense Committee and the Main Military Councils. This left the Council of People's Commissars--a policy-implementing body, not a military decision-making body--to serve as the formal link between the Defense Committee, through the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then to the Main Military Council. In effect, this was a break in the military chain of command. The People's Commissariat of Defense and of the Navy served the administrative functions for the military and provided the command link to the military districts and groups of forces of the former, and the fleets of the latter.

The end result was that the Defense Committee was not directly linked to the Main Military Councils, and the Main Military Councils were not directly linked to the military commands. Additionally, all strategic, administrative, and organizational functions bottlenecked at

the People's Commissariats and a void in strategic leadership resulted. An illustration of the relationships and linkage between the leadership of the country's defense and the leadership of the armed forces is shown at figure 4-1.

The Main Military Councils ". . . examined the most important questions of the development of the army and the navy, and directed all their activities toward their comprehensive preparation for impending war."¹² They are described as collegial organs at the strategic level, and the Main Military Council for the People's Commissariat of Defense acted as the strategic leadership in the "Winter War" with Finland of 1939-40. Similarly, when war broke out with Germany on 22 June 1941, the Main Military Council of the RKKA issued directives to the various army and air force commands; but clearly, it was not up to the task of strategic leadership on such a scale, and one Soviet source acidly notes that a "High Command" had not been created in good time, that is, in advance.¹³

1941-1945

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War in June 1941, extraordinary measures were resorted to, as they had been during the Civil War. On 30 June, the Defense Committee, including Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, was replaced by the State Defense Committee (GKO) which

. . . held the supreme authority in the country during the war, and which had the right to employ all the strengths and resources of the socialist state in conducting the war, provided the capability for the most purposeful planning and distribution of the physical resources of the country to satisfy the requirements of the war.¹⁴

During its existence, the GKO adopted 9,971 resolutions and decisions,




Figure 4-1. Soviet Strategic Leadership:
1937-1941

two-thirds of which related in one way or another to questions of military logistics and organization of military production.¹⁵ Its decisions were unquestioningly obligatory for all citizens, all party, soviet, komsomol, and military organs, and its decrees had the force of martial law.¹⁶

Stalin was the chairman of the GKO, with Molotov as his deputy, and Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria initial members. It should be noted that the latter two were only candidate members of the Politburo at the time, and that later additions to the State Defense Committee (Bulganin, Voznesenskii, and Kaganovich)¹⁷ still did not encompass all full members of the highest party body. This committee was modeled after Lenin's Council of Defense (1918)¹⁸ and it was especially concerned with mobilizing economic and human resources for the war effort. Individual members were given overall responsibility for particular sections of defense industry. As was its predecessor, it is referred to as the highest organ of leadership of the country and the armed forces, and it unified the military, political, and economic leadership of the country.¹⁹

The State Defense Committee assigned tasks to the Military Command, furnished it with the required forces and resources; concerned itself with the production of armament, combat equipment, and supplies; the training of strategic reserves; and devoted a great amount of attention to directing ". . . the struggle being carried out in the enemy's rear areas."²⁰ Concerning the work carried out by the State Defense Committee, Marshal Zhukov writes:

During sessions of the GKO, discussions were held and decisions handed down on the most important matters of the time. The plans for military actions were reviewed by the State Defense Committee jointly with the Party's Central Committee and the people's commissars, the rights of which were expanded considerably. Thus it was possible to concentrate tremendous material resources along

the principal axes, to follow a uniform line with regard to strategic leadership and, by reinforcing it with a well organized system of rear services, to coordinate the combat activities of the forces with the efforts of the entire country.²¹

The Stavka, or General Headquarters, was created on 23 June 1941 to fill the void of the Main Military Councils.²² The Main Military Councils apparently played no role during the war, although one source refers to military councils of the branches of the armed forces as existing, and they may not have been formally abolished.²³ The Stavka was initially chaired by Timoshenko, the People's Commissar of Defense, and its first members included Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Zhukov (Chief of the General Staff), and Kuznetsov (People's Commissar of the Navy).²⁴ Stalin became its chairman on 10 July 1941, People's Commissar of Defense on 19 July, and on 8 August took the title Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces.²⁵

The membership of the Stavka changed over the course of the war, evolving into a "military politburo" composed of Stalin and his senior commanders. Voroshilov and Budyonny, having demonstrated their incompetence in the first months of fighting, were replaced by genuinely professional officers. Molotov, who never acquired a military rank, eventually lost his seat, while Kuznetsov participated only when naval matters were under consideration, and apparently was not an actual member for most of the war.²⁶

The Stavka was overall in charge of leadership of the combat activities of the Soviet Armed Forces and was subordinate to the GKO. This collective leadership, as explained by Army General S. Shtemenko, was, in fact, an expression of one-man command:

. . . in the higher echelon of the Armed Forces leadership, one-man

command was carried out in a specific way. The point was that no one but GHQ had the right to control the armed struggle as a whole. GHQ alone approved the plans for campaigns and operations. Thus, as regards control of the armed struggle, GHQ constituted the body of one-man command.²⁷

Stavka's strategic leadership was carried out through the General Staff, the principal working organ of the Stavka. The most important decisions were made by the Stavka

. . . following thorough preparations for such decisions in the General Staff and discussions involving participation of the leaders of the General Staff and the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces and, during the planning of operations-- commanders and members of the military councils in the fronts involved, with the decisions being passed along to the executive personnel in the form of a directive from the Supreme High Commander.²⁸

The activities of the General Staff included (1) the collection of operational-strategic information on the situation; (2) preparation of operational calculations and proposals concerning utilization of the armed forces; (3) direct elaboration of plans for campaigns and strategic operations; and (4) supervision of strategic reconnaissance. Additionally, it was the General Staff that prepared the directives of the Stavka for the field commands, and gave birth to the strategic concepts and plans of military operations approved by the Stavka.²⁹

The General Staff was the "creative working organ"³⁰ and "laboratory"³¹ of the Stavka, the former's Operations section in charge of drawing up the specifics of the battle plans. The Stavka is thus termed the "highest organ of strategic leadership"³² or the "highest organ of military leadership."³³ It was subordinate to the State Defense Committee, with which joint sessions were held (as well as with the Politburo).³⁴

In the summer and fall of 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense was reorganized in accordance with a resolution of the Council of

People's Commissars for the purpose of perfecting the system of strategic leadership. The General Staff was freed from functions of an organizational and administrative nature, and was, therefore, able to concentrate its efforts on operational-strategic leadership of the armed forces, while the other directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense executed the administrative and organizational functions.³⁵ In effect, the General Staff was functionally removed from the People's Commissariat of Defense and was placed at the immediate disposal of the Stavka. Stalin's position as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces and as People's Commissar of Defense helped to prevent a widening functional bifurcation between the Stavka and the General Staff on the one hand, and the People's Commissariat of Defense on the other hand. An illustration of the strategic leadership between 1941 and 1945 is shown at figure 4-2.

Nominally, the Stavka was a "collegial" or "collective organ,"³⁶ but there is little doubt that Stalin's position in the Stavka, as well as in the GKO, influenced many major decisions. Soviet memoir literature suggests that although strict and standard reporting procedures were adhered to, Stalin consulted with whichever of his trusted associates were present when a particular problem arose, irrespective of civilian or military status, or even actual membership in one or another body.³⁷ Stalin's direct command of military activities has been noted even in the more recent works of Soviet military literature:

Three times a day (including at night) he would receive reports from the chief of the General Staff and the chief of the operations directorate, and he would personally telephone the front and army commanders in order to give them requisite instructions.³⁸

An important sphere of activity of the Stavka and the General Staff




Figure 4-2. Soviet Strategic Leadership:
1941-1945

in the leadership of the armed forces consisted of the organization and maintenance of "strategic interaction"--coordination. Depending on the concrete conditions pertaining to the operation, various methods of strategic interaction were utilized: (1) coordination of the efforts of strategic groupings operating in different directions and resolving independent missions; (2) coordination of actions of groups of fronts and branches of the armed forces advancing simultaneously along a broad front, in all strategic directions; and (3) coordination of actions of the Soviet and allied forces.³⁹ Liaison coordination was implemented by a group of General Staff officers, formed in the reorganization of 1941, which made it possible to continuously provide General Staff presence for information and control purposes. Two officers were placed with each front headquarters; three officers with each army headquarters; and two officers with each division headquarters.⁴⁰ These officers, while ostensibly implementing coordination from the General Staff, were also the "eyes and ears" of the General Staff in the operating forces.⁴¹

The experiences of strategic leadership during the Great Patriotic War are used by the current Soviet military leadership to point out the necessity for a solid system of strategic leadership and the practical application of these past experiences to contemporary conditions. Army General Kulikov stated:

Consequently one of the lessons of war consists of the fact that the system of strategic leadership must be thought out, worked out, and coordinated in all details ahead of time, before the start of the war.⁴²

With regard to the strategic leadership experiences of the Great Patriotic War, Marshal Grechko stated:

In the course of the war the forms and methods of direction over the Soviet Armed Forces steadily improved, became more efficient and effective as combat experience was accumulated and their material-technical base was strengthened. The experience gained in this regard not only has great cognitive interest, but it largely retains its practical significance under contemporary conditions as well.⁴³

1945-1964

With the end of the war, the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, and its responsibilities officially reverted to the Council of Ministers as the government of the USSR. No specific body was designated to be responsible for "leadership of the country's defense" following the war.⁴⁴ Such leadership regularly has been attributed to the party and its leading organs, particularly the Central Committee and occasionally the Politburo. However, the party was frequently paired with "the government" in such statements, raising the possibility that some such defense organ had existed. During the final years of Stalin's rule, the Council of Ministers had an executive committee called the Presidium, plus one or more subcommittees and one of these may have been a body with formal responsibility for defense matters.⁴⁵

On Stalin's death in March 1953, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was designated its sole executive committee, composed of the Chairman, the First Deputy Chairmen, and the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers.⁴⁶ Most members of the Politburo were initially members of this Presidium with the notable exception of First Secretary Khrushchev. Given this, as well as the norms of "collective leadership" at that time, it is doubtful that the Presidium of the Council of

Ministers functioned as the agency in charge of defense. Rather, it is probable that the full Politburo* handled such matters itself, with the Presidium meanwhile evolving more along the lines of the Economic Council created in 1937.⁴⁷

Khrushchev ousted his major opponents from the Politburo in June 1957, and took over chairmanship of the Council of Ministers the following March. It is possible that, subsequently, a subcommittee of Politburo members and government leaders came into being, to deal informally, and perhaps on an ad hoc basis, with defense questions. Reportedly, a "Soviet National Security Council" composed of Khrushchev and five ranking Politburo members managed the Cuban missile crisis on the Soviet side,⁴⁸ but this group may have been a temporary expedient rather than a regular and official policy-making body. Not until 1969 did a US State Department official, in congressional testimony, indicate that there was a regularly operating Soviet "Defense Committee."⁴⁹ As will be discussed below, there is some basis for believing that this body was not created until after Khrushchev was removed from leadership in October 1964.

With the end of the fighting, the Stavka ceased its activity. The separate Ministry of the Navy was merged into the Ministry of Defense in February 1946. At the same time, in place of the abolished Stavka

*The Politburo was renamed the Presidium of the Central Committee at the 19th Party Congress in 1952, and returned to its original designation at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966. To avoid confusion with the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the term "Politburo" will be used throughout this period as well.

was restored the Higher Military Council--the collective organ which had existed prior to the war as the Main Military Council.⁵⁰ This plus the fact that the Higher Military Council was described as "attached to" rather than "of" the ministry, suggested that it was an advisory body whose views were not binding on its chairman. It was composed of members of the Politburo and members of the Central Committee, leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces, and since Stalin remained Minister of Defense until March 1947, he presumably was its first chairman. The use of the adjective "higher" in the title of this council is perhaps explained by the simultaneous creation of Military Councils "attached to" the commanders-in-chief of each of the three branches of the Soviet Armed Forces--the army, air forces, and navy.⁵¹

Bulganin became Minister of Defense in March 1947, but since Stalin may have retained the title Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, he perhaps did not also take over the chairmanship of the Higher Military Council.⁵² Stalin probably maintained the position nominally, as the struggle for the Stalin succession began to take shape, perhaps as early as 1945. Yet, as a candidate member of the Politburo (raised to a full membership in February 1948) and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Bulganin seemed otherwise to have succeeded Voroshilov's former role as the "political marshal" charged with looking after military affairs.⁵³ In March 1949, the more professional, but less politically intimate Marshal Vasilevskii became Minister of Defense. The following February, a separate Ministry of the Navy was again established, with the Higher Military Council now "attached to" the Council of Ministers, while Main Military Councils were set up and "attached to"

each of the ministries.⁵⁴ At this point it is possible that the Higher Military Council became a functional advisor to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers for military-economic and defense-industrial matters, but there is nothing to show a strategic or command relationship between the two.

It is at this point that Soviet historical treatment of the evolution of the body for leadership of the armed forces ceases. On Stalin's death in March 1953, the two ministries were again reunited, with Bulganin once more Minister of Defense, but the major Soviet sources make no reference to the fate of the Higher and Main Military Councils. The "main" councils almost certainly were replaced by "ordinary" Military Councils attached to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces; but the Higher Military Council apparently survived intact.⁵⁵ One description of the October 1957 Central Committee plenum charged Zhukov (who had succeeded Bulganin in 1955 as Minister of Defense) with having

. . . insisted on the liquidation of the Higher Military Council--the collective organ composed of members and candidate members of the CC Politburo, military, and political leaders of the army and fleet.⁵⁶

The phrasing suggested that this body had continued to be responsible for leadership of the armed forces, an interpretation reinforced by the fact that Zhukov was indicted for weakening party control ". . . of the armed forces," not "of defense."⁵⁷ Given Zhukov's apparent attack on the Higher Military Council, as well as its composition of party officials, it appears that the Higher Military Council was aimed more at reinforcing party control over the military than at providing a viable body for strategic leadership of the armed forces.

Another, but rather different Soviet source, provides details on the

membership and activities of what appears to be the same body in the early 1960s. This is the alleged diary of Colonel Olel Penkovskiy, who provided a great deal of information to Western intelligence agencies.⁵⁸ He described a "Supreme Military Council" chaired by Khrushchev as "Supreme Commander-in-Chief," and composed of three additional Politburo members (Kozlov, Mikoyan, and Suslov), Minister of Defense Malinovskii, the commanders-in-chief of the branches, plus several other military figures. This body was directly subordinate to the Politburo, met at regular intervals, and often acted ". . . as substitute for the Minister of Defense, making decisions concerning the least important matters."⁵⁹

This description specified a degree of involvement by senior party leaders unprecedented since the first years of the Soviet regime, when prominent Bolsheviks constituted a majority of the original Higher Military Council, and then of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, to keep watch over the "bourgeois specialists" recruited from the old Imperial Army.⁶⁰ However, given the state of party-military relations in the wake of Zhukov's removal, such an infusion of political leaders into a military body was not surprising. Further, the presence of four senior Politburo members, evenly balanced between the "reformist" and "conservative" tendencies of the party leadership,⁶¹ perhaps allowed this "Supreme Military Council" to handle some matters beyond the narrow boundaries of "development of the armed forces." In view of previous estimation that no formal body for leadership of the country's defense existed at this time, Khrushchev may have satisfied his penchant for intervening in the most minor matters by using the absence of such a body to justify his highly active role in this military council, and

then tried to present his defense policies to the full Politburo as faits accomplis, already established in a forum that the majority of the party leadership did not attend.⁶²

Soviet Strategic Leadership under Brezhnev

Reorganization of Leadership Bodies

This arrangement may have been deemed unsatisfactory for several reasons following Khrushchev's ouster. The Politburo representatives on the Higher Military Council undoubtedly were preoccupied with more important political questions than the professional military matters that this body handled. Both party and military leaders had expressed dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's tendency to intervene in all sorts of detail.⁶³ Yet, so long as the old arrangement continued, several senior party men were forced to involve themselves in such matters. Further, with no governmental agency primarily responsible for leadership of the country's defense, the full Politburo either had to accept decisions reached by a council composed of some of its members plus the senior military leadership, or itself take up a variety of very technical questions for which the majority of its members lacked special competence. Finally, the arrangement was ill-suited for either crisis management or command and control should war break out. That these problems brought certain structural changes is, of course, speculation, perhaps rationalization.⁶⁴

John McDonnell suggests a possible model of these structural changes which might have occurred in late 1966 or early 1967. The membership of the Higher Military Council was divided into two groups. The Politburo members were constituted as a Defense Council, a governmental committee

responsible for the leadership of the country's defense. The tasks and responsibilities of this body would be similar to those of the defense bodies in the past, particularly the Defense Committee of 1937-41.⁶⁵

The military members of the old Higher Military Council comprised a second body, now called the Main Military Council, which is responsible for leadership of the armed forces. Since the Main Military Council handles only specifically military questions, it may have been given greater professional autonomy, in that there may have been no senior party leader in this body. The Minister of Defense very probably chairs the military body, and he may not have been, at least during the late 1960s, a member of the Defense Council to which the Main Military Council is subordinate.⁶⁶

At the same time, or perhaps somewhat later, a third body may have been formally constituted as the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. This would not have been a policy-making body per se, but rather a command-and-control organ for strategic leadership in crisis situations, or in the event of war. More probable than not, the membership of this body is not modeled after the Stavka of World War II, but consists of most or all of the Defense Council, plus two or three highest-ranking officers of the Ministry of Defense,⁶⁷ thereby making it subordinate to the Defense Council, but superior to the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff and Main Military Council.

The Defense Council

There can be virtually no doubt that a body for "leadership of the country's defense" now exists. In 1969, a US State Department official described a Soviet "Defense Committee" as a ". . . limited National

Security Council."⁶⁸ Subsequently, a British authority referred to the same body as the "Defense Council."⁶⁹ Most recently, Raymond Garthoff, on the basis of his contacts with Soviet officials during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, has described a "Supreme Defense Council" as ". . . the highest body dealing specifically with military and defense matters."⁷⁰ Additionally, the existence of this body has finally been confirmed in the Soviet press.⁷¹

According to Garthoff, this body is chaired by Brezhnev; other members are Kosygin and Ustinov. All are full members of the Politburo, although Ustinov had had only candidate status prior to the Twenty-fifth Party Congress. The late Marshal Grechko was also a member of both this Council and the Politburo until his death in April 1976. While the Ministry of Defense continues to be represented (in the person of Ustinov), no professional soldier is likely now to be a member, although the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, possibly acts as the Defense Council's executive secretary.⁷²

Garthoff states that this council has dealt with SALT issues on a number of occasions and that the military and defense industry leaders, experts from the Academy of Sciences, and even Foreign Minister Gromyko may be called upon to attend. At the same time, Garthoff emphasizes that the key Soviet decisions on SALT remain the prerogative of the Politburo, and this qualifier presumably applies to defense policy in general. Yet, given the composition of the Defense Council, it is doubtful that a firm resolution brought with unanimous support from the Council would be rejected by the Politburo as a whole.⁷³

The Main Military Council

At the next policy-making level down, the body for leadership of the armed forces appears to be named the Main Military Council. A Soviet work published in 1967, and republished in 1969, states:

The most important questions of military policy are discussed (and decided) collectively at party congresses and CC plenums. Organs of collective leadership also exist directly in the Armed Forces in the form of the Main Military Council, the military councils of the branches of the Armed Forces, of military districts, groups, forces, and fleets.⁷⁴

This listing of the Main Military Council before and independent of the military councils of the branches suggests that it is superior to them, hence having the role and position held by the Higher Military Council under Khrushchev.

A second reference to the Main Military Council, implying its current existence, appeared in a Soviet publication in 1968, which in fact was a revised edition of the 1964 work providing the only "official" reference to the Higher Military Council following Stalin's death.⁷⁵ Here, a resolution of a Main Military Council in April 1962 is cited, while the Higher Military Council is no longer mentioned. At first glance this would suggest that a change in the name occurred between the period described by Penkovskiy (1960-61) and April 1962. However, it has been suggested that this is more likely a case of "rewriting history."⁷⁶ The reference to a Higher Military Council in connection with the Zhukov removal, which appeared in the 1964 edition, suggested by its phrasing that a body so titled existed at the time of publication, as well as in 1957. However, when the revised edition appeared in 1968, the body almost certainly was known as the Main Military Council, resulting not only in the deletion of the references to the "Higher" council

in 1957, but also in the use of the contemporary name for the body adopting a decision in 1962, perhaps some four or five years before the actual change took place.⁷⁷

This explanation has in its favor two virtues. First, it moves the change in name (probably accompanied by the downgrading of its membership and function) away from a period when there were some sharp clashes over political controls in the military,⁷⁸ to one when party dominance seemed unquestioned. Second, it ties this change into the reconstruction of a body charged with leadership of the country's defense, which presumably did not occur until late 1966 or early 1967.⁷⁹

Several years later in the spring of 1972, Krasnaya Zvezda carried a report on a meeting of the "Collegium of the Ministry of Defense."⁸⁰ This suggests that the Main Military Council is also called, or has been retitled the "Collegium" of the Ministry. For while it is true that not all the organs historically charged with "leadership of the armed forces" have been officially "collegiums" of the corresponding ministries (that is, with majority vote binding upon the ministers), the adjectives "collegial" and "collective" have been applied to virtually all of these bodies, and not since 1923 has there been a "collegium" that was not identical to the military council at that level.⁸¹

Membership in the Main Military Council probably comprises the senior commanders (the Minister, the three First Deputy Ministers, and the eleven Deputy Ministers), plus one or more leaders of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. Precedent would suggest that a senior party figure also sits in this body, but the party leadership may now see the situation as sufficiently stable to not

require the monitoring of the military beyond that which the Main Political Administration provides the party apparatus in any case. Given the need for military professional autonomy in specifically military matters, plus the fact that all important decisions affecting such matters as manpower levels and weapons procurement must be reviewed by the Defense Council, direct Politburo involvement may no longer be considered necessary, nor in fact, constructive.⁸²

The Main Military Council is directly subordinate to and "of the" Ministry of Defense. All the various administrative and organizational functions of the Ministry are decided by the Main Military Council, and implemented by the branches and major administrations of the Ministry of Defense, whose heads compose the Council. This body, then, is similar to a corporate board of directors, responsible for the development of the armed forces, and handles professional matters of ministry-wide significance. It is probable that inter-branch rivalries for allocation of missions, financial and material resources, and manpower, as well as implementation of inter-branch coordination, are settled at this level.⁸³

The Stavka

The "evidence" for the existence of a Stavka consists of a single present-tense reference to such a body in the Soviet Officer's Handbook, published in 1971. Here it states that each branch of the armed forces ". . . carries out tasks under the leadership of the commander-in-chief of this Service or the immediate direction of General Headquarters."⁸⁴ This is followed by a reference to the Strategic Rocket Forces as being ". . . put at the disposal of the Supreme High Command. . . ."⁸⁵ This suggests that there is a working command-and-control organ to prevent

the unauthorized, and insure the authorized use of nuclear weapons. While neither Brezhnev nor any other Soviet leader has yet been publicly designated the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the General Secretary of the party's Central Committee must be counted as the most likely individual to have equivalent authority. He has been identified as Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR; he is said to possess the leading role in the Politburo; and he alone of its members (save, of course, the Minister of Defense) has had a high military rank associated with his name, in fact being promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.⁸⁶ Last, and certainly not least, Brezhnev's recent designation in 1977 as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet gave him ex post facto recognition as the head of state--perhaps the most logical position for a Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Relationships and the Chain of Command

The relationship among the Defense Council, the Stavka, and the Ministry of Defense--to include its General Staff and Main Military Council--is one linked by personalities and mutual members, but separated functionally in terms of operational command and control on the one hand, and administrative-organizational control on the other hand. An illustration of the linkage and relationships is at figure 4-3.

The Defense Council, the Stavka, and the General Staff form the strategic hierarchy below the Politburo to the military commands and formations. The Ministry of Defense and its Main Military Council sit above the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and the major administrations of the Ministry in the administrative hierarchy. Therefore, the link from the Defense Council to the Main Military Council




Figure 4-3. Present Soviet Strategic Leadership

would formally be through the Stavka and the General Staff. However, since the Minister of Defense is also a member of the Defense Council, it is more likely that the link from the Defense Council to the Main Military Council would be most effectively handled by the person of the Minister of Defense.

In the strategic-operational chain of command, the General Staff would again be the creative working organ and laboratory of the Stavka, drawing up battle plans for the Stavka's approval and issuing the operations orders directly to the military commands. Of course, all of the Stavka's directives are subject to the approval of the Defense Council, but this is automatically accomplished as the Defense Council is already part of the Stavka.

Conclusion

It appears that following a void in strategic leadership for some twenty years after the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union has finally established an effective system of strategic leadership. The Defense Council, evolving from the State Defense Committee (1941-1945) and direct Politburo supervision, has become the body responsible for the leadership of the country's defense and addresses broad military, economic, ideological, and diplomatic problems similar to a "national security affairs council." It is superior to the Stavka, the highest organ for the strategic leadership of the armed forces, who issues directives through the General Staff to the military commands. The Stavka, then, is the Soviet correspondent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States. As such, the Soviet Union has provided a direct-linkage operational chain of command: Defense Council-Stavka-General Staff-Military Commands.

The Ministry of Defense retains its superior position over the military commands through its General Staff--the working organ of the Stavka--as well as through the Minister of Defense's position on both the Defense Council and the Stavka. The branches and administrative bodies of the Ministry of Defense execute the administrative and organizational functions under the supervision and control of the Main Military Council. The Main Military Council, then is the Soviet correspondent to the service secretaries of the United States. As such, purely administrative tasks are handled through one chain of command, while operational and strategic tasks are decided and executed through the other chain of command.

The Soviets are very much aware of the necessity to insure that the leadership disaster of June 1941 does not prevail if another war should occur. Brezhnev realizes the need to close all the gaps and reinforce or eliminate the weak links in the Soviet chain of command, as well as the fact that the first days of a future war would be too late to assemble the pieces of the jig-saw puzzle for leadership of the country's defense and military-strategic leadership of the armed forces. Failure to establish these systems in advance of a military crisis would, literally, be the same as sending a division into combat without its commander, but of course, on a much larger scale. Furthermore, the Soviets realize that their strategic doctrine--its image of war, military credibility and capabilities derived therefrom, and state of high combat readiness for defense of Soviet gains--could not possibly be the exponent of a war-winning strategy, nor the supporter of and insurance for its foreign policy, if the urgent needs of strategic leadership were not sufficiently met.

Notes

¹John McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," in Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, eds., Michael McGwire and John McDonnell (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1977), p. 66.

²Marshal Andrei Grechko, "Triumph of Leninist Ideas on Defense of the Soviet Fatherland," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 20 (October 1967), p. 37, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 66.

³Major General S. N. Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook, translated by the DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada, and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 13 (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Obrony SSSR, 1971; Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 2.

⁴Ibid.

⁵McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 67.

⁶Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii and Major General M. Cherenichenko, "On Contemporary Military Strategy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 7 (April 1966), p. 62, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 67.

⁷McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 70.

⁸Ibid., p. 72

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 70, 75.

¹²Ibid., p. 72

¹³Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 354.

¹⁴V. P. Morozov, "Some Questions on the Organization of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic War," Istoriya SSSR, no. 3 (May-June 1975), in JPRS 65,273 (1975), p. 34.

¹⁵"Closing Out the Column," Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 May 1975, in JPRS 65,089 (1975), p. 2.

¹⁶Major General M. M. Kir'yan, "The Superiority of Soviet Military Organization," Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 April 1975, in Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970-1975, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 143.

¹⁷Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, vol. 5, book 1, p. 164, cited by Morozov, "Some Questions on the Organization of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic War," p. 34.

¹⁸McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 69.

¹⁹Army General V. C. Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1975), in JPRS 65,167 (1975), pp. 40, 41.

²⁰Major General N. Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and the Fabrications of the Falsifiers," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, no. 3 (March 1974), in JPRS 61,911 (1974), p. 20.

²¹Marshal G. K. Zhukov, Memoirs and Reflections (Moscow, 1969), p. 279, cited by Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and the Fabrications of the Falsifiers," p. 20.

²²Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 354.

²³Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd ed., vol. 5, p. 248, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 76.

²⁴Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," p. 41.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁶KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh, vol. 6, pp. 12, 22, lists him as a member of the Stavka created on 23 June, but not of the reorganized Stavka of 10 July, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 89.

²⁷Army General S. Shtemenko, "Strategic Leadership During the War," Soviet Military Review, January 1971, pp. 46-47.

²⁸Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and the Fabrications of the Falsifiers," p. 20.

²⁹Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," pp. 42-43.

³⁰Morozov, "Some Questions on the Organization of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic War," p. 36.

³¹I. Dzhordzhadze's book review of Army General S. M. Shtemenko's The General Staff During the War, 2nd book (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Obrony SSSR, 1973), Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, no. 4 (April 1974), in JPRS 61,113 (1974), p. 71.

³²Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," p. 42.

³³Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and the Fabrications of the Falsifiers," p. 20.

³⁴Shtemenko, "Strategic Leadership During the War," p. 46.

³⁵Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," p. 42.

³⁶Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and the Fabrications of the Falsifiers," p. 20.

³⁷Army General S. M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), passim, but especially Chapter 6, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 76.

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⁴³Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, p. 202.

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⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Pravda, 7 March 1953, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 71.

⁴⁷McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 71.

⁴⁸James M. McConnell, Military-Political and Military-Strategic Leadership in the USSR (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses "Working Paper," July 1975), p. 216, note citing US Senate Committee on Government Operations, Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 25.

⁴⁹David E. Mark, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, "Statement to the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee," in The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 956, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 72.

⁵⁰Yu. P. Petrov, Stroitelstvo politorganov partiinykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsii armii i flota (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1968), p. 391, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 77.

⁵¹McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 77.

⁵²Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd ed., vol. 4, pp. 563-64, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 77.

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⁵⁴Marshal M. V. Zakharov, ed., 50 let vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1968), p. 478, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 77.

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⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 210-11, 232-33, 238-39, 293-94.

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⁶⁸Mark testimony, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

⁶⁹Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military's Influence on Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, vol. 22, no. 5. (September-October 1973), cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

⁷⁰Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," Problems of Communism, vol. 24, no. 1 (January-February 1975), cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

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⁷²McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

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⁷⁴A. S. Zheltov, ed., V. I. Lenin i sovetskie vooruzhennyykh sily, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1969), pp. 131-32, in McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

⁷⁵Petrov, 1964 edition, p. 507, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 81.

⁷⁶McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 80.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 259-78.

⁷⁹McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 81.

⁸⁰"In the USSR Ministry of Defense," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 April 1972, p. 1, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 81.

⁸¹McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 81.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 81-82.

⁸³Ibid., p. 84.

⁸⁴Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook, p. 109.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 May 1976, cited by McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," p. 91.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC UTILIZATION OF THE BRANCHES OF
THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

All the theory and precepts of Soviet strategic doctrine would be meaningless unless a viable military posture, capable of implementing that doctrine, was produced. The Soviet Armed Forces, in response to this need, is organized in accordance with the doctrinal precepts of how the Soviets intend to conduct a future war, should one occur. Strategic operations through nuclear-conventional balance provide the foundation for the utilization of each of the five branches of the armed forces. While each branch is designated with a role or mission based on its particular battlefield and organizational weaponry, the main strategic effort toward a war-winning capability will come about by joint operations, coordinated and planned by the Soviet strategic leadership.

In addressing the roles, doctrine, organization, structure, and strength of each of the branches, this chapter is divided into five sections: (1) Strategic Rocket Forces; (2) Ground Forces; (3) Naval Forces; (4) Air Force; and (5) Air Defense Forces.

Strategic Rocket Forces

Mission and Doctrine

The Strategic Rocket Forces constitute the main strategic force of the Soviet Union, with the mission of destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, economy, system of government and military control, and

groups of forces and naval fleets in theaters of military operations. In December 1959, the Soviets established the Strategic Rocket Forces as a main branch of the armed forces, commanded by a deputy minister of defense, and controlling all land-based missiles with a range over 1,045 kilometers (650 miles).¹ Since then, the Strategic Rocket Forces have been concerned with the training of personnel, the development of command and control and the logistics support systems, construction of launch facilities, deployment of new missile systems, and the integration and training of personnel to attain and maintain continual combat readiness.

The primary mission of the Strategic Rocket Forces is to destroy means of nuclear attack and key military, political, economic, and communications centers deep within an enemy's territory.² The Strategic Rocket Forces represent the Soviet Union's instrument for intercontinental nuclear warfare, and as such, their employment and their effect on the world balance of power are a matter of ongoing international negotiation and discussion. Ballistic missiles have substantial advantages over other types of weapons. They are easy to disperse and camouflage at the sites; they do not require large launch sites; and they can be mounted on mobile launchers. Such missiles are capable of striking objects in practically any region of the world, delivering nuclear payloads of enormous destructive force with great precision.³

The Strategic Rocket Forces are capable of inflicting powerful retaliatory strikes on an aggressor and destroying his vital installations: missile, air, and naval bases; they also have the capacity to ". . . liquidate the enemy concentrations of ground forces, his control centers, and the country's administrative and economic activities."⁴ Colossal

destruction is not the raison d'etre of the Rocket Forces, according to Marshal Grechko, but

. . . the unavoidable result of their operations, which, in cooperation with the forces of the other services, guarantees the achievement of complete victory over an aggressor.⁵

Command Organization

The Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces is responsible for the administrative and technical control of the forces and equipment under his command. He probably does not have operational authority; rather, he simply implements policy established by the Main Military Council. The organizational structure of the headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Forces, although less visible, is probably similar to that of the other armed forces branches. The Commander-in-Chief is assisted by a first deputy chief, five or six deputy chiefs, an assistant chief, and a Political Directorate chief.⁶ The major functional components of the headquarters consists of at least a Main Staff; Directorates for Rear Services, Rocket Engineering, Military Educational Institutions, Political Administration, and Combat Training; and probably a Chief Inspectorate. The directorates coordinate their activities at the Ministry of Defense level and with subelements in subordinate units. Organization within the Strategic Rocket Forces is probably on the basis of army, division, regiment, battalion, and battery. It is likely that a battery consists of a single ICBM, IRBM, or MRBM launcher.⁷

Structure and Disposition

The number of personnel in the Strategic Rocket Forces is estimated to be 375,000, an increase of about 265,000 since 1964. The Strategic

Rocket Forces have three categories of land-based ballistic missiles: (1) the intercontinental (ICBM), with ranges between 4,830 and 12,070 kilometers (3,000 to 7,500 miles); (2) intermediate (IRBM), with ranges of 2,415 to 4,830 kilometers (1,500 to 3,000 miles); and (3) medium (MRBM), with a range of 1,045 to 2,415 kilometers (650 to 1,500 miles).⁸ There are at least ten operational missile systems--seven ICBM,⁹ one IRBM, and two MRBM. The large ICBM force includes about 1,500 missiles capable of striking potential enemies anywhere in the world. The IRBM force numbers about 100 operational missiles, and the MRBM about 500.¹⁰

Four of the ICBM missile systems--the SS-X-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19--were developed in recent years. By late 1975, the Soviets had deployed small numbers of all but the SS-X-16. All three of the newly developed missiles have a MIRV-capability, permitting accurate strikes against separate targets. Additionally, several new ICBM systems may be under development. Most of the ICBM force is housed in underground silos, and all are capable of delivering nuclear warheads in the multi-megaton range.¹¹

The ICBM force is deployed in missile fields along the Trans-Siberian Railway, while the MRBM and IRBM forces are located mainly in the Baltic states, and western and southwestern regions of the Soviet Union. Other sites are found in the Caucasus and Turkestan.¹²

Ground Forces

Mission and Doctrine

The Ground Forces, with a strength of 1,825,000 constitute the largest of the five branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although experiencing a period of secondary status between 1955 and 1964, this branch

has again--since 1967--been the focus of expansion and reemphasis.¹³ Traditionally, Imperial Russian and Soviet armies have been characterized by great numbers. Today, the Ground Forces are highly modernized and well equipped, possessing great firepower and mobility. Both manpower and materiel thus combine to make the present Soviet Ground Forces the most powerful land army in the world.

The main combat power of the Ground Forces is centered in tank, motorized rifle, and artillery divisions which are deployed under combined arms commands and controlled through the Chief of the General Staff, with Ground Forces headquarters performing purely administrative and technical functions.¹⁴ Similarly, Soviet Airborne Troops, nominally an arm of the Ground Forces, are operationally subordinate to the General Staff.

Changes have been largely evolutionary in nature, based on new weapons and equipment, with some modifications in organizational concepts, and operational and tactical doctrine. One of the main shifts has been a return to the traditional reliance on ground forces. Thus, for instance, the addition of some twenty divisions has increased and heightened the relative value of the Ground Forces.¹⁵ Factors influencing these developments have been the growing threat of China, the increasing recognition that war without the use of strategic nuclear weapons--limited war--would be possible, and the acceptance of a possibility that a nuclear war might be limited to tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁶ Recent wars in the Far East and the Middle East have reinforced such thinking.

The Soviet leaders view an upgrading of the Ground Forces, in concert with an expanded navy and improved strategic air transport capabilities, as adding a desirable flexibility to the exercise of Soviet military power on a global basis. Increased availability of helicopters, armored

vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and surface-launched guided missiles has provided the Ground Forces with unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and firepower.¹⁷

The missions of the Soviet Ground Forces are deterrence, defense, and offense in the land theaters of military operations. The primary area in which these troops are to be employed is the territory of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact member states. The Ground Forces must neither allow the enemy to invade the socialist countries nor permit an aggressor to subvert the internal security of those countries.¹⁸ To achieve final victory, the Soviets not only must destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack and disorganize its interior, they must also completely defeat the enemy's main forces and occupy its territory, a role which inevitably falls to the Ground Forces. Thus, the main tasks of the Ground Forces are to annihilate the enemy's military formations through rapid offensive movements and to gain possession of vital installations and regions.¹⁹

Soviet military doctrine is based on the concepts that any major war will most likely involve the use of nuclear weapons (though not necessarily strategic nuclear weapons),²⁰ and that, since the initial stage will be decisive, massive forces-in-being at the outset and deployed across unprecedented distances will be required for a quick victory. Marshal Yakubovskii, then Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, declared in 1967 that

. . . along with the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union attaches great significance to developing and perfecting conventional combat means. Conventional means have not lost their significance. This further increases the ground forces' firepower and striking power, and their capability for combat with or without nuclear weapons.²¹

When this doctrine is applied to the European theater, the arena in which the Ground Forces are predominant, strategy calls for the rapid defeat of NATO forces and the occupation of Western Europe. The method will be to thrust through holes blasted in enemy lines by massive strikes on his strongpoints and reserve concentrations; the initial breakthroughs will probably be on the scale of a division front.²² The Soviets envision armored spearheads smashing through such prepared gaps and proceeding at high rates of speed into the enemy's communications zone (or operational rear), where they will destroy all reinforcements or reserve formations in a series of meeting engagements.²³ The brief, decisive campaign would be characterized by rapidly changing situations requiring flexible command and control systems and highly maneuverable troop units capable of coping with contaminated environments, of exploiting opportunities, and of remaining effective with a minimum of logistic support.

In conformance with this doctrine and its resultant strategy, the Ground Forces have prepared for a blitzkrieg offensive operation in north and central Europe.²⁴ Soviet forward forces in that area are trained and equipped for a short war. Divisions and regiments are fully mobile and have a good capability for independent operations. The ratio of combat-to-support troops is high. River-crossing equipment is abundant, and troops frequently practice forcing of water barriers--a significant feature of the European plain. Training for survival in radiologically and chemically contaminated terrain is part of the daily routine.²⁵

Organization and Structure

Within the Ministry of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces is a deputy minister of defense equal in status to the

CINCs of the other branches. His duties are essentially supervision of technical affairs and research and development, direct control of non-operational training, and supervision of Ground Forces administrative organs. He does not have direct operational control over the troops. Assisting him are a first deputy CINC, a chief of the Main Staff, who is also a first deputy CINC, several deputies, and an assistant CINC.²⁶ The operational chain to Military Districts will be discussed below.

The lack of operational control authority of the Ground Forces is not immediately apparent from its composition, which includes a Main Staff and several technical directorates. The Main Staff, however, apparently fills a traditional role of coordinating, planning, maintaining liaison with the General Staff on Ground Forces' matters, and acting as a consolidation point for the work of the Ground Forces directorates. After elaborating the mobilization requirements for the Ground Forces and analyzing the organizational needs of field forces, the Main Staff submits its recommendations to the General Staff.²⁷

Among the principal directorates of Ground Forces Headquarters are the Political Directorate, the Combat Training Directorate, the Personnel Directorate, and the Military Educational Institutions Directorate, all of which have counterparts at the Ministry of Defense level.²⁸ In addition, there are technical directorates for those troop components peculiar to the Ground Forces. These are expert, liberally-manned agencies which supervise and monitor technical aspects of their respective arms. They are responsible for research and development; they closely monitor the equipment procurement process, even to the extent of undertaking quality control inspections at production enterprises; and they

actively provide for special training of troop branch personnel.²⁹ The end result is that each troop component directorate acts as a service headquarters which prescribes the organization, equipment, tactics, and training for its troops, and operates the career management for its leading personnel.

The Ground Forces are divided into combat arms, special troops, and services. The combat arms are the firing elements, consisting of motorized Rifle Troops, Tank Troops, Rocket and Artillery Troops, Airborne Troops, and Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces.³⁰ Special troops are the combat-support forces such as engineer, signal, chemical, radio-technical, motor transport, railway, and highway troops. The services, which perform rear area support activities include supply, medical, veterinary, topographic, military transportation, finance, administrative, and justice units.³¹

Motorized Rifle Troops generally parallel the infantry and mechanized infantry of other armies. Because these troops constitute the basic arm of the Ground Forces, various agencies under the Ground Forces CINC, rather than one special organization, administer their affairs. These agencies prescribe motorized rifle and combined arms tactics and organization, prepare training schedules for motorized rifle as well as combined arms units, and administer motorized rifle schools and motorized rifle personnel. Logistics support for the Motorized Rifle Troops is provided by the other arms and services.³²

Tank Troops, on the other hand, have at their head the Chief of Tank Troops in Ground Forces headquarters, who is supported by a Main Directorate of Tank Troops, an intricate organization with all the trappings of an administrative headquarters. Tank Troop officers or generals

command armored units at all levels. Combined arms formations feature a special staff officer as chief of Tank Troops; he commands subordinate armored elements and reports to the combined arms commander.³³

Rocket Troops and Artillery is one of the most prestigious components of the Ground Forces or, for that matter, of the Ministry of Defense. Artillery troops have long held an honorable position in Russian military annals, and in recent decades the technological advances taking place in missile weaponry have enhanced that position.³⁴ Since missile armaments have also become important to the other components, missile equipment development is probably centered at the Ministry of Defense level. Nonetheless, a Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery is present in Ground Forces headquarters. His supporting administrative agency is large and contains a coordinating staff. In addition, chiefs of Rocket Troops and Artillery appear in the special staffs of combined arms units down to and including regiments. At regimental level, the enlarged title is a recent innovation; formerly, this official title was simply "chief of artillery."³⁵

Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces include anti-aircraft personnel directly organic to combined arms formations, exclusive of the aviation units of the front. They are administered from Ground Forces headquarters and serve under combined arms command in the field, with a necessarily close coordination with aviation, radiotechnical, and National Air Defense Forces elements in operational matters.³⁶

Airborne Troops are generally considered a component of the Ground Forces, although operational control is specifically reserved to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.³⁷ They would not become subordinate to a field command until committed by the Stavka. This

definite separation tends to impart to the administrative agency regulating these troops the status of a distinct branch of the armed forces, even if it is nominally subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces.

Special Troops include the personnel and organizations providing combat support to the combined arms field forces and also support to the other branches of the armed forces.³⁸ For this reason, they are centrally administered from directorates in the Ministry of Defense. Ground Forces headquarters nevertheless contains specialized directorates or departments in each of the combat support areas to deal with purely Ground Forces problems and conditions, and to act as a Ground Forces' administrative eschelon for the superior Ministry of Defense Directorates.³⁹ Like Special Troops, Rear Area Services active in the field forces also support the other branches of the armed forces and, therefore, are administered from various agencies in the Ministry of Defense.⁴⁰

The major operational combined arms commands in peacetime are the military districts within the Soviet Union and the groups of forces in Eastern Europe. These military districts are directly subordinate to the Stavka through the General Staff. In wartime, military districts can be transformed into fronts or can continue to function as territorial commands with most of their combat and corresponding support forces being shifted to field commands.⁴¹

Unless a theater command is established, the front is the largest field formation in wartime. It is a tactical and administrative unit, with size and composition subject to wide variation depending upon the mission and situation. Roughly equivalent to a US army group, a front

could be composed of three or four combined arms armies (fifteen to twenty divisions), one tank army (four to five divisions), one tactical air army, and other appropriate combat and support elements.⁴² Airborne troops could be attached to a front as required. Forces organic to the front headquarters could include conventional artillery, tactical nuclear weapons units, surface-to-surface, and surface-to-air missile units; also, engineer, chemical, signal, intelligence, and rear area support units in battalion or larger strength.⁴³

The combined arms army is also a tactical and administrative organization; it is the basic Soviet field army. A typical combined arms army would include four motorized rifle divisions; a tank division; an artillery brigade; missile units; and intelligence, chemical, engineer, and signal units.⁴⁴ By altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank divisions, and artillery and missile support, the army organization has flexibility for offensive or defensive roles and can operate in different geographical areas or under various operational restraints.

The role of the tank army, a heavily armored force of tanks and motorized rifle troops, is to rupture and penetrate enemy defenses and to exploit breakthroughs deep into the enemy's rear areas. This army is a tactical and administrative unit capable of independent operations, although its normal employment, like that of the combined arms army, is as a component of the front. The size of the army and its force composition is dependent upon its mission, the situation, and the area of operations.⁴⁵

There are three different types of line divisions in the field forces: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne.⁴⁶ The motorized rifle and

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
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tank divisions are the major combat and maneuver elements of the ground combat forces. Divisions are organized on a triangular basis. The motorized rifle division has three motorized rifle regiments, plus one tank and one artillery regiment; each motorized rifle regiment has three rifle battalions; and each battalion has three companies. The tank division forms around three tank regiments, of three tank battalions, of three tank companies, all with supporting units.⁴⁷ Three airborne rifle regiments are the nucleus of the airborne division. A fourth type of division found in a front is the artillery division; it consists of three artillery regiments, each containing three battalions of varying caliber weapons.⁴⁸

Strength and Disposition

The Soviet Ground Forces contain an estimated 1,825,000 personnel, more than double the size of the combined active US Army and Marine Corps. In addition, the Soviet Union has over two million trained army reservists who have served in the Ground Forces within the last five years.⁴⁹ Since 1967, the number of Ground Forces divisions has grown steadily from about 150 to about 168, broken down as follows: 111 motorized rifle divisions, 50 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. On the other hand, the personnel strength of the Soviet divisions is less than that of comparable US divisions: the Soviet mechanized division has 14,000 troops (US, 16,000); the Soviet armored division, 11,000 (US, 16,500); and the Soviet airborne division, 7,000 (US, 15,000).⁵⁰ A comparison of equipment inventories is shown at table 8.

TABLE 8

USSR AND US CONVENTIONAL EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES

	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>
Tanks	41,500	9,000
Armored Vehicles	37,500	22,000
Artillery	17,500	6,000
Mortars (heavy)	8,500	3,000
Helicopters	2,500	9,000

SOURCE: US Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, DDB-2860-40-78 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office 1978), p. 8-3.

Soviet tank divisions have about 325 tanks and their motorized rifle divisions may have up to 265 tanks. The ratio of tanks-to-troops in the tank division is very high--about 1 to 33; for US divisions, it is 1 to 51. In motorized rifle divisions, the ratio of tanks-to-troops is 1 to 53; for US divisions, it is 1 to 74.⁵¹

The Ground Forces line divisions are deployed approximately as follows:

1. Central and Eastern Europe (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany; and Northern, Central, and Southern Groups of forces): 31 divisions deployed in
 - a. East Germany: 20 divisions (10 tank)
 - b. Poland: 2 divisions (both tank)
 - c. Czechoslovakia: 5 divisions (2 tank)
 - d. Hungary: 4 divisions (2 tank)
2. European USSR (Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow Military Districts): 64 divisions (about 23 tank)

3. Central USSR (Volga and Ural Military Districts): 6 divisions (1 tank)
4. Southern USSR (Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts): 23 divisions (3 tank)
5. Sino-Soviet Border (Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern Military Districts): 43 divisions (about 7 tank).⁵²

Operations

The basic principle of Soviet operations is the offensive, and, in the application of that principle, Soviet combined arms formations will try to seize the initiative at the outset of the campaign, to penetrate the enemy's main defenses with powerful armored forces, and to sustain momentum deep into the enemy's rear.⁵³ They will direct high speed offensives over key terrain to subsequent objectives, surmounting obstacles and barriers as quickly as possible, while maintaining sufficient dispersion to reduce vulnerability to enemy nuclear strikes. The Soviets may subject enemy concentrations to nuclear attack; the advancing Soviet combat troops will then be expected to transit or bypass the resultant contaminated areas without serious reduction in the rate of advance.⁵⁴

The tactical concept presents the Soviet leadership with contradictions. Typical situations encountered by units using this concept include (1) attacks from the march; (2) movement along divergent axes; and (3) opportunities demanding the quick crossing of rivers, minefields, and contaminated areas.⁵⁵ All of these problems require unit commanders to exercise initiative and indicate that they should be vested with the authority to do so. Yet, at the same time, tight and effective control

of unit movement is essential to the sustained offensive. In an apparent attempt to meet these two requirements, the trend in Soviet tactical doctrine has been toward combined arms task groupings at the regimental and division levels to provide for independent operations.⁵⁶

Naval Forces

Mission and Doctrine

The Soviet Navy (VMF) is one of the five major branches of the armed forces, and its commander-in-chief is a deputy minister of defense on an equal staff level with other branch commanders-in-chief. Responsible for the defense of the maritime approaches to the Soviet Union, the navy also serves to project Soviet military power and political influence beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁷ Moreover, its weaponry is a significant factor in the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal.

Operational naval forces are organized into four fleet commands (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific)⁵⁸ and the Caspian Sea Flotilla.⁵⁹ The Main Naval Staff in Moscow directs the operational and administrative activities of these forces.

Currently, the missions of the Soviet Navy are (1) to maintain a strategic nuclear strike/deterrence system;⁶⁰ (2) to support Soviet Ground Forces;⁶¹ and (3) to support Soviet diplomatic initiatives around the world.⁶² In wartime, additional goals would be the defeat of hostile seaborne nuclear attack forces and the interdiction of enemy sea communications.⁶³ Because the four fleets are geographically separated by long distances, they must carry out their local missions independently, with worldwide coordination achieved by communications links to the

central headquarters.

The Soviets base their naval planning on the premise that at sea, the change from peace to nuclear war will be instantaneous. Anti-carrier warfare (ACW) will, therefore, require surprise nuclear missile attacks launched nearly simultaneously against forward deployed US and other Western aircraft carriers from submarine, aircraft, and surface vessels. These vessels would fire nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles at an enemy carrier to saturate its defense and assure its destruction.⁶⁴

Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) doctrine is that of defense in depth. To counter the Polaris submarine, Soviet ASW forces have moved from their coastal waters out into open ocean. These forces are to be backed by general fleet concentrations in strategic narrows and key straits, and by the full complement of coastal defense forces in home waters.⁶⁵

Organization and Structure

The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy exercises administrative and operational responsibilities through the Naval Headquarters Organization. He has as his assistants a first deputy CINC, a chief of the Main Naval Staff, who is also a first deputy CINC, a chief of the Political Directorate, six deputy CINCs, and an assistant CINC.⁶⁶ The various directorates of Naval Headquarters include Shipbuilding and Armaments, Naval Aviation, Coastal Rocket and Artillery, Hydrographic, Auxiliary Fleet and Emergency Rescue, Combat Training, Rear Services, Naval Construction, Naval Educational Institutions, and Personnel. An assumed Naval Infantry Directorate, responsible only for administrative affairs, and not for operational control, is believed to exist; also, a

directorates whose title and functions are unknown, may handle special projects, long-term planning, systems analysis, or operational readiness.⁶⁷

Directly subordinate to the Naval CINC are the four fleet commanders and the commander of the Caspian Flotilla. The seagoing forces are organized into eskadia (task force), deviziya (flotilla), brigada (squadron), and divizion (division).⁶⁸ The number of ships assigned to these subdivisions varies greatly depending upon the mission of the group.

Fleet air units are operationally subordinate to the fleet commander and administratively subordinate to the Commander of Naval Aviation in Moscow. The largest operational component is the air division, which is directly subordinate to the fleet commander of naval aviation, who works closely with the fleet chief of staff.⁶⁹ Below the regimental level, the organization of naval aviation is identical to that of air force long-range aviation units. Usually based near the coast, naval aviation personnel sometimes receive assistance in their patrol activities from long-range aviation.

Naval Infantry is administratively subordinate to the Chief of Naval Infantry in Moscow, but operationally under the fleet commander. Fleet naval infantry is organized into regiments which report directly to the deputy fleet commander for naval infantry. Naval Infantry regiments are organizationally similar to motorized rifle regiments. Because of their amphibious mission, they do not have an artillery battalion; rather, they consist of three infantry battalions, a tank battalion, and several specialized companies and platoons (signal, engineer, and chemical).⁷⁰

Strength and Disposition

The Soviet Navy has approximately 450,000 personnel, including 50,000 in naval aviation, 14,500 naval infantry, and 6,000 in coastal rocket and artillery forces. The division of manpower among the fleets is approximately equal, with the Northern and Pacific Fleets being slightly larger.⁷¹

In the last ten years, the Soviet Navy has not significantly increased the number of active ships, but has improved their quality by addition of SSMs, SAMs, and ASMs. These more powerful ships have replaced older, conventionally-armed vessels. Presently the Soviet Navy has 214 major surface combatants, 231 attack and cruise-missile submarines (84 nuclear), about 480 smaller combatants, 300 minesweepers, 160 amphibious ships and craft, 145 support ships, and 50 intelligence collectors (AGI), plus nearly 650 combat aircraft.⁷²

The Northern Fleet has the most powerful strike capability of the four fleets. It is well armed with modern SSBNs; cruise-missile, ASW, and long-range patrol submarines; and ASW cruisers for its ACW, ASW, and strategic deterrent missions. The Baltic Fleet has many small combatants and minesweepers, but few major combatants. Its capabilities are suited for support of ground forces operations and maintenance of control over the Danish Straits.⁷³ Although it has relatively few submarines, the Black Sea Fleet has more ASW cruisers and destroyers combined than any other fleet, as well as larger numbers of destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. A considerable force of amphibious craft is also available to the Black Sea Fleet. The Pacific Fleet appears to be

ill-equipped to fulfill its ACW and ASW missions, especially in the distant waters of the Indian and Northwest Pacific Oceans, for it has only a relatively few SSBNs, cruise-missile and ASW submarines, and ASW cruisers.⁷⁴ The general disposition of ships and aircraft by fleet, in 1975, is shown at table 9.

TABLE 9
DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS

	<u>Northern</u>	<u>Baltic</u>	<u>Black Sea</u>	<u>Pacific</u>
Ballistic-Missile Submarines	62	0	0	19
Cruise-Missile Submarines	39	0	0	17
ASW Submarines	14	0	0	2
Long-Range Submarines	50	17	6	19
Medium-Range Submarines	10	45	31	28
Coastal-Patrol Submarines	0	11	11	0
Aviation Ships	1	0	2	0
ASW Cruisers	7	2	5	3
Gun Cruisers	3	4	4	3
Missile Destroyers	9	12	16	10
Destroyers	13	14	14	18
Missile Corvette	3	5	4	0
Frigates and Corvettes	58	101	80	56
Small Combatants (Missile)	25	40	35	35
Small Combatants	25	105	25	47
Amphibious Landing Craft	29	35	51	38
Minesweepers	65	107	65	75
Intelligence Ships	16	8	15	15
Aircraft	430	240	184	91

SOURCE: Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 9-6, 9-7, 9-8, 9-9.

Operations

The Soviet Navy demonstrated its ability to control its resources while performing divers' tasks over wide areas in two worldwide naval exercises--OKEAN 1970 and 1975. About two hundred units participated in each, but OKEAN 1975 featured more vessels outside their normal operating areas and two reconnaissance satellites which may have been

launched to assist in command and control.⁷⁵ Despite the worldwide scope of these maneuvers, the principal concentrations were in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

Since 1972, the navy in general has improved its shiphandling ability. It still has shortcomings, however. Although Soviet seamen have practiced alongside replenishment in the last few years, they still lack the equipment and skills of their counterparts in the Western navies.⁷⁶ Typically, Soviet ships are not cruising, but are at anchorage or in port; only during exercises or during periods of alert do most ships leave their anchorage or port. In periods of world tension, or when US carrier task forces enter the Eastern Mediterranean or Norwegian Sea, the Soviet Navy makes a point to trail the US carriers.

To implement its ACW doctrine, the navy relies principally on a combination of attack submarines and aircraft. The sophisticated "Charlie" class submarine, with submerged-launched SS-N-7 missiles, is important in ACW operations. With its high speed and nuclear power plant, this submarine can approach within thirty miles of a carrier task force and fire its missiles with little outside help.⁷⁷ The naval aviation ACW force consists of the Backfire and the Badger (B, C, and G) aircraft. The aircraft can launch their missiles at ranges of fifty to three hundred miles from a carrier task force.⁷⁸ In the coastal areas of the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, surface forces assist the aircraft and submarines.

Nuclear-powered attack submarines and ASW cruisers, as well as other large surface ships and ASW aircraft are the main forces on which the Soviet Union relies to defend against SSBNs. The helicopter carriers

Moskva and Leningrad, and the aircraft carrier Kiev, which the Soviets describe as ". . . large anti-submarine ships,"⁷⁹ allow the Soviet Navy for the first time to take helicopters and aircraft to sea. The helicopters locate submarines, and the ASW cruisers or their escorts attempt to destroy the submarines.⁸⁰

Naval infantry operations are primarily amphibious landings from the sea or across large rivers. Unlike US Marine operations, the second wave of Soviet amphibious assault troops are not naval infantrymen, but Ground Forces' motorized rifle troops.⁸¹ Thus, the 14,500 naval infantry are responsible for opening the beach to the ground troops, who will carry on the battle.

Air Force

Mission and Doctrine

The Soviet Air Force (VVS) constitutes one of the five branches of the armed forces and its commander-in-chief is a deputy minister of defense on an equal staff level with the heads of the other four branches. The Air Force itself has three distinct components, each with a separate mission: Long Range Aviation (LRA), composed of a long-range bomber force and a medium-range bomber force; Front (Tactical) Aviation (FA); and Military Transport Aviation (VTA).⁸² The long-range bomber force is one of the three strategic attack forces, or triad, which can carry out strikes against the North American continent. The medium-range bomber force could be used against targets near the Soviet Union, namely, Western Europe and China. Front Aviation is the largest component and includes fighter, fighter-bomber, and light bomber aircraft. Its primary mission is to provide counter-air, interdiction, and ground

attack in support of front operations of the Ground Forces. Military Transport Aviation is responsible for providing airlift support to all branches of the armed forces, and for coordinating all VVS military transport activities.⁸³

The overall mission of the VVS consists of destroying important objectives in the enemy's rear, supporting ground and naval forces in their operations, conducting air reconnaissance, dropping airborne troops or airlifting ground forces, transporting materiel, and evacuating the sick and wounded. The primary mission of Long Range Aviation is the bombing of strategic targets--enemy ICBM sites, nuclear arsenals, naval bases, strategic bomber bases, and war industries--but it also performs other tasks. LRA often serves in a reconnaissance role, and in recent maneuvers, it provided support for theater forces.⁸⁴ The general mission of Soviet Front Aviation is to provide air support for ground operations. This general mission may be broken down into the following basic tasks: (1) to gain and to maintain air superiority in the decisive areas of operation; (2) to isolate the battle area and to restrict the movement of enemy troops, equipment, supplies, and reserves; (3) to provide close air support to the ground forces; (4) to provide the ground forces with helicopter transportation and other support required for heliborne operations; and (5) to provide air reconnaissance for the ground forces.⁸⁵ The mission of Air Transport Aviation is to provide a rapid means of transportation for troops and equipment, and to evacuate the sick and wounded.⁸⁶ VTA also plays a major role in supplying arms, equipment, and if necessary, troops to friendly foreign governments.⁸⁷

Soviet doctrine emphasizes the importance and necessity of cooperation among the branches in both strategic and tactical operations. In the event of a nuclear war, the Air Force and the Ground Forces, immediately following or in conjunction with the launching of nuclear strikes by the Strategic Rocket Forces, would execute rapid offensive movements to annihilate the remaining enemy forces, to occupy enemy territory, and to prevent attacks on Soviet territory. The doctrinal requirements for joint actions between tactical aviation and ground forces is reflected in the subordination of tactical air armies to combined arms commanders.⁸⁸

In recognition of the importance of surprise in modern warfare, Soviet strategists insist on a high degree of combat readiness, particularly in tactical aviation and air defense units. Offensively, surprise is also considered a vital element in tactical strikes. To adapt further to anticipated conditions in fluid, fast-moving, non-positional theater warfare, the Soviets have worked to improve the mobility of the Air Force. They practice moving air units from one base to another, and train flight and support units to operate from sod airstrips. In addition, they have systematically raised the number and quality of the aircraft in Military Transport Aviation.⁸⁹

Organization and Structure

The Commander-in-Chief has administrative control over the three major components of the VVS. In other words, he is responsible for organization, manning, training, and logistical support. Operational control of the components varies: Long Range Aviation is under the Stavka; tactical air armies of Front Aviation are subordinate to the

front commander of the ground forces in wartime, and the commander of a military district or group of forces in peacetime; and aircraft of Military Transport Aviation assigned to various branches of the armed forces are under the operational control of the commander to whom they are assigned, while the rest are probably under the Stavka.⁹⁰

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is a deputy minister of defense and is assisted by a command element consisting of two first deputy CINCs, one of whom is Chief of the Main Staff of the Air Force; a chief of the Political Directorate; and nine deputy CINCs. Two of the deputy CINCs command two of the components of the VVS: one is Commander of Long-Range Aviation and the other is Commander of Military Transport Aviation. There is no evidence to identify a deputy CINC for Frontal Aviation. Five other deputy CINCs perform the principal administrative and support functions: Combat Training, Military Educational Institutions, Rear Services, Aviation Engineering Service, and Personnel. The remaining two serve in unidentified capacities; as of 1975, one was a marshal of aviation and the other a colonel general of engineers.⁹¹

The Main Staff of the Air Force has all the attributes of a conventional coordinating staff, and as such, its primary functions are the creation of plans affecting the air arms--training, mobilization, research and development, operations, etc.--and the preparation of VVS input into the planning of the General Staff. It contains at least six functional directorates which resemble their counterparts in the General Staff.⁹²

The largest operational unit in the Soviet Air Force is the air

army. Air armies vary in organization, composition, and strength according to their mission and location. Those assigned to western and eastern borders are generally larger than those in central areas. In wartime, at least one air army is assigned to each front. The organizational chain of command runs from the air army through the air division, air regiment, and air squadron to the flight.⁹³

The air army is organized, in general, on a triangular, hierarchical system. Thus each air army may have three divisions, each division three regiments, each regiment three squadrons, and each squadron three "links." A link equates to the US Air Force flight and consists of four aircraft.⁹⁴ Although this structure may be the norm, it is not necessarily the rule: the size may vary in order to meet specific operational situations. Thus, for example, there may be four squadrons in a certain regiment or four regiments in a certain division.

The air regiment is the basic administrative and tactical unit. Regiment size varies according to the type of aircraft, mission, and location. It may be composed of a single type aircraft--fighter, fighter-bomber, or reconnaissance. The number of aircraft in a regiment may range from about thirty-two to fifty, depending on the type aircraft and the number of reserve. A regiment is likely to have thirty-two bombers or up to forty-two fighters or fighter-bombers. In addition, it may have ten to fifteen aircraft as rotational reserve.⁹⁵

Front Aviation includes front air armies located in the peripheral areas of the Soviet Union and in the groups of forces in Eastern Europe, and units subordinate to the military districts in those areas of the Soviet Union which are not the first line of defense. Each military

district has an air force commander whose staff and air units are the nucleus of a tactical air army if one does not already exist. A tactical air army might be composed of a bomber division, two or three fighter-bomber divisions, two fighter divisions, and units of reconnaissance, transport, and helicopter-transport aviation in regimental strength.⁹⁶ Again, the units are flexibly tailored depending on the requirements of a given situation. In wartime, elements of one or more tactical armies may be allocated to a front. The tactical air army stationed in East Germany has over one thousand aircraft, while the Seventeenth Air Army in Kiev Military District has about one hundred.⁹⁷

In the system of cooperation between a front and its supporting air army, the front commander is assigned his tasks in accordance with the general plan. He then confers with the air army commander (the front commander's deputy for air) concerning the role that air units are to play in the operations, and he allocates specific responsibilities concerning: (1) type and degree of air support for each phase of the operation; (2) priority for execution of air missions; (3) areas for aerial reconnaissance; (4) air support for secondary axes of advance; and (5) ground forces support for airfield construction and defense.⁹⁸

Long Range Aviation is composed of units of intermediate-range jet bombers, long-range jet bombers, and long-range turboprop bombers. Such bombers are still considered effective for strategic missions since they have been modified to carry air-to-surface missiles which can be launched outside the immediate air defense network of a target. At present, the Soviets have only a limited in-flight refueling capability using twenty modified Tu-16/Badgers and fifty modified Il-4/Bisons for this purpose.⁹⁹

Long Range Aviation, although administratively controlled by VVS Headquarters, is under the operational control of the Stavka. Although the Soviets have maintained their long-range bomber force, its relative importance has diminished with the deployment of intercontinental and shorter-range ballistic missiles.

Military Transport Aviation is organized into regiments. Present inventory includes medium and heavy transports. Additional transport assets are included in units assigned to other branches of the armed forces. These transport assets are under the operational control of the forces they serve, but they could be released to augment VTA if the need arises. Moreover, the civil aviation fleet would probably augment Transport Aviation during time of war.¹⁰⁰ Most VTA units are deployed in European sectors of the Soviet Union.

The airlift capacity of VTA is estimated to be two airborne divisions, depending on the distance of the mission and the amount of equipment carried. The maximum operational radius of action with a maximum payload is probably between 1,930 and 2,495 kilometers (1,200 and 1,550 miles). It appears that the Soviets can airlift two airborne divisions (about 14,000 men) over a range of 480 kilometers (300 miles), or one airborne division 1,610 kilometers (1,000 miles).¹⁰¹ In airborne exercises, the Soviets have been transporting only one airborne division.

Strength and Disposition

The Soviet Air Force (excluding fighter aviation of air defense and naval aviation) has about 450,000 personnel--a decrease of about 60,000 since 1965. There is also a reserve of over 300,000 men.¹⁰² The operational aircraft strength of the VVS is estimated at over 10,000 aircraft

and helicopters, which of course, does not include the aircraft assigned to Air Defense Forces. Long Range Aviation has a total of about 855 aircraft, including 135 long-range bombers (Tu-95/Bear, M-4/Bison), 650 medium bombers (Tu-16/Badger, Tu-22/Blinder, Backfire B), and 70 tankers (Tu-16/Badger, M-4/Bison). Seven hundred light, 800 medium, and fifty heavy transports comprise the Military Transport Aviation, which also includes some 320 helicopters. Front Aviation has approximately 2,900 helicopters and 4,500 tactical aircraft, of which nearly three-fourths are made up of MiG-17/Fresco, MiG-21/Fishbed, Mig-23/Flogger, and Su-7/Fitter.¹⁰³

Long Range Aviation is organized into three armies--two in western USSR and one in the Far East along the border with China. Seventy-five percent of the 785 combat aircraft are based in European USSR. Most of the rest are stationed on the Chinese border. The LRA also has staging and dispersal points in the Arctic.¹⁰⁴ Of the sixteen air armies of Front Aviation, four are stationed in Eastern Europe, and twelve in military districts inside the Soviet Union. Approximately one-half of the Front Aviation aircraft are oriented toward Western Europe and about one-fourth toward China. The largest air army, stationed in East Germany, has over 1,000 aircraft. This represents almost one-fourth of the whole tactical air force.¹⁰⁵ Most Military Transport Aviation units are deployed in European USSR.

Air Defense Forces

Mission and Doctrine

The National Air Defense Forces (PVO Stranny) is one of the five branches of the armed forces, and its commander-in-chief is a deputy

minister of defense on an equal staff level with the heads of the other four branches. All means of air defense of the home territory of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations--early-warning networks, surface-to-air missiles, interceptor aircraft--are combined in a single, self-contained system under the centralized control of PVO Stranny Headquarters in Moscow. The territory to be defended is divided into sixteen air defense districts, ten of them in the Soviet Union and six in the other Warsaw Pact nations.¹⁰⁶

Even though PVO Stranny is defensively oriented, the capabilities of Soviet Air Defense Forces lend themselves to offensive action. In such a case, air defense fighter aircraft, missiles, and artillery could support other forces in the attack. The operational branches of PVO Stranny are fighter aviation, anti-aircraft rocket troops, and the radiotechnical troops.¹⁰⁷ The threefold mission is reflected in the PVO Stranny organization from the highest level to the operational position.

The mission of PVO Stranny is to defend the country and its armed forces against enemy air attack and aerial reconnaissance by destroying, diverting, or otherwise neutralizing enemy aerodynamic, ballistic, and space objects while they are still airborne. At the present time, the main task of PVO Stranny is to ward off surprise air attack and to insure the uninterrupted operation of the national economy, the organs of state control, and the combat capabilities of the armed forces during combat operations.¹⁰⁸ More succinctly stated, the National Air Defense mission is to

. . . prevent penetration by enemy means of attack into the air-

space of the country and to prevent his nuclear attacks against the most important regions and objectives of the country and against groups of Armed Forces, missile troops, air and naval bases; areas of the location and organization of strategic reserves, materiel storage bases; control points; communications; and other important objectives.¹⁰⁹

Inherent in this objective of PVO is the task of supporting military operations of the armed forces. Accordingly, PVO shares in the mission of gaining and maintaining air superiority over the battlefields.

As Soviet military literature emphasizes the preparation for nuclear war, writers on Soviet military doctrine consider the frustration of a surprise enemy attack as the main and immediate task of the armed forces.¹¹⁰ The main element of strategic defense against enemy nuclear attack is the PVO Stranny, which therefore must remain in a constant state of combat readiness.

The Soviet Union has been steadily upgrading its strategic defenses to lower the chances of successful penetration of Soviet airspace. The Soviets feel that uniform coverage of the entire USSR could not assure reliable, effective protection against nuclear strikes and would only result in the dispersion of PVO strength, allowing the enemy to penetrate Soviet airspace with greater ease. Therefore, they aim to provide protection for the most vital and important regions and objectives and concentrate PVO resources on a priority basis near and along potential main avenues of approach to these targets.¹¹¹

In a future world war, great destruction and high levels of radioactivity in PVO areas are probably inevitable. In order to cope with modern conditions, Soviet air defense doctrine asserts that PVO must have (1) a high level of mobility and maneuverability; (2) dispersed assets and concentrated firepower; and (3) instant, accurate communica-

tions. In Soviet words, the combat operations of PVO will be distinguished by ". . . great activity, fluidity, and continuity," as continuous action by PVO Stranny is deemed a necessity until ". . . complete destruction of the air enemy is achieved."¹¹²

The anti-aircraft missile troops are the backbone of the active means of air defense. Soviet doctrine calls for the development of SAMs capable of destroying enemy airborne aircraft at sufficient distances and altitude to prevent the enemy from employing air-to-surface missiles against important targets.¹¹³ Fighter Aviation will apparently play a considerable role in the air defense system for at least the next few years. Improving interceptor capability with better missiles and radar should allow fighter aviation to conduct successful combat operations against enemy airborne craft at any altitude. The radiotechnical troops of the PVO Stranny are continually upgrading their personnel and equipment in order to keep pace with the technical advancement of other arms. An important goal is the development of jamming devices for effective use against guidance systems of manned and unmanned air attack systems, as well as anti-jamming devices for Soviet radars.¹¹⁴ Some Soviets see the perfection of the automation system as the most important problem for PVO Stranny. In addition to the requirements for anti-air (PVO) and anti-missile (PRO) defense, the Soviets recognize and address the problems and necessity for anti-space defense (PKO).¹¹⁵

Organization and Structure

The Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of PVO Stranny, is assisted by an administrative element consisting of a first deputy commander-in-chief, a chief of the Main Staff, and a chief of the

Political Directorate, ten deputy CINCs, and an assistant CINC. Three of the deputy CINCs command the distinct subordinate elements of PVO: the Commander of Fighter Aviation of PVO, the Commander of Anti-aircraft Missile Troops, and the Commander of Radiotechnical troops. Three others support the principal administrative and support functions: the Deputy CINCs for Rear Services, Armament, and Combat Training.¹¹⁶ The remaining four serve in unidentified capacities; as of 1975, one was a marshal of aviation, two were lieutenant generals of aviation, and the fourth was a lieutenant general of artillery.

PVO Stranny is organized into air defense districts. This territorial system is designed to achieve maximum effectiveness; factors bearing on the organization of districts include the potential threat, mission, geography, lines of communication, resources available from military districts and other military services, and priorities.¹¹⁷ These air defense districts do not coincide precisely with the military districts or civilian administrative divisions. Two districts mentioned prominently in the Soviet press are the Moscow Air Defense District and the Baku Air Defense District. Both contain major headquarters units with elaborate facilities; the Moscow district is preeminent. The air defense districts coordinate air-based and ground-based means of destroying the air enemy. These districts and the PVO command are linked with the air defense forces of the groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and with the air defense network of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.¹¹⁸

Fighter aviation is made up of regiments of fighter-interceptor aircraft. These regiments are, in turn, broken down into squadrons,

flights, and sections. A section consists of two aircraft, and a regiment contains as many as forty-two fighter aircraft. Anti-aircraft missile troops form regiments, which are further divided into missile battalions, batteries, sections, and teams. The radiotechnical troops are also organized in regiments, battalions, and companies. There have been reference in the Soviet press in recent years to anti-space and anti-missile defense, but there is no indication that these have been separately organized. They are probably functions of specialized units of the PVO anti-aircraft missile troops.¹¹⁹

Deployment of the airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft Moss in 1975 added a new dimension to the air defense capability (assuming a "look-down" capacity, among other advances) and a new organizational complexity, the details of which are not yet clear.¹²⁰ The AWACS aircraft could operate under either central or local control.

Strength and Disposition

Soviet strategic air defense is the most massive and extensive in the world, consisting of some 550,000 troops, more than 5,000 radars for early warning and ground control intercept, some 2,600 fighter-interceptors, and almost 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, located at over 1,000 sites.¹²¹ In addition, the Soviets have deployed 64 Galosh anti-ballistic missile (ABM) launchers at four sites around Moscow.¹²²

The Soviet Union has an elaborate and comprehensive three-tier radar early-warning system designed for defense in depth. The first section of it stretches from offshore in the Arctic Ocean in the north down to a line from Warsaw-Moscow-Omsk-Novosibirsk-Irkutsk-Vladivostok.

An eastern line extends from coastal Bering Sea regions southwestward through the Maritime Provinces and west to the Afghanistan border. A southern line covers approaches to the Soviet Union from the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, and the Caspian Sea.¹²³ The Warsaw Pact air defense system on the western approaches is of unprecedented density. About 10,000 SAMs are deployed along the borders and the remainder in selected areas of the interior around major cities. Active air defense sites ring both Moscow and Leningrad. The Moscow complex consists of two concentric rings. In addition, Moscow is the only city in the world with an ABM system.¹²⁴

Operations

The active, operational elements of the PVO Stranny systems are the early-warning and tracking radars, the weapons systems--missiles and interceptors--and the direction and control network. It is most likely that control centers operated by the air defense district headquarters coordinate the detection and tracking radars, select and commit weapons systems, and conduct localized air battles.¹²⁵ Under the supervision of these centers, fire control centers launch the missiles and fighter direction centers guide interceptors to the targets.

Although the control center can decide whether to commit missiles or interceptors in a specific tactical situation, long-standing Soviet practice has been (1) to engage attacking aircraft or aerodynamic missiles at extreme range with interceptors; (2) to harass them enroute to the target with a controlled mix of fighters and SAMs; and (3) to rely on the missile sites for point defense of the target areas.¹²⁶ PVO Stranny headquarters in Moscow exercises centralized control through

command centers in various strategic locations such as Moscow and Baku.

The Soviet air defense interceptor force has all-weather capability and can intercept targets at medium and high altitudes. Low-level intercept capability has been limited but is being improved by the introduction of newer interceptor types; low-level air defense is currently entrusted to the missile forces.¹²⁷ Deployment of the Moss, with a possible "look-down" capability, also affects this capacity. Moss's potential for early warning and airborne command and control will also enhance the overall air defense operation. PVO operations continue to emphasize (1) improved command and control by extending early warning, increasing the accuracy and speed of disseminating tactical information, and developing flexibility for concentrating air defense fire and for rapidly shifting fire as priorities change; (2) enhanced kill probability by achieving higher rates of fire; and (3) greater durability of extended operation by maximizing the chances of survival under modern suppression weapons.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The basic tenets of Soviet strategic doctrine attempt to provide the Soviet Armed Forces with the necessary military posture to achieve the desired aims of a future war. Being oriented toward a war-winning strategy, the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces are organized and structured based on their respective primary battlefields of a future war, and on the capabilities of their specific weapons systems. Thus, the combined efforts of all the branches through joint operations, and not the absolute primacy of any single branch will provide the Soviets with the means to fulfill their strategic objectives.

The Ground Forces, the most numerous branch, are the most significant in theater warfare. The Air Force is predominantly prepared to support the Ground Forces, but also retains a visible strategic bombing capability. The Air Defense Forces are committed to the protection of the homeland and the rear assets of the other branches. The Navy has been expanded from its mission of coastal defense to sailing the world's oceans; its ballistic missile fleet adds to the offensive power of the Strategic Rocket Forces, whose ICBMs represent the first line of Soviet military power. Each of the branches is dependent on the operations of most or all of the other branches to accomplish its mission on its particular battlefield or theater of operations.

While each of the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces is assigned specific missions and roles in the event of a war, the basic strategic orientation is directed toward joint operations. Each branch's role is different but dependent upon the mutual support it receives from the other four branches. Each branch is reinforced and/or directly supported by all of the other four branches, with no one branch operating completely independent of the rest. The combined arms concept--applied mostly to the tactical operations of the Ground Forces--is but an extension or encapsulated form of the entire strategic concept of joint operations by the Soviet Armed Forces.

The amount of operational control and detailed planning by the Stavka and the General Staff--and not by the commanders-in-chief of the respective branches--is directed at providing the most effective means and capabilities available to bring about the required ends through joint operations. Given this, independent branch operations would be

less practical and even more difficult for the Soviet Armed Forces, especially when considering that logistical allocations are controlled at the Ministry of Defense level, with only coordinating directorates at each of the main staffs of the branches. Detailed planning at the General Staff level can render effective joint operations at the strategic level, but this detailed planning can hinder the tactical operations of units, especially at division level and below, when line commanders encounter obstacles and unexpected conditions not addressed in the high level operations order. Thus, this detailed operational planning at the high levels insures a more effective strategic flexibility, but can preclude tactical flexibility.

Given their perception of total war and the strategic operations and tasks therein, joint operations provide the Soviets with the most viable means of implementing their war-winning strategy. Additionally, the Soviet system of strategic planning and leadership would make it difficult for the individual branches to pursue independent operations at the strategic level. Soviet perceptions on the conduct of war dictates the need for nuclear-conventional balance to attain the aims of the war. Both the need for a quick victory and the possibility of a protracted conflict would require a unidirectional and well coordinated plan of action.

Notes

¹U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, DDB-2680-40-78 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 12-3.

²Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 246.

³Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 104.

⁴Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook, p. 109.

⁵Ibid., p. 110

⁶Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, p. 12-3.

⁷Ibid., p. 12-4.

⁸Ibid., p. 12-2.

⁹Defense Intelligence Agency notes eight systems, including the aforementioned dismantled SS-7 and SS-8, and excluding the SS-X-16.

¹⁰Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, p. 12-3.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 12-4.

¹³Ibid., p. 8-1.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Erickson, Soviet Military Power, p. 71.

¹⁷Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, p. 8-2.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹V. Rabichev, "The New Face of the 'Queen of the Fields'," an interview with Army General I. G. Pavlovskii, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense P. Mikhailov, in Nedelya, no. 11 (10-16 March 1975), in JPRS 64,562 (1975), p. 6.

²⁰Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, p. 8-2.

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³⁵Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, p. 8-3, 8-4.

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⁴⁰Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, p. 82.

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⁸⁸Colonel I. Timokhovitch, "Air Force Cooperation with Ground Forces in a Front Offensive Operation," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, no. 7 (July 1977), in JPRS 69,740 (1977), p. 39.

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¹⁰⁷Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook, p. 115.

¹⁰⁸Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 108.

¹⁰⁹Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 251.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Soviet strategic doctrine has brought about a military posture which provides not only a credible deterrent value, but also an effective defensive value. It attempts to strike a balance between deterrence and actual war performance value without an overreliance on one or the other. It gives the Soviet Union the capability to respond to various levels of threats, while maintaining its self-proclaimed role as the "pillar of world peace" and the leader of the world socialist revolutionary movement. Soviet strategic doctrine, as it evolved through the Khrushchev regime, and was transformed during the Brezhnev regime, is based on the Soviet image and conduct of a future war and the threat this poses to Soviet national security; it is not based on the political utility of war, nor initiation of a war as an instrument of policy.

Under Stalin, war with the West was inevitable, since the West was surely to resist the tide of the historical process to socialism, and thus it would seek to destroy the socialist acorn lest it take firm root and grow. This "inevitability of war" theme, while a real concern of the Soviet leadership at that time, was used quite effectively to portray a state of constant emergency to support various national drives. This, in conjunction with the use of terror within the Soviet Union at that time, became a viable means of the party's consolidation and legitimacy of power. Despite the advent of the nuclear age and the dramatically changed geostrategic environment following World War II, Soviet strategic

doctrine remained very much the same by 1950 as it had been in 1940. Basic doctrinal needs had not been met during the "period of Stalinist stagnation," as military thought was stifled.

One of the principal foundations for Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the West was that war was not necessarily inevitable, but indeed, preventable. Nuclear warfare would be such that there would be little distinction between the victor and the vanquished. Also, Khrushchev was confident that the United States was not the bellicose nation it was perceived to be, especially since the United States had the means to obliterate the Soviet Union during the continuing crises of the cold war, but had chosen not to do so. This, in conjunction with Khrushchev's defense-spending policy for reduced forces-in-being and the eradicated role of conventional forces in a nuclear war, brought him to opt for strategic inferiority through a small, "cheap" nuclear missile force.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union was left without a war winning strategy, despite the image of war portrayed by military strategists. Since a short war was seen as the only realistic contingent, smaller forces-in-being were required and absolute strategic primacy was placed in the newly formed Strategic Rocket Forces, which in effect, became the "only" branch of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military posture brought about by Khrushchev's strategic doctrine was incongruent with the image of war. Khrushchev sought deterrence alone without any viable means and capabilities to provide for an adequate defense if deterrence failed; it was a policy of deterrence with no deterrent value.

Khrushchev's overreliance on deterrence could lead to nowhere except

fatalism and passivism as it bypassed war-winning defense strategies, objectives, and capabilities. His judgements were based on narrow probabilities, not the worst-cased possibilities demanded as a starting point for an effective strategic doctrine. Khrushchev's approach, while it sought a return to orthodox Leninism, failed to consider Lenin's statements that negotiations with the West were possible only from a position of military strength.

While Marxism-Leninism certainly injects unusually tense hostility into Soviet policy-making, it does not blindly propel the Soviet Union toward war or the assumption of great risks. Soviet leaders would not be prone to unleash the terrible might of their--and therefore our--military power on the basis of theoretical probability of military victory. Increasing Soviet reliance on the forces of internal revolution and the "relation of forces in the world arena" as the means to eventual communist victory in the world militates against a preoccupation with purely military solutions. War had become utterly inexpedient as an instrument of extending either Soviet control or communist rule, and as such, it had been relegated to a reserve position as the ultimate defensive recourse of the Soviet state. Use of a preemptive strike by the Soviet Union under Khrushchev was not possible from a position of such strategic inferiority and would have led to a Soviet defeat. The end result of Khrushchev's policy was a deterrent posture which was not credible, and a military posture which was not effective.

After the Cuban Crisis of 1962, Soviet leaders resolved never to depend on strategic inferiority and/or deception. Since the drive toward strategic superiority would have spurred the United States to expand

its nuclear arsenal, the Soviets drove toward a parity motivated by decreasing the relative power of the United States, rather than increasing the relative power of the Soviet Union toward superiority. In addition, the size of Soviet arsenal must be viewed not only in terms of its strength vis-a-vis the United States, but also in terms of the growing and formidable threat posed by the Chinese against the Soviet Union. This Chinese threat includes both national security and ideological polemics, the former of which is of the utmost and vital concern to the Soviets.

The Soviets contend that capitalism, by virtue of its intrinsically aggressive and expansionist tendencies, would seek to destroy the Soviet Union were it not for the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and detente supported and reinforced by a strong military posture derived from a realistic strategic doctrine. This merging of the foreign policy with strategic doctrine enables the Soviets, in their view, to be the pillars of world peace and stability. They emphasize that war is a continuation of politics once the war has begun, and strongly attempt not to confuse this tenet of Marxism-Leninism with another question, close to this but not the same, regarding the admissability or inadmissability of war as a viable instrument of politics. Additionally, the Soviets point to the tremendous hardships which would be encountered if socialism were to be born out of the aftermath of a nuclear war. Again, the ideology does not provide for adventurist gambles, or taking risks which would jeopardize Soviet gains, internal stability, and national security.

Future wars could arise out of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism, giving birth to total general war, civil wars, and wars

of national liberation. The latter two, reflecting Soviet acceptance of the possibility of limited war, enable the Soviets to continue their revolutionary role toward socialism, while avoiding total war. If a total war did emerge, the Soviets would then pursue the elimination of capitalism and would attempt to bring about a meaningful victory--one which would destroy capitalism, and at the same time, preserve and sustain socialism. This would be accomplished, hopefully--though not assuredly--through a short war which requires sufficiently large forces--in-being at the outset of hostilities. Should this approach prove unsuccessful, the Soviets realize the need to take all necessary measures for a protracted war well in advance of such a possible conflict.

The possibility of protracted war, the need to finalize war aims and victory, and the inherent requirements of a flexible response for limited and local wars have brought the Soviets to a strategic posture of nuclear-conventional balance with the capability to respond to various levels of military intensity rather than an all-or-nothing response to threats of varying intensity. The military capabilities derived from the strategic doctrine, as it evolved from 1966, were brought about to fulfill the new doctrinal requirements for winning a war if war could not be prevented by deterrence and detente. The strategic posture brought about under Brezhnev is based on the return to a war-winning strategy, and is predicated on the capabilities of the potential adversaries, not their intentions; it is based on possibilities, not probabilities, to provide the means adequate for insuring the defense and security of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet nuclear arsenal is composed to provide a sufficiently

large second strike capability following a possible surprise attack by the United States, which would then allow the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces to conduct their strategic operations. Conversely, the relative size of the Soviet arsenal also provides the Soviets with a first-strike preclusive capability aimed at destroying the US ICBMs and strategic bombers, if they felt certain that the United States was preparing to strike. The response, however, would be one derived from the demands of national defense and under conditions of war, or the apparent certainty that war is imminent. To consider such a first strike under conditions other than these would require a gross gamble by the Soviets that virtually the entire land-based arsenal of the United States would be totally destroyed, and that the United States would not use its SLBMs in retaliation, if indeed, only a partial or token retaliation against Soviet cities. The assumption and theoretical probabilities required for such a Soviet strike can not provide the Soviet leaders with a necessary degree of certainty of virtually total success, and as such, they probably would not launch such a strike unless the required degree of certainty could be established. Unless the United States posed a direct threat to the survival of the Soviet Union, the risks of a premeditated first strike would be too great for the Soviets to consider it as a viable means of policy implementation.

Soviet mobilization plans are based on the requirements for a quick victory, as well as for a protracted war. Large manpower reserves will bring the three categories of units up to the strength required for the desired extent of response. Materiel assets are stockpiled and sheltered to provide the continuous supplying of troops until the industrial sector

is fully converted to a wartime arrangement.

The Soviet population is prepared politically and militarily. The political messages are aimed at instilling a sense of Soviet patriotism and emphasize the defense of the motherland. These themes help to continue the constant state of emergency which perpetuate the legitimacy of party power and policy, again, a kind of modern and modified version of war communism. These political messages remain constant, with only the means of indoctrination differing during pre-induction, in-service, and post-service training. The messages are clearly aimed at increasing the Soviet citizen's and soldier's resoluteness to defend his country. Should these constant and repetitive messages result in boredom, then the party also benefits in a negative sense as the citizens and soldiers turn off all political messages, particularly external ones. The Soviet leadership must be aware that to employ military forces for actions other than those which are obviously defensive--those threatening Soviet national security--will present a contradiction in the minds of the soldiers and could seriously affect their morale and combat effectiveness.

Military training is psychologically oriented rather than performance oriented. It is aimed at conditioning the soldier's will and alleviating his apprehensions regarding actual combat conditions. Universal military training provides the Soviets with an economical means and viable alternative to maintaining the excessively large forces--being required to accomplish the goals of a future war--quick or protracted--as perceived by the Soviet image and conduct of war.

The Soviets realize the need--lacking at the beginning of World War II--for government bodies to provide leadership of the country's

defense and leadership of the armed forces. They are very much aware of the necessity to insure that the leadership disaster of June 1941 does not prevail if another war should occur. The strategic doctrine requires a system of leadership which can direct the unified efforts of the nation on the one hand, and the military on the other hand, through extraordinary powers. The Defense Council, the Stavka, and the Main Military Council are such bodies welded together by the political and military position held by Brezhnev as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The branches of the Soviet Armed Forces are structured and organized in accordance with the precepts of Soviet strategic doctrine and the capabilities derived therefrom. Each branch is but a part of the whole, and not a separate entity unto itself. The absolute strategic primacy of the Strategic Rocket Forces--while still the first line of Soviet military power--has been replaced by a more balanced approach toward nuclear-conventional balance in order to attain the foreseen objectives of a future war and achieve a meaningful victory.

Each branch is reinforced and/or directly supported by the other four branches. All branches are under the operational control of the Stavka rather than their respective commanders-in-chief so that joint operations--essential to the accomplishment of strategic goals--can be effectively implemented through the high-level detailed planning and operations orders. The structure and strategic utilization of the five branches as a single strike force, rather than that of independent services, reflect the Soviet view on the conduct of a future war and the need therein to bring about a meaningful victory through nuclear-conventional balance. Also, considering the Soviet views on the possibility

of limited wars--even limited-nuclear wars--the structure and roles of the branches of the armed forces provide the Soviets with the means to respond in accordance with the posed threat through strategic and tactical tailoring.

The current posture of nuclear-conventional balance reflects a Soviet strategic doctrine based upon the needs of national defense. Had the Soviets been considering a posture based solely upon the strategic nuclear weapon aimed at the elimination of the West in an inevitable war through a premeditated first strike, it is unlikely that they would have considered the possibility of a protracted war, made the effort, and allocated the resources for increasing conventional armaments. Instead, they would have devoted much larger proportions of their defense resources toward the nuclear arsenal alone to increase and insure the required degree of certainty for a first-strike success, and disregard the conventional posture once and for all. There would be no need for nuclear-conventional balance, bodies for strategic leadership, or extensive defensive preparations for mobilization and military training of the population, if Soviet strategic doctrine was directed at inevitable war and policy implementation through a first strike.

To say that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and detente is simply a means to maintain a status quo is not totally correct. The Soviets still recognize their self-appointed role as the leader of the world revolutionary movement to socialism. Any denial of this role would imply their doubt or rejection of the inevitable historical process toward socialism, and ultimately to communism. With this, they consider the survival of the Soviet state as essential to the advance-

ment of the historical process. Without a strong Soviet state, the world revolutionary movement would be suppressed and totally eliminated by the capitalist powers, who would seek to halt the tide of history and to perpetuate the survival of their system.

Through peaceful coexistence, the Soviets are able to encourage the world revolutionary movement as its strategic posture provides an active buffer which prevents the United States and the West from effective and spontaneous interference in civil wars and national liberation wars. At the same time, the Soviets realize that they must pursue their foreign policy objectives in an ostensibly passive manner by not directly initiating the revolutionary movement in any particular country or region, but by encouraging and supporting it once it has been initiated by the indigenous revolutionary movement. One qualifier must be placed on this assessment: that the Soviets would not jeopardize their security nor the continuing revolutionary movement by encroachment toward areas which are vital to the national interests of the United States.

Thus the credibility of Soviet deterrence and the potential war-winning capability of the Soviet military posture support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union by providing the means to at least frustrate those efforts of the United States aimed at preventing the tide of the historical process, and at the same time, to insure the survival of the Soviet Union--still the foremost consideration of the Soviet leadership. In effect, the Soviets want to remove and prevent a "free hand" by the United States, thereby preventing any automatic reversals of the world revolutionary movement, and reducing the risk of a potential confrontation between the two superpowers.

It is unlikely that the Soviets will embark upon a plan for a continuous series of revolutionary activity, since this would seriously jeopardize detente--an essential prerequisite for Soviet national security and ideological objectives. Instead, they will most probably seek out opportunities which they could legitimize under detente, for example, support for the movements in Africa in response to criticism by the United States attacking human rights in the Soviet Union. Also, they can be expected to increase activities during periods of isolationist tendencies in the United States and Congressional restraints on the President's role in foreign policy and utilization of the military, such as that following US activity in Vietnam. Additionally, opportunities will be exploited in areas and regions where the foreign policy of the United States is vague and not precisely defined. Finally, the revolutionary movement will probably be oriented more toward supporting indigenous factions which are pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese, and at least indifferent to the United States, rather than seeking radical communist rule.

Without an effective military posture capable of winning a war, the credibility of Soviet deterrence would be the same as it was during the early 1960s under Khrushchev. The changes in and maturation of Soviet strategic doctrine have resulted in the war-winning capability of the Soviet military posture to insure Soviet deterrent credibility, which in turn supports Soviet foreign policy objectives. Through the revised strategic doctrine, perhaps the Soviets have discovered a long-term means of providing for both their foremost national interest--the survival of the Soviet state--as well as their ideological interest--the leadership of the world revolutionary movement.

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